Chris Isham Structuralism & Other Topics in Phliosophy of Physics, Oxford 2003
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Recorded at Structuralism & Other Topics in Phliosophy of Physics, Oxford (2003), featuring Chris Isham. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.

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0:00 In point of view of all the levels, how does it turn out in terms of this entropy, where the probabilities, the equal probabilities here and here, at the moment of the rating cycle, the correlation is, if the gas is somewhere in here, the possibility is somewhere in here, then the rating cycle has no correlation to the good. Whereas, at the covering cycle, it's only if the gas is somewhere in here, and the heat is somewhere in here. So if we look at these two things, the reversal from the rings of the cycle onto the lowering cycle is this, the reversal from the lowering cycle onto the raising cycle is this, it's got to be lower, so it's always going to spend more time on the lowering cycle, and that's going to be in this direction. So this is, what we're seeing here is, what's really going on is the role of fluctuations, the probabilities of those fluctuations, and the correlations between subsystems. You can understand it without referencing the equation. There isn't any particular information theoretical going on here. These are just normal statistical and mathematical systems. The piston plays exactly the same role in this as the demon or the computer does. If that's all it is, it's just a piston. It has two stakes and an alternative to it. It doesn't do any information processing. The demon really has to be introduced to the level of the spring. It doesn't do anything else. You're sort of thinking of being a demon. We're starting off with a statistical state and a movement to the situation where the demon, or the destiny, is correlated between several cycles. This is how the information theory goes. The full statistical state is then random, because, relative to the observer, the information then is supposed to have to arrange the information again in a measure.

2:30 One measure. To quantify the information gained from the measurements, who refers to the Shannon information? Well, the Shannon information is equal to the ethical information, but this is really just a reintroduction to the statistical state that they got abandoned in the first place. They haven't abandoned the statistical state, they haven't abandoned statistical mechanics in the first place. They wouldn't need to introduce this idea of Shannon information, it would just be the Gibbs mixing. So there's no real role, there's nothing special that information processors do. There's no significance to any of these terms. And the statistical state hadn't been abandoned before, so it probably wouldn't have occurred. The second point is that, really, semi-languages generally consider that everything is at the same temperature. But I sort of generalise into, well, what are things from different temperatures? And that seems that there's more general cases of semi-languages, though, because they're definitely interesting. They're doing similar things to each other, but they're not actually doing it by the normal rules I said earlier, There's no direct heat type between impacts. It's taking place by correlating fluctuations in systems between one system and the second system. This is more than just normally just the situation about fluctuable fluctuations. We start off with 19th century thermodynamics and core statistical mechanics, and we've got energy actually in all the systems. And then you move to statistical mechanics, and we have fluctuations within that, so you've got a mean energy and a fluctuation of atoms. This is actually saying there's something more than just fluctuations in each system, there's correlations between those fluctuations that's going on. Two systems are correlated. Now with macroscopic bodies, those correlations are small, they're destroyed, they're inaccessible. Still on edge, those correlations are stable. That piston, which is the trapping mechanism that is generally used. That doesn't have thermally fluctuating from one state to the other, or moving from one side to the other. The idea of Maxwell's demons being a thermal fluctuation, not generally valid, not in the case of the cylinder, but it is, because of the stability, because it's not just this correlation to state. But the overall entropy hasn't been reduced in level. The problem of gravity is solved, and the demon is equivalent of this.

5:00 And another thing that finally might be said about this is that I mean, you could attach a computer to the pistol. You couldn't do it. It wouldn't affect the analysis at all, making the information processing of the demon clearly isn't playing any role at all. The second point, though, is what are the issues of the observation of systems by conscious intelligent beings? Well, all throughout this, implicitly, we've assumed that the demon was placed by a computer, and all of the information are theoretic components. And we want to replace intelligence by computing, but to do that they have to assume, they're assuming that consciousness and so on is just something that can be explained by quantum physics. Well, we have a general solution for that anyway, so really what can't we get by doing that? In your paper I said, you've got to be able to qualify to test the information you've got, so I guess I don't agree with this. I want to go to the pencil, so I want to practice energy to do this. And if we don't pick up relative to mean to go down, and therefore relative to mean for a kettle, then I'll not be totally bothered by the fact that whatever it is in terms of what's about to happen to me will also go to the kettle, such that all of us together have an increased energy from that. It does seem to be something to see what the story is that's being told from the observer's point of view, at least from the practical perspective of several of the programs preventing this. And there is this point that... So I have to go to the kettle and I now have the memory in me. Well, the information from the cycle, I've got to replace that with the information from the complete cycle. It's all quite separate then, and I don't speak for it. We have to talk about work being extracted and eaten, and nothing else happening. The sole result of the process being my memory state is different, then that's not the sole result of the process. But again, you don't need to view this as being information theory at all, because one can view it from the point of view of, say, a cellar factory.

7:30 At the end of the process, where the gas is expanding and the weight is being raised. So, suppose we're at this point here. The weight's being raised and the gas is expanding. Well, again, we're going to run that estimate. And we can start to completely down the impression. Start the cycle again that way, and keep raising weights that way. And this is exactly the same as what happens if you're regarding it as being a cell or being a computer which is recording it in memory. And now the memory is the location of the piston you've discarded. And if you actually think about that, what we're actually saying is going forward is we don't need the cell identity at all. We're actually extracting weight from the isothermal expansion of the piston state. So in that sense, I start off with a memory of what my memory is. I isothermal expand the state of my memory and extract it. Energy. Is there anything again special about the information theory? I wouldn't say that I said anything that says that the information interpretation of cancer is in itself false. What I would argue is that the cell identity doesn't provide anything new or special to support that case. If you're starting to want to view your identity as an international theory, I think the Landauer Quasis is the best time to do it. I don't have any problem with Landauer, Ehrich, and Pallott on the thermodynamics of computation, but I think it requires the non-existence of those attributes. I'm not going to do the technical analysis as you've done with Zlatan.

10:00 It's not very objective. You do stuff very objectively. You derive the data themselves, but then you see that it's not true. I'm against the use of plan derivation in this context. I'm saying that the plan derivation can't be used to look at the application. Quite, but because of the great success of Zlatan, it's not objective. Just in terms of what exactly the state of the matter is, I don't know the information on that. We will talk about that in the summer term. The usual information for this case is that it's a typical work in the case of the syllogism of the attempt to keep up. If that were the case, then sure, I think we would have learned our way through this simple case and become more familiar with it. If you have the two temperatures, then it's not going to help you. Yeah, let's say we have this situation, and there's a potential here that the rest of the sectors aren't the same as the fluctuation, the probability of the fluctuation that you're capturing at first. So, because you're moving, it happens to be that they coincide when the two temperatures are the same. So you can talk about it just being information translated from one system to another, but when you're moving between the two systems at different temperatures... The probabilities aren't the same in the different sections, they're still correlated to each of the systems, and it's no longer clear that it's just simply some information processing that's going on, because there's temperature there as well. It's only when the temperatures are the same, the probabilities remain the same when they're translated through the different subsystems. So we always look for the same amount of information. The entropy, of course, is the same, so you can get some expression of entropy, but it's no longer, at this point, it's no longer clearly it's a system having information about where the gas originally was, because it's all been inter-correlation.

12:30 I think the thing that's more actually critical of quantum mechanics is the issue of quantum mechanics in geometry dynamics. Probably that is, possibly that is actually the wrong way of phrasing the term quantum mechanics. In very simplified situations I think that all the microstates actually exist. I think this is the second part. The more general thing is actually, where you allow these logical states to have different energies and different entropy, which you can do, it's very well done, but if you did it, then the actual proof of lambda erasure would actually end up depending on who gives entropy. The proof of that down there is a bunch of more that we actually need to get back to the second part of the topic. Then, at least there's some kind of synopsis about the human context of driving the second door. No, no, that's a big concept. Is that a conceptual concept? It is. I'm certainly not trying to say I've solved any problems with intelligence. I think there are definitely genuine issues there and I don't think I've actually placed much of an address on those. Your overall thesis seems to me very sympathetic. I'm not a great expert at the topic of information theory. I've always had the feeling that it's oversold and I'm really rid of talking about that. And it's again, in a nutshell, saying what is information theory and what is its distinguishing feature, you know? What is this? This will interest me. Is that an unfair question? I don't detect much consistency in that as it looks to information theories themselves. And so, kind of hard for someone who doesn't do a good job to actually give them a fair representation of what they're going to say. I don't think that their intelligence isn't dependent on it. I think you could start off by just saying the entropy isn't good, the entropy is there because it didn't actually proceed good enough.

15:00 I like to make the basis that it will play out to be a little bit of a contradiction between the integration theory and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. But still I don't think it's going to be. There won't be anything special here. The idea of a settled action presenting a paradigm with a point of view proves the information of entropy. You can get something as precise as the idea of a challenge in a challenge book. Or in the case of quantum mechanics, you can have an equation which has the same thing on one side. An information theory is the study of changes in space all around when you make certain restrictions. And the ultimate picture of the second law has been detected by being predominantly in large volume mathematics. But is that what you sort of had in mind about the physical significance of space? Yes, but they're not very good. I think that, for example, Albert's chance is correct in that that particular new Boltzmann entropy actually is what we would see decreasing systematically in the mathematics system, but still you have this thing that you've got definitions of the second order that aren't viable. Which raises the question, what could be the measure of entropy that decreases with and so forth and so forth. I prefer using the Gibbs-Schumann unknown entropy, but then that does give probabilities in that pattern. I don't think I have a particularly good answer to that. I would like to contemplate it in terms of density matrices and the likelihood of a state. It's a possible direction, but I don't have an answer to that as well.

17:30 We meet again at 2 o'clock. Those of you who have questions, those of you who haven't, let's not stay for too long. Thank you very much for your attention and I look forward to seeing you again soon.