Who Invented the Copenhagen Interpretation & When?

0:00 Thank you. Let me begin by saying that it means a lot to me to be here for this conference in Jim's honor, and especially to be able to talk about the topic I wanted to address today, because because there's a deep sense in which I owe Jim a real debt in work that we're talking about here. And not only is this a continuation of a long-running conversation between Jim and myself about the photopodic interpretation and the history of the photopodic interpretation, but it's also the case that this specific paper owes its origin to Jim. More specifically, it was two years ago, I believe, that we were reading Mara Bellers on the Dialogue in the PBS Reading Room the other day, and I remember quite vividly one day, and Jim asked this question. He said, by the way, Heisenberg introduces the use of the term, Kopenhagen Interpretation, was one paper. Does anybody know of any earlier use of the term? this is like one of the bolts out of the blue you're going to say no, I don't remember any other earlier use of this and this just set off a whole train of thought that is eventuated in this paper so what do I want to try to argue here in this paper the basic claim I want to try to put forward in this talk is that what we have most of us come to regard many of us come to regard of the Copacabana Interpretation, A, has much less to do with Gore's use on the interpretation of quantum mechanics that we have long thought and that legend would lead us to think, and B, that what we have come to regard as the Copacabana Interpretation is importantly to be

2:30 understood as in some important measure a somewhat self-conscious invention of the post-war period an invention for which I think Heisenberg was chiefly responsible, but an invention of the eventual success of which was then reinforced by the appropriation of this version of a Copenhagen point of view by a diverse group of other physicists and philosophers, chiefly Bohm, also Feyerabend, Hansen, and most importantly Hopper. here today is to persuade you, A, that what we have come to regard with the colonial interpretation has less to do with foreign views than many of us have long thought, and that what passes through the colonial interpretation is perhaps an invention by people from Heisenberg . I think it's important that we start getting some of these historical questions about the Copenhagen interpretation for a variety of reasons. One is simply that there is a lot of new interest in the history of the Copenhagen interpretation, and I just put up here on the board a list of some recent work that speaks to this issue in one way or another. These papers being primarily papers aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation from a somewhat more systematic point of view. A list of some recent works that have engaged the Copenhagen interpretation from a more historical point of view, but the larger point here is just there is a lot of new issues in So all the more reason why we want to get clear about the relationship between Bohr's point of view and complementarity, which I want to call, let's say, gravity, I'll call Bohr's point of view, complementarity, and get clear about the relationship between that and what it passes to the coconut. So, to begin with, I want to talk a little bit about what is or is not Ford's view about interpretation of the commentary.

5:00 And time being, in short, let me be a little bit dogmatic here and invite questions for any of these later on. So, just to sort of summarize some of the more polemical points that I'm trying to make here, is I don't think there is a unitary phenomenon in the interpretation of the commentary. between the points of view of Gore and Heisenberg on interpretation. More specifically, and we now get to some of what are some of these differences between Gore and Heisenberg, I do not think that Gore is in any sense to be understood as an instrumentalist or an anti-realist. I think Heisenberg was very self-conscious and had the kind of positivist laws that Gore was not. I don't think there's any justification whatsoever for a branded war, any kind of a subjective idealist. I think I'm going to try to persuade you that though Heisenberg wants to assign an important role in Quanterell to the observer in the observer's subjective aspect, but never a part of the war's interpretation program. And specifically, no kind of subjective idealist. or did not believe in anything like creation and measurement. And perhaps the most important signal of the differences here is that I think Ford's interpretation on the end is no class interpretation, but Heisenberg's interpretation makes a new sign. So, what is Ford's interpretation? Well, again, proceeding somewhat dogmatically, will walk us, try to walk us through several steps and for the sake of time I think I'll just concentrate on the first, maybe the first five steps here in the screen, my version of the story about what is the complementary interpretation. But I want to advertise right from the very start step one, an important part of my story about the law and complementarity, that I'm convinced that for war, entanglement is where it all means, entanglement is where it all means. But to get to the full complementary interpretation, we're going to walk through a few additional very important parts of war for a broader program. And most importantly, and let me highlight this idea of advertising, most importantly is getting clear about what war meant by

7:30 classical descriptions or classical concept. Because I think there's a lot of, there's an about what Ward intended was quite an important part of his story about how to interpret the complementarity. So to start with entanglement, and let me start by talking about the situations before the introduction of Ward's complementarity interpretation, which takes place basically in the coma lecture in 1927. I want to make the claim that entanglement is where it all starts, and everybody's going every act by saying, well, the way that the term entanglement wasn't around in 1927, it's only introduced by Schrodinger in 1935. Surely it can have been the case that there was any kind of self-conscious awareness of just as the deep fact that I wanted here in 1927. A lot of you can argue at the moment rather dogmatic that this is quite false. In fact, I've been convinced for quite some time that though it only comes to be termed in 1935 by Trillinger, that what we might more generally term an anxiety about the way in which classical assumptions about the mutual independence of interactive systems will have to be denied in a future quantum theory, that that anxiety is actually there from a very, very early day. And indeed, I think it's there already from 1915. On this work in Einstein's first paper on photon hypothesis, you're all familiar with the, I trust that you're familiar with the broad outlines of Einstein's argument in the 1905 paper when he introduced the photon hypothesis through this famous entropic analogy where he says that in the beam regime, the radiation field behaves as if it was composed of mutual corpuscle-like carriers. the magnetic energy. And the evidence for that is that the radiation field satisfies the Boltzmann principle. Well, what does it mean to say that the radiation field satisfies the Boltzmann principle? Well, what it means to say is, and what Einstein explains right there in the paper, is that what it means to say is that the entropy of the radiation field is applicable. But, again, as he goes on to say in the paper, what that means is that to say that the entropy

10:00 is additive if s equals k log w is to say that if we are thinking about the joint probabilities for two of these corpuscle-like carriers of electromagnetic energy in an occupied specific region of the basements, to say that the entropy is additive if entropy is s equals k log w is to say that the joint probabilities factorize. specifically. But what he also understands, and he understands this as a way of capturing what for him is going to be an important part of his sort of intuitive notion of what's corpuscular, his behavior, and his mutually independent passion. But as he also goes on to stress very clearly, this is going to be true only in the Bean regime. And the full understanding of the full top form of the micro-fibration will, of course, involve some some kind of denial of that fact about the radiation in some fact, some has yet been a demonstration. I think already there we find there's glimmering to this anxiety that some kind of compromise on classical notions about mutual independence of quantum systems will be part of the full story, but not clear. Further evidence for how well-entrenched was an awareness of the problem of entanglement by 1927 is to be found, again, in a work of Einstein, this an unpublished work of Einstein. Moore did a coma lecture in September of 1927. In May of 1927, Einstein gave a talk with the Lynn Academy of Sciences and the manuscript of that part, not as far as the proof state, and then at the very last moment was withdrawn from publication. Why was it withdrawn from publication? Because Einstein discovered at this late stage that his own best attempt at a hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics failed to satisfy what he took to be a necessary condition on any adequate more fundamental theory. And what is that condition? It's our little trend here. He says that my, you know, a satisfactory fundamental theory should be such that the function through which we represent whatever it would take to be the physical reality be such that the joint state factorizes. And he found that this is not true in his own fundamental theory.

12:30 And he couldn't find a way around that, so he withdrew the paper on publication. But Einstein's worrying about whether or not the joint state that would categorize takes place in a context where there's already been a rather wide-ranging discussion of this emerging property of the quantum theory. This comes to the fore especially clearly after the discovery of those Einstein statistics get clear about what this is going to imply about the way we think about the individuation of the quantum systems. But there's also a lot of experimental things that's being done in the early 1920s that represents a kind of early exploration of these peculiar quantum correlations that we have another one in the name of the traces of the evidence of entanglement. Especially important on the experimental side was the discovery in the very early 1920s of the and also the experiments like the Bode-Geiger and complex climate experiments which overthrew the Bohr-Kammer-Slater theory. And it's not often well enough understood what was really the issue here. We remember the issue there as one about whether or not energy is conserved only statistically. But actually, another deep fact of the Bohr-Kammer-Slater theory is that it actually assumed the kind of statistical independence of the properties of photons either emitted from or absorbed by atoms under my change of state. Well, anyway, here's one further example. There's lots of evidence to this kind of one to pull out in this period. Let me just pull out one here. This is a letter that Bohr wrote to Tiger in 1925, short day after the Tiger experiment. He says, I was quite prepared to learn that our proposed point of view about the independence of quantum processes, he's referring to the VKS theory here where he's making an assumption about the mutual independence of separated, means transition processes to separated atoms, he says, I was quite prepared to learn our proposed point of view about the independence

15:00 of quantum processes in potential processes. of separated atoms would turn out to be wrong, not only were Einstein's ejection very disappointed, but recently I have also felt that an explanation of collision phenomena, especially Ram's average results in the penetration of soil like ponds and their atoms, presents difficulties for our ordinary spacetime nature similar to those presented by the simultaneous understanding of interference phenomena and a coupling of changes in state of separated atoms and organization. In general, I believe that these difficulties exclude the attention in the ordinary space-time description of the phenomena to such an extent that, despite the existence of coupling, conclusions of a possible propulsive mutual radiation lack on its initial basis. Well, anyway, so, again, somewhat dogmatically assertive, the point is that there's a context here in which a sensitivity to that aspect of the quantum world that we're going to come to designate that entanglement was already extremely well-developed within the kingdom of 1927. Against that background, then, I invite you to read with me these very famous words from the color lecture where Einstein first introduces the notion complementarity. And let's go looking for entanglement here. It's not hard to find it. What does he say? Now, the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of an observation not to be neglected. This point is simply a paraphrase in our modern idiom that a system in an interaction with measuring apparatus is an entangled pair. Accordingly, an independent reality of the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomenon or the agencies of observation. This situation has far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, the definition of the state of the physical system is ordinarily understood claims of elimination of all external disturbances. that any observation would be possible, and above all, the concepts of space and time lose their immediate sense. On the other hand, if in order to make an observation possible, we permit certain interactions with suitable statements in the measurement, not belonging to the system, and as they do establish the statement, the system is actually made up if possible, there is no question of polarity in the sense of the word. The very nature of the common theory thus forces us to regard the space-time for the in the plain of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theory as complementary but exclusivity in the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition

17:30 respectively. Now, let me pause and make two comments about this passage in this homo lecture that have caused unfortunate confusion in this consideration. One is, of course, many people cite that first excerpt as justification for attributing for a very strong kind of anti-realism. But, especially once we become sensitive to the work that his intuitions about a fondant angle of our doings, I think it's pretty clear that his point here is not to deny that there's an atomic reality. So the emphasis in this last sentence, and in reality, the ordinary existence of observation, the emphasis belongs not on the word reality, the emphasis belongs on the word independent, that's the point, not that there's no quantum world, this point is that the object, the measuring instrument, form, the name of the pair. And so we have to think about that as an indissolver there, and an opinion. The second observation that has to be made about this, yet there's a lot of confusion on this in literature, is that at first reading, it seems as if here we are confronted with a very different notion of complementarity from that which is often said more dependent later on, namely the idea of complementarity, in the relationship between observables represented by non-commuting operators, whereas here he talks about a relationship between space-time description of claims of causality, but Earth is that? Well, I mean, one thing is that it's very helpful to appreciate the extent to which Bohr had grown up in a very confident philosophical environment and to appreciate the way in which is employing a very specific complement vocabulary here. The real point I want to make is that there is no change in Moore's understanding of the nature of complementarity in 1927 through the past in 1935, as, for example, Arthur Fine and Mara argued in a classic paper there, and Mara argued in the book. Already the Como for a later stage makes the connection between this

20:00 between that and what is, to us, the more normal version of complementarity. He says, a general specific relation exists between an action and a part of the definition of space, time, energy, and a part of the simple, symbolic expression of the complementary nature of the space-time I'll give time to get some questions to talk about that, try to unpack the connection that we're trying to instruct here. But still, again, speaking dogmatic, I want to make the point that he connects these two different, seemingly different notions of complementarity already in the same notion of complementarity. Well, anyway, another point to be noticed here, before I take this away, is that, in a manner that's quite typical for Bohr, when he's talking about complementarity in whatever it is that's novel about the situation in the quantum world, you'll notice he's not talking about observers in their subjective aspects. He's always careful to avoid doing it. He always uses expressions like this, agencies of observation, to make the point that whatever's going on here that's in the novel has nothing to do with the subjective consciousness of the observer, but instead has something to do with the physics of the interactions between the object in question and the measuring instruments regarded as physical systems. So the point is a physical point, and again, it's a point of pain. Sorry, should we just say what, what's the closest to the physical? Well, that's actually an important hermeneutic question, what the quantum posture itself means here. And let me just beg off on that for a moment. I mean, my temptation here is to, I mean, what I like to try to do is to put together a coherent story and try to read backwards, and I don't know if that's the right hermeneutic principle. going to be informed, and try to read backwards to see if it's possibly someone for an obscure or a idiot. Well, anyway, how do we get, so let's assume, for the sake of argument, that this is where the story starts with, this point about the object of the agency to operate and forming a entangled pair. How do we get from that to the full-blown complementarity and interpretation of quantitative

22:30 We have to take this detour to Horne's doctrine of classical concepts. What is Horne's doctrine of classical concepts? Well, to understand that, we have to start with a point that he mentioned many times about what he terms objectivity and unambiguous communication. For Horne, objectivity is unambiguous communication. It's virtually a necessary position on any possible science of nature. So he says, for example, in the Schultz part, it's decisive to recognize that however far the phenomena transcend the scope of the classical physical explanation, the count of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms, the argument is simply that by the word experiment, we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and therefore the account of the experimental arrangement and the results of the observation must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable applications of paranormal and classical physics. He's got this idea that objectivity is unambiguous communicability, and then he goes on to say that this unambiguous communicability that he sees is what forces us to deploy classical modes of description in our account of long and long. But then the question is, what does he mean here by classical modes of description? Does he simply mean using the tonic mechanics and that's well in the language of dynamic? Well, I think the evidence is quite clear. That's not what he had in mind by the deployment of classical modes of description. What he had in mind by classical modes of description is a mode of description that makes possible this hooked-for unambiguous communicability, tell people what we have done and what we have learned, and so on and so forth. And now, more specifically, what does that mean? What does it mean to use classical modes of description to facilitate an unambiguous description? Well, for example, he says, The essentially new feature of the analysis of quantum phenomena is, however, the introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus, the objects under the measuring gate, and the necessity of the count of the functions of the measuring instrument in purely classical terms and excluding, in principle, any regard to the quantum of action.

25:00 Well, here's one clue. Whatever is going to be meant by a classical mode of description that will make possible an unambiguous and hence objective description, part of what that has to mean is our being able to introduce a fundamental distinction between measuring algorithms and the objects under investigation. One thought already is the problem. he's just told us that the start of the whole complementary interpretation is the fact that, you know, from a modern idiom, the object and the instrument form an entangled pair, and yet the requirement of objectivity and ambiguity will require the point of the classical description, which will require the introduction and distinction between the measuring apparatus under investigation. What would make sense out of this? And here's one I think especially helpful, slightly longer discussion part of this essay in 1938. And this one bears careful reading of the way in which Bohr himself sort of plays with this tension with the market of the parallelism. The elucidation of the paradoxes of atomic physics has disclosed the fact that the unavoidable interaction between the objects and the measuring instruments sets an absolute of speaking of a behavior of an atomic object which is independent of the means of observation and tangential theory. We are here faced with an epistemological problem quite new in natural philosophy where all descriptions of experience are so far from based on the assumption already inherent in ordinary conventions of language that it is possible to distinguish sharply between the behavior of objects and the means of observation. But the assumption is that they are in it. This assumption is not only fully justified by all everyday experience, but even constitutes the whole basis of classical disease, meant by the classical. As soon as we're dealing, however, with phenomena-like individual atomic processes, which do, to their very nature, are essentially determined by the interaction between neologics and the classroom, and the measuring instruments necessary for the definition of the experimental arrangement, we are therefore forced to examine more closely with the question of what kind of knowledge should be obtained, or pertained concerning the knowledge. In this respect, we must, on the one hand, realize the aim of every physical experiment, the reproducible and communicable conditions, again, objective communicability and ambiguous communicability, leaves us no choice but to use everyday concepts. Perhaps you're trying by the terminology of classical physics. Not only in all the caps of the construction and manipulation of the measuring instruments,

27:30 but also in the description of the actual experimental results. On the other hand, it is equally important to understand that just this circumstance implies that no result in the experiment concerning a phenomenon which is principalized outside the range of classical physics but a dependent property of the engine that had non-intentioned in these two perspectives. Well, how do we resolve this tension? How is it possible for us to give an objective, classical description that assumes the disentanglement of object and instrument, given the quantum, the fundamental fact of quantum theory is that object and instrument form an entangled pair. Well, one clue to this is Bohr's also famous, frequent emphasis on the importance of the experimental content. If you've read anything in Bohr, you've heard this mantra. So, for example, again, from Schultz, the more appropriate way of expression, I advocated the application of the word phenomenon, exclusively to refer to the observation contained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experimental arrangement. Or, again, quoting from this somewhat less well-known because not included in any of the standard anthologies in some less well-known paper from 39. The essential lesson, the analysis of measurements and quantum theories, that's the emphasis on the necessity and the count of the phenomenon taking the whole experimental arrangement into consideration completely uniformly The U.S. interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of the external conditions of finding the initial state of the atomic system of the concern, and the character of possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measurement of quantum theory can, in fact, only refer you to the fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it inserts the combination of the measurement of the atomic system of the problem. potentially concerned, constituting, in fact, the only basis for the definition of the concept of which this phenomenon is described. So this is another important clue. There's constant emphasis on having to take account of the ceremonial conduct. Okay. How can we put this all together in a consistent picture? The history of non-performing entangled pair, and yet the requirements of unoccupied

30:00 community force us to regard that there not being an entangled pair. and somehow or another that means are deploying classical modes of description which assume that they are distinguishable from one another, separable from one another, and we've got this clue about the systematic importance of the inclusion and characterization of the experimental context. Well, the way I think one can make systematic sense out of this requires a little bit of formal apparatus. It wasn't habit to use formal apparatus for these purposes, but I think it's a way of making fairly clear sense out of the idea that Bohr had in mind, and I'll read some textual evidence in a moment for the suggestion that this more formal way of understanding Bohr's point was actually pretty well understood in the community fairly early on. And the point is simply this. One improvement theorem, according to which, if you give me the pure state describing an entangled pair, like an instrumentology pair, and if you give me a specification of an experimental context, in the sense of simply specifying a set of co-measurable observables, including for the instrument-object pair all of the joint observables on the point of position spinning, whatever. I can write down a mixture that will give you for all observables measurable in that context exactly the same statistical predictions that the Puritans would give. It's not a deep and difficult point. It's actually almost a trivial point for discrete observables. It's actually a somewhat difficult point for continuous observables, and one of Hans Halberts and many claims to fame is to have tackled this problem in the case of observables, or observables, or non-speed inspection. But, the fact is, you can do this. Give me the pure case, give me a specification for the experimental context, and then I can write down a mixture that gives me all the right statistical predictions for all observables measurable in that context. But what does that mean? That means that if I can deploy such a mixture to describe the instrument object there with respect to all observables measurable in that experimental context, that means that with respect to all of those observables,

32:30 I can pretend that the instrument and the object aren't entangled. And I can pretend that all of my statistics are classical ignorance statistics, and I've got what I think more description. I think that's the way we make systematic sense out of this. Complementarity, then, is just one simple step. Complementarity follows because, of course, if you consider a pair of non-computing observables represented by non-computing operators, you're going to have to deploy different mixtures in different contexts. And the two contexts are the various contexts and outside of the games to realize that. So what do I do? Well, anyway, move on. This is the way I think one makes the best sense out of four. Notice. No talk away from the collapse. No talk about a special role for the observer from the point of view of the observer's subjective consciousness. No flat-out denial of quantum reality. All of these hallmark documents that we have so long associated with our interpretation, they just aren't there. I challenge you. Go to the texts. Find them. They are not there. Where are they? They're all in the writings of Heisenberg. So let me turn to the other part of the story, and that is, how then did this notion arise that there is a unitary Kopenhagen point of view on interpretation that has at its heart the typical Heisenberg story about wake-up collapse, a skeptical observer, anti-realism, positivism, and da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da. Well, again, proceeding so much dogmatically, I've convinced myself now that this is a fairly self-conscious invention of the post-war period. And let me briefly outline the story here. And having said that it's an invention of the post-war period, let me quickly correct myself and say, there are already hints that this is starting to happen in the previous period. At least in this respect, there's already a body of literature that's growing up in the pre-war period in which there is an emphasis on a special role for the observer and the observer's subjective aspect, a linking of that with a certain kind of positivist interpretation or gloss on the quantum theory. and this occurs in a literature

35:00 in which even though Bohr's name is used as his typical for a lot of the later literature all of the citations are actually the papers by Heisenberg again, a challenge go look at these sections, a really interesting thing to do to see the way in which Bohr's name is used and then the footnotes all the things are the papers by Heisenberg especially important in this sort of pre-war phase of this, I think are the works of Pasquale de O'Donnell, and especially his textbook, his at the time quite widely read textbook, I'm shouting at the Procterian, good at quantitans, which has a long-ish introduction that puts a strong philosophical gloss of this kind of historian of quantitans, and then has spelled something like six chapters at the end that's on the philosophy of science. And a big part of the argument back there is a more of an expanded version of this story that we sort of now recognize as the story about what we were taught as the Poconautic time and the Poconautic location. But again, I think this gets started in a significant way in the post-war period. And I think it gets started in a very self-conscious way by Heisenberg. And as I said at the beginning of the talk, as far as I've been able to determine The first time the term Copenhagen Interpretation is ever deployed is in this 1955 paper by Heisenberg and this collection was edited by Talley in Wars of Honor. But the story about what now comes to be called the Copenhagen Interpretation then gets repeated in a lot of subsequent works by Heisenberg. What does Heisenberg say? Well, a few selections from that essay from 1995, and in fact, I quote here at the beginning just the very first place, the first paragraph before that term is first employed, and we shall then require criticism which are recently made against the Co-common theory. His office was born in Co-common in 27. It's not only an unindiguous prescription for the utilitarian experiments, but also a language in which one spoke by nature on the common scale, and in so far, a part of philosophy. In the absence of an observer, and now it gets very interesting as it goes on now over a couple of paragraphs that I'll share with you,

37:30 start putting together the pieces of his version of a Copenhagen point of view. In the absence of an observer, the mathematical representation of the system would go on changing, continuous of the way we have it, however, in the present he will suddenly register the fact that the plate is black and the transition from possible to the actual, and that's hallmark, sort of aristotelian size of Heisenberg, is thereby completed as far as he is concerned, and correspondingly alters the mathematical representation that's continuously in the new ensemble contains only the black and the photographic plate, this is an English change, actually not containing the tantric equation system, or the ensemble which characterizes the system, of course, runs exactly the reduction of way facts on the theory, that's where that We see from this that the characterization of the system by an ensemble not only specifies the property of the system, but also contains information about the extent of the observer's knowledge of the system. To this extent, the use of the word objective for the characterization of the system by an ensemble is problematic. So this subjectivist twist enters the story here in these essays. But now this, to me, is the most interesting piece of this essay because it shows the way in which Heisenberg has somewhat accurately heard part of the conversation before, but at the same time in presenting itself insinuates his own emphasis on wave-packed conjunction, subjectivism, etc., etc. But especially interesting is the fact that you'll see here, he gets the point about the deployment of mixtures to describe the answer in the novel. If the system is closed, we may in some circumstances have at least an approximate picture of a case. The system is then represented by a vector of Hilbert's case. The representation is, in this particular case, completely objected by e. It no longer contains features connected with the observer's knowledge, but it is also completely abstract and incomprehensible. since the various mathematical expressions do not refer to real space or real property, and thus, so to speak, contains no physics at all. The representation becomes a part of the description of nature, only by being linked to the question of how real a possible experiment would result. From this point of view, we must take into consideration the interaction with the system and the measuring apparatus, and use a statistical mixture of the mathematical representation of the larger system composed of the system and the measuring apparatus. It might appear that this could, in principle, be avoided if a possible as a compound entirely in the entire world.

40:00 However, Gore is right to point it out on many pages that the connection with the external world is one of the necessary conditions to the measuring apparatus for its function. Since the behavior of the measuring apparatus must behave with the registrants in the actual, therefore they describe in terms of simple concepts. If the apparatus is to use the measurements at all, then the connection in the apparatus is to use the measurement at all, and the connection with the actual world is necessary. The compound system and system in the measuring apparatus by a mixture, and thus the description contains, besides its objective features, so you see he's got the Bohr part of this, used the mixture, now that's what we have in class about this, so forth. The compact system, the system of measuring apparatus is different now described mathematically by a mixture, and thus the description contains, besides its objective features, also the previously discussed statements about the observer and other. Here comes this insinuation of its distinctive Heisenberg emphasis on the subject of the observer. It wasn't there in Bohr's version of the story, prominently here in where there's a certain behavior in the operating apparatus and actually in the alder mechanical representation is continuously because the weight packet comes out, because there's a certain one among the various possibilities of the real one, and it's continuing to have the weight packets which come to the rack, and showing your approach, and that's exactly what you can give us and manage the consequences of the transition. And here's the invention. The nuts and bolts of the invention. Well, as I say, this invention is quickly taken up by a number of other thinkers. Well, let me just back up and make one other point here about what I think might be going on in 1959. I asked myself, why is it important for Popper in 1955 to do this? That is to say, to invent, by my lens, this version of the Copenhagen Interpretation and appoint himself the chief publicist for this version of Copenhagen Interpretation. Oh, excuse me. And the point itself, the chief publicist for this version of the film novel, The Permutation. I was helped a lot in this respect by reading, a couple of years ago, David Cassidy's biography of Heisenberg, and gaining thereby, I think, some insight into sort of the psychoanalysis in which Heisenberg found himself in the Cold War period. I mean, we all know now, thanks to the frame of play, about this collapse of the relationship with Ford would take place after the meeting in 1941. What I think Frank Lloyd doesn't explain to us clearly enough is what the psychological and professional echoes

42:30 of that rupture were for Heisenberg in the post-war period. On a previous handout, I had sort of deliberately labeled him a kind of moral exile from the Copenhagen community. I think that's the way he felt at the time. And I say to myself, what better way to put oneself back into the back in the bosom of the community than to invent this notion of unitary Copenhagen interpretation and make oneself into the chief spokesperson. I mean, that's just absurd psychological speculation on my part. But still, I find it helpful to bear in mind this situation. So, as I say, a lot of people then conspire perpetually. And the philosopher who does more than anyone else to... Well, I had mentioned Bohm, of course, on an earlier slide, but we'll come back to Bohm in just a moment. The philosopher who does more than anyone else to perpetuate this myth of the book of Poppins Interpretation is Karl Popper, who, at about the time Heisenberg introduced this version of the book of Poppins Interpretation, is starting his big campaign against, I mean, he's been writing against Ordo Dr. Juan Buchanan since the 1930s in one way or another, but in particular, at this time, he's starting to publish his papers of the propensity of which he very explicitly is putting forward as an objectivist alternative to Copenhagen's subjectivism. Many papers from this period in which Hopper puts forward as a foil the image of the Copenhagen interpretation that Heisenberg has invented with heavy emphasis on the subjectivism of the Heisenberg version. Just one question here that illustrates this from, probably the most important essay published on a subject in 1967, Quantum Mechanics, without the observer. This is an attempt to exercise the most called consciousness, or the observer, from quantum mechanics and to show that quantum mechanics is as objective a theory as, say, classical statistical mechanics. The opposite view you would call the Kopenhauer Interpretation of quantum mechanics is almost universally accepted. In brief it says that objective reality has evaporated, and quantum mechanics is not represented in Parkinson's, but rather our knowledge, our observations, our consciousness of Parkinson's and so on and so forth. And Popper throws Bohr's name around all the time, again, I invite you to go to these texts and follow the show notes to all the way through the after, you know, Bohr's name

45:00 is so cool. Popper is not alone in this enterprise of using the Heisenberg version of Kopenhagen as grist for another philosophical mill. Two other philosophers who play an important role in this process are Feyerabend and Hansen. In different ways, they're attracted to different aspects of the Heisenberg version of Kopenhagen. Feyerabend is at this time becoming epistemological anarchist. No better example for his story about epistemological anarchism than the clash between Voln and Bohr as represented by Heisenberg as an example of a case of theory choice that is empirically undecided. And he, in frequent citations in his works in this period of Heisenberg's essays on the complementarity interpretation. Mara, by the way, has a lovely talk on this very theme. She and I just read deeply about what the co-complementary interpretation is all about. But I owe her a big debt for the work she's done trying to understand Feyerabell's co-creation of the co-complementary interpretation. this talk she made at this conference on occasion of Genesis 6 and birthday back in 1997. I dearly hope that she does break this out. Hansen, she has written about it in the book. And briefly, Hansen is interested in the Heisenberg version of the Kodum-Hodden Termination for a slightly different purpose. He's especially interested in yet another part of the Heisenberg story, and that is Heisenberg's Since the late 1940s, Avery published a dialect of that in 1948. His representation of the quantum theory is what he terms a closed theory, by which he means, and let me, by the way, advertise some recent work by Lisa on this subject topic, by which he means, among other things, the claim that the quantum theory is an example of a theory that is systematically insulated against representation. and this is Grist or Hansen's sort of proto-paradigm

47:30 notion, so Hansen as proto-proto-prune and again, in my frequent citations to the Heisenberg-Hurden-Cook one of his essays of Hansen's period. Let me wrap this up then by talking about one event that I think was especially important in the myth that is cementing the invention of the Heisenberg interpretation under Heisenberg's description. This is the 1957 Colston Research Center, the proceedings of which appeared in this widely cited volume that is by Krenner's observation and interpretation. Here's a list of the speakers of the speech. It's quite a remarkable effort. I am told privately that the meeting was originally organized. Notice this is right, this is a couple of years after Bohm has sort of come out of the closet as a non-pokenhogging guy, right, promoting variables program. I am told privately that this meeting was originally conceived as an opportunity to rein in Bohm and to set Bohm straight, but in fact it turned out to function very, very differently. kind of a coming out point. Rhetorically, it was a huge success. There are many papers in this meeting that, in one way or another, make reference to what is at this time only a two-year-old invention. Refer back to that 55 paper of Eisenberg's. Already two years later, all these people are using this expression, Topenhagen Interpretation, as if it were just a settled matter of what this means. Of course, way back its last, and it's already a well-cemented part of the art. Especially interesting to me, I remember, is the paper that Rosenfeld gives at this meeting. He's one of the two or three people. Pierce is another representative of sort of co-optimal orthodoxy, but Rosenfeld's paper is especially interesting because it's a kind of a sad lament from someone who I think all along understood far better than did Heisenberg what Bohr was up to and someone who I think is one can trust far more than one can trust

50:00 Heisenberg to explain to us what the Bohr program is all about. And this paper is a kind of a sad lament as he's standing there watching this distortion take place in front of him at this meeting. He writes, according to our critics, the view of quantum theory undermines the sound belief in the reality of the external world, in which all physical thinking is rooted, and opens the door to, I forget the title here, and opens the door to the barren doctrine of positivism. This picture would be alarming if it were true. However, it is just another dream, a nightmare perhaps of our critics. It is based on the most futile casuistics that critics diligently insert from the writings in which the principles of quantum theory are discussed, isolated sentences on which they put arbitrary interpretations. No wonder that they should find some difficulty in understanding more. That's another one of the tropes that enters the literature at this time, right? As we can dismiss this because we can't use it. No wonder that they should find some difficulty in understanding more, which incidentally does not prevent them from granting these opposites. There is no difficulty in understanding the critics' philosophy and exposing themselves to them. Thank you very much. So Rob first, then Simon, then Cunningham, then Chris, then Patrick. Just a very minor point, but at Heidenberg, in 1955, he talks about that. But from all of the things that you put up there, it's actually Popper who put the word COVID project and interpret it. No, no, no, no, no, it's actually a type of book. I'm going to put the transparency back up. Now, this is the passage from the 55 paper in the Powell book. It's a very first sentence, and we shall then And then, by the criticisms that you've recently been made against the power of the population of the population. As far as I have been able to determine, that's the first time in the literature that the phrase, expression of the cognitive interpretation of the population. Yes, Popper seizes Popper. We didn't. He uses it all the time.

52:30 What terms did Popper use in the 30s? I mean, he just talks. He wasn't polemicizing against the program the same way in the 30s. His disagreements in the 30s were more local, and so he thought, for example, he had his own version of a kind of a thought experiment that was supposed to demonstrate violations of the determinists of this form. Of course, it doesn't work. It's pretty elaborate. Well, let me ask the other question I really wanted to ask. That was about Chardin. I mean, but now for Jordan, it's pre-born. It's pre-born, so 1936, right? So, I mean, I want to be careful about the kind of thing that I make here. What I've said about Jordan is that already in the 30s, one begins to see the strategy, consciously from Heisenberg, but from others, and especially people within the Vienna Circle, and let me add that, the other hand is very close to the Vienna Circle. They're all eager to put a positivist twist on quantum mechanics, and use the intellectual authority for his legitimation for the logic of the jurist's line, in the same way they're trying to use Einstein to legitimate the logic of the jurist's line. So, especially in that community, there is this very deliberate effort to put a positivist's skin on the top of it, well, I mean, that's a terrible thing, on the bottom of it, to cite Bohr's name, and yet, when they want to document claims about subjective rule of the observer or something like that, to cite a paper by Eisenhower. And so now one might say, well look, all of this is the name, and that might well be the case, except that most of this literature that I'm aware of from the 30s is restricted to that in the circle of logic and empiricist community, and I think they have a local agenda there. And we don't have Hopper himself in quite such a polemical way and under the banner of this thing called a unitary co-competitive religion. We don't have Heisenberg himself out there polemicizing quite the same thing on behalf of this alleged unitary co-competitive religion.

55:00 But yes, I mean, one has to grant that the invention in some sense is starting, at least in this one corner of the literature, already in the three book here. Philip Tronc is another positivist who's eager to put quantum mechanics to use for legitimating the Vienna Circle program. It's interesting to compare what Trump writes with what Bernan writes, because Trump is, I think, a smarter guy than Bernan, and I think is a nicer guy. And he's much more careful about to whom he attributes what kind of view, and to be clear that this line is his line, and not the line that he's taking over from Bohr, and so forth. But he's actually a much more sensitive interpreter of what's going on on Part 4 and Heisenberg than Rebann. And Rebann is much more blatant and glimmer, not with intention. So again, I don't want to make the point too strong. There's clearly something already going on in the free law period. But what's notable in the post-war period is the self-conscious introduction of the term. And then the way in which after that point, after 25, that all of these other people suddenly jump on them, in a way that, at least, to the givenance degree, after that, is not about it. Well, I'll just ask you a couple of comments, if I may, for the question. The comment is that it was a convincing case, and I had always come to a similar view. So, there were clear elements in the law of subjectivity. and you can actually take out the sense that you want to do a demo lecture where he does refer to what the sense of passion is. And then you put your name as the paper of the subject. It doesn't do well now. Above all, the last chapter of this book is because it's all about the subject. It's all about the problem of the subject of the subject. There's a very strong strand running through, and I think that you were right, that in the end we shouldn't go through the subject.

57:30 He lets himself in for this degree. Well, you're mentioning this discussion of subject and object before. is helpful and pertinent and quite important for getting clear about what's going on here. Or was eager, and I think over eager, to take the principle of commonality and apply it in all manner of different domains where if there's anything going on, at best all, it's got a feeble analogy in some other domain. But one of the domains in which he was mostly in a poison analogy is in psychology. And he frequently said that the relationship between the, you know, the knower's subjective perspective on his own consciousness, the way that's related to the outside perspective of the psychologists say, that that relationship has the structure of a complementarity about it. But that point is to be completely detached from the point about complementarity in physics. His point analogy in the relationship between subject and object to the relationship between observables represented by not object and object. I don't know if that's my question. What do we mean by well, this is another thing that I've thought about for quite a long time. It's not the only piece of Borsi that one has to think about. He talks about the visibility of the, of the quantum of action, or the, yeah, I think that's the way he talks about it, okay? And, uh, and, uh, the best I can offer at this point is this. I think what's happening here is that he's got an intuition about that which we later call entanglement, but he doesn't have a good vocabulary for talking about it, and especially he doesn't have the kind of conceptual vocabulary that we're talking about, that was the kind of vocabulary he was most comfortable with. And what I think we find going on at this time is he's playing with these different locutions to try to get at this intuition about the peculiar relationship between interacting systems, and so that's the best I can offer here is that I think he's struggling to find

1:00:00 a good vocabulary in which to talk about this, and would that he had a vocabulary to tank available to them in 1935. Now, of course, another question is, once Schrodinger introduces the vocabulary in 1935, why doesn't it bore quickly seeds upon it? Well, I'm not quite sure what to say in answer to that one. That's the question you might ask for himself. There's the obvious fact that there's a whole antagonist between the two of them that might be sufficient to explain why he wouldn't be comfortable with Schrodinger's vocabulary. But still, the question is in the text. Yes, whatever that means, whatever that means, really. He says actually that from Kermit, he says this community is more rather individualized. And in Sanskrit writing, I don't think that it's digital. But one child can say, it's just a common posture. It's a phrase that has been used by all of them, by everybody. It could be . So I think, in a way, one suddenly quit . He really is using a very well-used phrase. But remember the other one. And again, I don't want to be over-boldened by what I claim here. I want to confess the limits of my own ability to do more urban movements here. I get frustrated myself beyond a certain point. But let me do remind you of this one other point I made earlier on, and that is that, yes, that term has been around for a long time, But remember, I've convinced myself that this anxiety about entanglement had been around at least in 1901. And so it's not at all as possible for me to think that this is the, we know not yet what the folks are trying to get at. I mean, you see a similar thing going on with Einstein, who is even more anxious about this. He struggles to come up with analogies and metaphors that are going to illuminate this other side of the picture. Yes, in the mean regime things, photons behave as if they're mutually independent, you know, corpuscle-like articles, but clearly that's not the whole story. What is the other side of the story? And so he says, well, maybe, you know, already in 1909,

1:02:30 you find him in correspondence and in some of his lectures saying, well, maybe the way to get at this is to think that there's some sort of wave-like aspect. You know, there's a kind of proto-pilot wave idea that he already has in 1909. You know, as he's struggling to try to come up with some way of representing this other part of the story. Okay, we're going to have to ask everyone to shorten the discussion because it's such a cute . I'd like to question whether the idea of antagonism really is there in law. it seems to me the really decisive thing is the absolutely clear application of correlations between two atomic particles and the EPR power and if you read Thor in 1927 and things like that it's all this idea, which is also very like the famous line in Dirac about a photon hitting a polarization analyzer, you have an idea of one quantum particle hitting a great big macroscopic thing and showing up in some point and I remember a fantastic shock when I read the Bauer London book where he said we're going to use the position of the particle in the Stern-Gerlach experiment as the measuring instrument to tell us, because it's correlated with the spin. And that, for me, was an... I read that before I read the EPR paper. And I've just read the EPR paper again and the entanglement paper. And it's absolutely staggering. And it's very interesting that it was, of course, Einstein who brought that out so clearly. Is there anywhere before the EPR paper where you clearly talk about the correlations between two particles and what they're measured with anything? I see that it's a bit there, but it's not in the standard literature that you see about the published four, is it? No, no, no, it's not. And I grant you that point. And would it once saw this expressed a little bit more clearly in some of that published literature? But again, this is where looking at the context in the mid-1920s is extremely helpful. Because certainly after the discovery of the Roundtower, in fact, but especially after Rosa-Einstein and the experimental reputation of BTS, one finds this emerging very, very clear awareness that this, as yet to be found in full-time story, is going to have to tell us something, is going to have to have a good story about these very peculiar long-range correlations that we're seeing, not just between atomic systems and big measure, but between individual

1:05:00 atomic systems. And I stress that was the real question that the BKS theory had, was that it implied the statistical independence of these transition events in atoms that are interacting electromagnetically. That was the real issue there. Statistical energy conservation, that was ever phenomenal. was the statistical dependence of the transition process and the data that had to interact with what they're making by the transition. But it should also be said that it doesn't stop with Bota, Geiger, and Compton-Syner. Geiger, especially, is involved with these. Geiger is one of the other of them. Then goes on to do a whole series of experiments from about 25 through 26, 27, in one paper a few years ago a series of proto-data experiments where he's just, and in fact it's very interesting, he's in correspondence with Einstein they're talking about subtler tales of how experimentally can we get at this phenomenon, and it's all a number of different ways of trying to explore this kind of correlation that are now confronting in the laboratory between individuals previously interacting with atomic systems the board in that context, you know, that was, of course, perfect development for everyone. It now becomes complicated. That's what he's going to do. To elucidate this extraordinary puzzling stuff that's starting to show up in the head of the head of the head of the head of the head of the head of the head of the head. Theoretical statistics. But it remains true. In all the great documents, he doesn't specifically have entanglement between the atomic particles. It's a sort of an intimate, it's an unbreakable thing between an individual atomic particle and the macroscopic. which is not given any model without attacking. Okay, Chris. Yeah, I'm worried a little bit about your reading of the chemo-electric. Partly the reason that it's already come up with the answer is why I can do it again. The first one is that in the chemo-electric, you're making a big fuss about disturbance, and the disturbance is based on the individuality of the image of action. And I can't see any direct map from disturbing by poking something with a big object, And the second point is that measurement, performing measurement, need not be equal to disturbing that the constant state. I think there's lots of types of measurement where that's not going to happen.

1:07:30 So if measurement needn't be disturbed in the object system, it needs to be disturbed in the state. And I'm just saying, I'm sure if you entangle something, the individual system is an individual conscious state. But Paul was talking about disturbance in the object system and entanglement that can be disturbed in the measurement. This remains a complicated part of the hermeneutics of the 27th of the Coma lecture, but here's part of the story that is, I think, importantly relevant to the larger story I want to tell about the relationship between Bohr and Heisenberg. Part of the reason why there is so much discussion of the disturbance analysis and measurement in the 27th paper is that Bohr is having an argument with Heisenberg at that time about how you interpret indeterminacy. And it's Heisenberg, who from then on is the great advocate of the disturbance analysis, the disturbance interpretation of indeterminacy. From the very beginning, Bohr has been cautioning Heisenberg, and he does so in the 27th paper, has been cautioned Heisenberg, saying, look, Heisenberg, whatever's going on is not just a matter of limitations on measurement. That's part of the disturbance when you're talking about the significance of the transparency. What he says is, of course there are going to be limitations on measurement, but these are derivative from deeper, what he calls, limitations on definition. That's his expression. So that's the context of this long discussion of disturbance analysis of measurement is that he's having this argument with Heisenberg, and he's trying to persuade Heisenberg that there's something more going on here than just the instrument or the observer's disturbing the state of the eye. Sure, but I mean your account is not very wrong for the object system before, is that they've got some tangle with the measuring apparatus, but if you can do measurement where you perform the measurement on the end, I guess I'm not sure I see the conclusion of that argument here. Because, I mean, this is part of a standard argument in the literature for why there is change in Borat to cut. The argument is, well, look, TPR especially made us aware

1:10:00 in direct measurements, and clearly what's going on here can't be a matter of the interaction of the distance system of measuring apparatus that's performed locally over here. But the fact remains that you've got a larger entangled system, and it's all, it's now you've got the entanglement of the two previous interacting particles, and this one gets entangled with the measurement apparatus. So, I mean, entanglement is still part of the story. Can I entangle your cases and leave it as a close group? Well, I hope it's better. You can do it when it's just one. I mean, it's a long mission, but you're going to step back. I'm just going down here. Well, correct. It looks good. Sorry, we almost moved on. That's the average of the year. So, very, very interesting to speak. Okay, so what I'm taking is that Paul's really the same. It's about the active role in the experimentation, and that this can easily be a bit strange or distorted, some sort of subjective. That's not really what he said. Now, it's interesting. And from the hidden miracles point of view, It's fascinating that Bell, in the 1960s, made repeated use of George's insight about the ancient world of the experimental arrangement. But it was really that insight that enabled Bell to save a different variable program that was supposed to be possible. So, what I'd like to ask you, and I understand at this point about if I had a fixed experimental content, given any, just a, the statistics of measures would be derived from a mixture. So they would be a mixture of definite outcomes for one to experiment. So in some sense, one could regard those outcomes. What I'd like to ask you, do you think there's any way to move forward, an exception, a exception in the environment? That's a really interesting question. and I don't know but let me cite a piece of tangential evidence on this one I don't know what Bohr would have said, but I actually think

1:12:30 that Heisenberg was not at all sympathetic to the idea of contextualizing and what's the evidence for this? The evidence is that in the summer of 35, right after ECR appeared, before Bohr published his reply Heisenberg We've been emboldened to do this by Powley. Heisenberg actually wrote a reply to EPR that was never published. And if one can find it, the only place it can be found currently in print is in the Powley correspondence. It's printed along with a letter that the company, the public name, to Powley. It's July, I think, or early July, or something, or June, or July. And if I'm reading that paper of Heisenberg's, rightfully, I think Heisenberg deserves credit for discovering the idea of the potential of his verities. And I wish that someone would do something with that paper, and I haven't done it yet, but I think it's an extremely important paper. But for that's before, you said that, okay, it's the arrangement where I can regard this with the experimental set-off. I can regard everything as a mixture, but the mixture depends on the experimental range. Now, isn't that, isn't that in a sense sort of stochastic? The actual outcomes, they are there, but which outcomes are there, or what mixture of outcomes depends on what the context is, but the outcomes are given in a statistical sense. Well, where I think the difference lies is that there's no one, the board, there's no underlying description at the level of the hidden variables that's going to go through from the one to the next to the next to the next. So it's not as though we've got some underlying reality described by a set of hidden variables, and then we have to patch onto that some kind of context to get some predictions out of it, and yet you agree with quantum theory. There's just not that underlying apparatus Now, whether or not it can be consistent with the spirit of this idea of Goar's to receive an infection and how Goar would respond to them.

1:15:00 But again, Heisenberg, I think, was not at all... I'm sorry. I think it knew everybody needing tea and giving doughnuts. Right, we should, I'm sorry, Marcus, but I think we'll just tell you to continue to agree about it. I'm very sympathetic to your analysis that there are at least quite several strategies. I sometimes think it's more sociological movement than the multiple intellectual positions. But, I want to follow up with T, your interpretation for something, I'm sorry, I didn't feel the first part of that sentence. Oh, Wade Packard. Yes, right. So that's probably not there in law. And, you know, if you can ask an example of where he is there, but surely there are other places where you can find it very early on. in Iraq. And then you had that way of speaking. Of course, of course. I'm making no claims that wave packet reduction appears for the first time in the post world. They look like a sort of retrospective reconstruction. It was something that he believed a little while. I don't mean to be denying that. I mean, that he believed in What I'm trying to say, what I'm trying to say is that it's in 1955 that this term is introduced, seized upon by others, where for the first time then it begins to accrete around this term, you know, this cluster of ideas that we then come to associate with one another as part of the future. You know, these individual pieces have all been, you know, from, from, from, from, from the fact that that's been around for a long time. Heisenberg has been trying to put a subjective positive spin on this story for a long time. What, what, you know, the claim is that there's this self-conscious introduction or invention of the idea that there exists a unitary point of view that we're going to call to the common interpretation, and that this is what the common interpretation means. Now, they look at unity.

1:17:30 They want to say, do you all agree on that? You cracked it out together here. Well, the question is how much unity and what kind of unity? I very much like your suggestion that, and I fully agree, that there's a kind of sociological unity that's there from very early, very early on. There is a community here. And they agree upon a variety of things. They're agreed that they want to try to defend Copenhagen against various kinds of challenges from the side of Schrödinger and from the side of Erdogan and so on and so forth, against There's clear agreement on wanting to try to defend the quantum theory against various of these challenges. But that's a long way from our having a unified, thoroughly worked out joint point of view I rather like the expression that Rosenfeld is not used. Rosenfeld spoke frequently of what he called the Coca-Cola spirit. And I think that much better captures the kind of unity that there was in this community. Much more accurately than does this talk that we use on the Coca-Cola meditation. Just a small comment about the anxiety about the around 1927, there is a lot of discomfort about the way it comes to the wrong configuration space is more than unvariable. For instance, there was a discussion of that in the proceedings of the 1927s of the Congress. And then I was just wondering about Boehme, if you didn't go into that, and for instance that F.D. Pontellata, the graceful behavior interpretation comes out in 1955, three years after the Boehme theory, and in that sentence, So then Heisenberg is announcing that he's going to defend it against the critics, and I would just do it. Well, actually, when you go over to see who the critics are, Bohm is not, I mean, he's mentioned, but he's not prominent, and he's certainly not the most important. There's a wide variety of other critical attacks on bomb mechanics that were of more concern at Heisenberg at the time. Especially important ones, but actually perhaps not unconnected to them.

1:20:00 Here's another story. It's especially important for the Soviet history of quantum mechanics. The early 1950s was one of these periods of the intensification of the Soviet attack on quantum mechanics as a damnable form of idealism. And he mentioned several Soviet authors in this article. The story of the project I want to suggest here is that I always found it interesting that Bohm comes out of the closet as mad at the very time of his American passport. And I'm not sure, again, this is perhaps nothing but a coincidence. I wondered whether it's more than a coincidence. And so let me actually go one step further in this respect. I mean, Bohm is famous for this view, this sort of layered ontology. It's in the 57th book, you know, that you've got determinism at one level, and then determinism at another level, and determinism at another level. And there's this sort of infinite level, infinity of levels of description in nature. What most people who read that in Bohm don't understand and don't recognize is that to a Soviet audience, everybody understood that as a hallmark Leninist doctrine, that idea of infinite levels and layers in nature. Now, again, I don't know enough about Bohm to know whether or not there was some kind of influence there or not. But again, it's quite striking to me that this famous Leninist point of view of natural philosophy finds and embodies what that sort of point of view. And on that, Chris Newton's book, to talk with him to speak with Bohn. Bohn gave him Mark Danny's books to read after a member of the time of the night And Chris said he would stop when he read this. Well, that's very . There's actually a dissertation project underway, part of the Congress question. And I should put you in touch with this project. so that's an answer to that I'm very sorry that we have to stop especially when the great themes of the red and the black are the ramparts I think that we'd like to thank you

1:22:30 very very much for putting a step along the dialectical road to the realization of the guise in our advanced dialectic fight giving us all parents thank you Thank you. Thank you.