The many worlds interpretation of QM (contd.)
Recorded at Imperial College, London (1987), featuring Frank Tipler. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.
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mw0003641-cc-b_p- Format
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- Michael Wright Collection
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- Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy
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0:00 The problem is, they're talking about the way the function of the universe as a whole, you include in that these systems as subsystems, as tiny subsystems. These objects which von Neumann would want to call observers. If something like an observer is floating around, it has to be erased with the human, presumably going to be used by something later on. So if we assume that human beings are one of these things called observers, then this must actually contain this wave function within the machine. In other words, we would expect that the wave function of the universe would be brought into one day's uniqueness. And so, any statement about quantum cosmology, which is currently highly correlated with the model of time, is absolutely meaningless. So, in this position, I think this is why it's hard to see what this thing could even mean.
2:30 So, in a sense, give something like any word. So, another way for experiments, for interpretation, try to make use of the superposition principle at the realm of quantum cosmology. It's described to you. In fact, in putting it in a nutshell, there are different sorts of conventions. Well, I would disagree with both of those. I would say there wouldn't be any experiments. In principle, we could run this one computer experiment. We can't do it now, but in principle, we could do it. That would be a disagreement with the experiment. And if great quantum induction is actually done by intelligent beings, this machine is intelligent beings, so it would be more possible for it to come back together, and that would be an experimental confusion. The other thing is... I kind of have a challenge there. I don't really see it because you have quoted a really fine text, but the Turing test that you referred to, after all, acquired facts that have been done in computer terms, is trying to decide whether to give you the machine or the human. So there's, yeah, an adjustable boundary there. If you only give me three seconds in front of this guy, I might think it's a human. If you give me longer, I'll eventually figure out a deal with the machine. There's no clear boundary. Well, that's, that's a problem which I will throw back to my point. That was really my point. It seems to me that this issue of deciding whether it's, you can make an experiment to settle... The choice between the many worlds of interpretation or standard fundament. That whole question of decidability throws you back on one of the problems. There's no clear boundary. You either have to decide with the weight packet at some scale, or you have to decide that there's a certain point at which you're making a task that's sufficiently complicated. You do not know whether your Atari is dead or alive. It's never intelligent.
5:00 50 or 100 million could reassemble space. I'm saying I think it's done at the level of pure like a few hours of the physics, but it exalts the physics. There is no other physical that says it is either this day or that day. Well, again, it depends on the detail. I mean, it's like a reversible and I suppose that they're square. They try to use a scale. Well,
10:00 The thing is that you can actually go through the same procedures, the same formal procedures, by themselves. For this T, the fluid variables, the singularity here, the scale factor of the universe,
12:30 and this chosen equation of state, and this arbitrary choice of others, you actually have one free parameter, which is a genuine physical parameter, namely an infinity assumption. And then you have to decide what that means for the radius of the scale factor, which would be negative, I assume, and it depends.
15:00 As I said, this is really physical because this, essentially, is your home arm. Since you've got all these possible R-max, a huge number is invariant. And what I'm suggesting to you is that there is no reason to think that, in fact, this would even be a real kind of weight function. As a matter of fact, H-bar over 1 is just high. So, okay, let me get a place function in a given time is going to have a support.
17:30 This universe is physically a delta function, dispersive, so that delta function just explodes out of the entire universe. That doesn't mean you can solve the problem. Look at this quantum mechanical problem that you get, and we expect, and then this equation, if we find out what happens, explodes.
20:00 The point of these rules, you are led naturally to expect that the solution to the flatness problem is opposed in the inflationary model.
22:30 In the inflationary model, we are not, we are very close to flatness. Say, the later good models, the new inflation, I think they're going to be flatness. Maybe there's people who want to move up into the sixth. Which means since we can't measure that number in a factor of two, there's still an amount of experiment and improvement to do and we can see if that prediction is worn out. But what this says is that it's not merely a question of one part of 10 to the sixth, it's an arbiter of extreme equivalence. The overwhelming probability is extremely close to one. So you should be able to go far below omega equals one minus 10 to the sixth. In practice, we can't possibly say we're going to be able to test that difference, but the difference is there. Again, it really comes from the way we're looking at that.
25:00 One of the things that convinced Gallaudet and convinced Galileo that the De Furnican was to say, is that when people were actually trying to find eclipse signs on the moon, they were almost always like Galileo. They hand in their duck feet and the earth cannot move. It is ridiculous to carry out this philosophy. So, I would say an argument at this stage, and here's one that's better than one I've ever seen, is to play with it anywhere else. Suggest different sorts of pictures. Play in different places. And it would be more effective for some other mechanism. We'll propose, perhaps, that we're going to have to deal with more expanded reality.
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