Alain Badiou XX/06/05 Alain Badiou 2005
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Recorded at XX/06/05 Alain Badiou (2005), featuring Alain Badiou. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.

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0:00 Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. They haven't registered the passage from 8th to 15th. Good evening, we are here for the last session of this year. We will now take a moment to meet you for the next year. The first course of the next year will be on Friday 19th October. If everything goes well. The three first course of the next year will be on Friday 19th October, on Friday 30th November and on Friday 11th December. In the same conditions in principle. It's a question that there are travaux in this room, there are incertitudes, but in principle in the same conditions. So that's it, but I'll just remind you of the articulation of this year on the next year.

2:30 as we will come to the end of this session, we will have a certain number of operators allowing to proceed to what I call identification of adversity in the contemporary world, the identification non dialectic of adversity, and so an element of situation, of orientation, precisely, because the title general is how to orient the thought, how to orient the thought, how to orient the existence. And the next year it will be more conceptually, it is to say it will be more concentrated to the assembly, to the articulation, to the collection of a certain number of concept operators, destinées precisely à ressaisir cette identification, cette localisation, cette circonstance finalement au sens radical du mot dans un élément qui permette de la redisposer. Cette redisposition étant l'enjeu de la troisième année et dernière année de ce séminaire qui tentera d'apporter une réponse à comment s'orienter en existence. It's in order to nominate, to say what can signify a real orientation of the subject in the contemporary circumstances. contemporary. This is for the announcement of the next year. I also wanted to give you two indications about the elements that we can consider, after all, as notes marginals at this seminar. First, these are two representations of my theater theater Ahmed Le Subtil, which will have lieu at Theater XIII. And the Theater XIII is the theater XIII, as his name is, and it is located 103A Boulevard Auguste Blanqui. So, 103A Boulevard Auguste Blanqui, Theater XIII. in fact, in the metro Glacier. And that's a lie, that's a lie the 24th and the 25th, June.

5:00 So, Wednesday and Saturday, the next week, at 20h30. Now, I'll tell you, not by narcissism evident, this is the first point, but also because it's a, Amel de Chipsis is written it's about 20 years ago. And I think it's interesting to see it in this case, in this case, where you think about what you have to think, to see it, to see it, to see it, it's also an element of identification, after all, the system of the difference between the world of 20 years, this piece was written in 1984, and the world of today. And also, perhaps more important, the invariants. Very frappant, very frappant. Invariants who carry on everything that there is already in the piece of predictive quant to the constitution of a certain exteriority of the people to any real nomination. which is, as you know, the massive sense that it is to give to the Non to the Constitution. It is a Non which, in any case, we can talk a lot about it, but it is absolutely something that is something like a pronunciation of the exteriority. What about what, in fact? Probably, in fact, precisely, to play against adversity. C'est-à-dire, le nom est un nom qui se faufile, qui transcende l'opposition, ou entre majorité et opposition précisément. C'est quelque chose qui est non-inscriptible dans la figure admise ou reçue de la contradiction ou de l'adversité. C'est un nom diagonal, on peut l'appeler comme ça. It's not a non-oppositionnel, it's a non-diagonal, it's to say he is not clearly inscriptible in the game as it is coded, and as the journalists are the guardian, so they are not happy in general. but that it's not good for them. And then as you will see, I had, at this time,

7:30 called the main character of this piece, which is so an Arab of Banlieue, an Algérien of Banlieue, I was called a diagonal character, precisely when I talked about the piece at this time. And this element of diagonality, this element of traverse, like that, which rôde and which manifest from time and time, which crystallize from time and time is an element invariant very important of the situation contemporaine. The problem is to know precisely how to transform an orientation. And we could say that the problem is not only political but the problem much vast that we propose the world contemporain is how to transform an orientation. Alors qu'évidemment les orientations sont normalement vectorisées, c'est-à-dire le plan est normé et les orientations sont inscriptibles comme orientations. Si vous avez une vraie diagonale, elle transperche le plan où elle est hors coordonnée et elle se présente d'abord comme une désorientation. And everyone has obviously received the name of the theorem as disorientant, in a way essential. The comments are what we're going to do, there's no orientation defined, etc. And in fact, it is disorientant. And the problem is to know how this is disorientant can be distributed as orientation. That was the first point, the second, well the second, and many of you have already been avertis in reality, I will propose, in the case of the conference of the Rouge Gorge, a conference, the 28th, the 28th, at 18h, you take care of the time, and it is located at the place called the Point Ephemère. It's a beautiful name, the Point Ephemère, it's a beautiful name also, and it's 200 quays de Valmy, 200 quays de Valmy au métro Jaurès c'est une conférence sur l'ensemble des conférences du Rougetage sont des conférences assignées au rapport entre politique et histoire, quelque chose comme ça, donc des sites historiques de la politique en tant que méditation sur qu'est-ce que nous pouvons retenir ou penser aujourd'hui et dans quel contexte sur un certain nombre d'épisodes fondamentaux de l'histoire de l'émancipation And there it goes on the constitution of the popular popular category in China in the years 1920. So it's a very defined sequence.

10:00 As you can see, what I propose to say, to argument, is that beyond the singularity of the situation of the popular popular in a country like China in the years 1920, there is an example extremely strong of what I call in my own jargon the constitution of a body subject a body subjectivist, a body of a new body a new figure of the corporality subjective in the space of the politics and that is it that is interesting beyond the anecdote of the singularity of the historical sequence and that in particular since this time, it is the thesis that I soutenir the proposition of Mao and that strict le parti n'est pas suffisant pour la constitution d'un tel corps et que le parti qui la tradition léniniste incarne désigne ou nomme précisément le corps subjectivable de la politique dès cette époque là et ça continuera jusqu'à en un certain escala révolution clinique dès cette époque là Mao est propose une disposition beaucoup plus complexe du corps une disposition du corps political, the body of what he calls the popular power, which internal composition is not deductible to the party. This is what is interesting in an era where in any way, in any way, there is a sort of or in any way, in any way, the heritage that represents in the space of the politics the question of the party. So these were the two announcements that I wanted to make. And now we take our affair regarding the identification non dialectic of adversity. I believe to say that we have come to three conclusions in this research which has traversed These are quite unique, because we are very much supported, and we will continue to support today, maybe more on the poets than on the doctrines of politics or the philosophers. And in terms of this work, we are coming to, I believe, three conclusions, if we are a bit schématique. It's not in the order where they have been exposed here.

12:30 First, there are two ways of the identification process of what is the adversary, which I propose to say that it should be a self-straire. by the ways non dialecticals, which are not the ways that are not in any way, even those which I'm going to pose, but they are not in contradiction. Because our start question is this, it is, what does it mean in the general space of the existence that there is an adversity if we think without the support of the logic of the contradiction? If we think in a space which is not immediately the one who identifies the adversary in the dialectic of the devenir. So that's our problem. And inside the solutions possible of this problem, I propose to say that there are two voices dominantes in their articulations in which it is necessary to be used to. The voice that I call, a little like that, by provocation, that I call the gauche, that we can also call the opposition, if we and which I said that her essence was to force an acquiescement in the figure of adversity. It is that she organized a figure of adversity like what she works in this figure of adversity is a particular form of acquiescement to what there is. that it is for this reason that the left disorienting the thought. That's why it is a major force of disorientation. And the particular form of disorientation that she instrues, it is to install the deception as an obligation to the politics. because what is presented as a figure of adversity is in reality brought to a subjectivity of accomplishment.

15:00 And the particularity of the thought is of course to be in this paradoxical situation, which is in the sense of the subjective and the deception, and finally to install the idea that the deception is obligatory. And that finally what we can expect better is to be déçu. and d'où le système de perpétuelle reconstruction de la gauche vous remarquerez que la gauche est toujours à reconstruire aujourd'hui plus jamais elle est toujours à reconstruire mais ce n'est pas un attribut accidentel c'est ça qui est c'est une c'est une c'est un c'est un attribut intrinsèque. C'est-à-dire, elle doit être reconstruite. Parce qu'elle est toujours défaite, naturellement, puisque sa figure d'activité est de proposer l'opposition à la figure de l'acquiescement. Donc elle organise la déception et au terme de cette déception, elle doit être reconstruite. Et c'est une figure, c'est vraiment le rocher de Sisyphes, la gauche. Vous la reconstruisez, vous le montez au sommet de la colline et puis après il vous roule dessus. Voilà. Mais ça marche. J'insiste sur le point très intéressant que ça marche. C'est-à-dire qu'effectivement c'est une... on est... on peut dire condamné gauche comme on dit condamné à mort condamné à gauche c'est le destin commun on est tous un peu condamné à gauche alors ça c'est une figure alors c'est donc elle marche elle marche comme comme un destin comme une condamnation subjective d'où la tentation de la figure alternative que rebel and that technically we can call the voice nihilist like the other the opposition and then it's forcer the first it's forcer the acquiescement as a figure obligée of adversity and there it's forcer the affirmation of the rien as a figure obligée of discordance the figure obligée of discordance so in fact the adversity in a sense radicalisée s'effectue en définitive dans l'affirmation du rien de ce que le quelque chose en tant que tel

17:30 est finalement toujours corrompu dans cette figure là ou dans cette voie nihiliste il n'y a pas naturellement on ne force pas l'acquiescement mais l'affirmation est évidée en quelque sorte il y a l'affirmation, le corréla affirmatif the discordance, the heterogène, the inacceptation, the content of the inacceptation, the content of the affirmation of the inacceptation was evident. It is to say that it is, it is in the sense that it is a definitive orientation nihilist. And there it is, it is the condemnation of nothing as a single figure absolutely disjoint. Well, I don't want to talk about all this because we're going to talk about it, but I think it's an element of situation very important which is that not only we have to propose a non-dialectic way, which is the general schéma, it's to say an identification of the adversary who is not simply negative, it's not because I say non that I identify the adversities, not even this time, by the way, In fact, the non is diagonal, but the adversary which he constitutes is insaisable in the same time. It's the same who are there, but the others don't do better. We have said no, as diagonal general of the situation. But the consequence is obscure by definition. So the non-dialectic, the non-diagonal is already something that is not exactly reductive to the logic of the contradiction, but that is not possible to talk about how to talk about it. C'est-à-dire, ça reste toujours, je m'identifie selon la négation de l'adversaire sans que la primauté de l'affirmation soit saisissable. Alors non seulement nous devons sortir de l'orientation dialectique, mais nous devons sortir aussi des figures appariées et en vérité dominantes de la gauche et du rebelle, It's the way opposition and the way nihilist, which, and it's very important to say, are these voices always open, and they don't have a protocol of fermeture, they are always available, and at the same time, they are always ready, and they are always ready, but their essence is their commencement.

20:00 And these are protocols of capture. These voices have a great capacity to capture, including those who would present themselves as heterogene to them. Alors ça c'est une analyse particulière, j'y reviendrai sans doute l'année prochaine J'accorde beaucoup d'importance à la question de qu'est-ce que c'est qu'une capture Pourquoi si souvent, et vous voyez que c'est la question de l'orientation Pourquoi si souvent une décision, un mouvement, une situation, une nouveauté sont capturées Elles sont capturées par une disposition qui les désoriente C'est-à-dire qu'elles ne trouvent pas leur orientation They are disaimantées, they are perds the North. And that is what I call the procedure of capture. There is a whole discourse of alienation. The banality on this point is that the novelty and the capitalism have a power of alienation, of appropriation, of everything that is new. I think it is a bit schématique. I think that the procedures of capture are often infiniment subtiles in reality. Infiniment subtiles. And that the key element of a capture is the moment where what was in promise of orientation is disorientated. And so it is necessary to examine the mechanisms of disorientation. Naturally, the capture by the left is the type of disorientation, but we are not interested in the details of the mechanisms of capture. Or, it is an existential experience fundamental, the capture. there again, we take the picture of the political example because they are the most evident today, but for example, there is a capture of the projection amoureuse which is very interesting to study from près, it is to say that there where something should be oriented, there is an element of disorientation which is very interesting to analyze in itself, because it is not like a fatality, or it is not the thesis that love is very beautiful at the beginning, and that somehow it goes towards its decadence. It is not at all that. It is an element of... It is a question of logic. It is a question of logic. It is a capture of logic. It is to impose a logic that it is oriented the first logic. It's a logic. It's a logic which is imposed on the first and creates an obliquity or a disorientation. These mechanisms, it should be armed conceptually for the study, and they are fundamental today.

22:30 They are fundamental today because today the general situation is that the situation is disorientated. And our experience is disorientated. I don't think it's just our experience political-etatical, but our experience existentielle is disorientated. And she is disorienting as if the disorientation was a regime of being, at the point that she is often validated, vindicated. A great number of rights that we propose are the rights to the disorientation, the right absolute to be completely paumé. It's a great affirmation of the democratic freedom. I have the right to not understand it, to be lost, to be lost, to be paumé, to be nothing at all, to never do what I want. I have the right to be in the malheur of the disorientation. And finally, the freedom in the sense immédiat includes the freedom of the disorientation. But in reality, the disorientation is a capture. So this was all the first pieces, the first acquisition of this year. The second concern the question of the form of the identification of adversity. The first, it's two voies supplémentaires to source. The second, it's quant to the form. What is the adversity in its form? to Platon. That's why it's formal. We are going to go to Platon when we have highlighted that there is a fundamental gesture that is the identification of the sophists as adversaries of philosophy. We have said that the adversity is a synthesis of proximity and incommensurability. There is a formula that we have proposed. It is to say that the real adversity is something And almost indiscernible, it's not at all what is loin, what is exterior, what is like a substance other. That's a false adversary. It's what is, at the same time, intimement close, but at the same time, all a bit incommensurable.

25:00 And so the formalism of adversity in its essence non dialectic must be conceived as this apparition of the extreme proximity and an element, however, différentiel in the figure of the incommensurability. Now I would simply say, well there is not a definition that we have produced, I would I would like to elaborate or in five minutes a little bit more this question of the form, it is to say the synthetics disjonctive of proximity and incommensurability which which makes that the adversity is what we traverse also. It's to say that it's intimement proche, it's not... We can't define the adversity by exteriority. But I would like to take a look at the question logically, a little bit more, or ontologically also. the question question qu'est-ce qui me sépare de l'adversaire qu'est-ce qui me sépare en moi-même de l'adversité si l'adversité m'est aussi immanente vous voyez que si on dit que l'adversité c'est une synthèse de proximité et d'incommensurabilité on ne peut plus What I see from the adversary is a relationship, even a negative relationship. And what I see from the adversary is not the relationship that I entretied with him, sous the form, for example, of a relationship dialectic, which makes that the adversary would simply be the one I am, or the one I am, my negation. But it's a relationship. It's a relationship. The essence dialectic of the adversary thinks the adversity as a relationship. If you say that it is incommensurable, it is that you say that there is no relation. It is all proche, but it is not related to it. So it is not a relation that is susceptible to define the adversities. It is one of the reasons for which we have encountered the echo of this in the poem of Pasolini. The reason for which the figure of the opposition can't be a figure of the adversities,

27:30 because it is entirely relational. The line majority opposition, for example, is a line normer, it is a relationship and, of course, the rules of this relationship are accepted by the two parties. So it is an adversities fallacious. It is relational, it is not dialectic in the strict sense, but it is relational. And the relationship dialectic, even if you say, my relationship is my relationship of class, on regard d'un ordre qu'il s'agit de détruire, et telle est l'identité de mon adversaire, vous êtes encore dans la relation. Donc le point c'est que ce qui me délie de mon adversaire, ou de ce qui constitue l'adversité, n'est pas relationnel. Alors c'est quoi ? C'est quoi si ce n'est pas relationnel ? C'est un problème très difficile et très profond. If it's not relational, we need to focus on incommensurability and proximity. If it's not relational, how do we define proximity? Well, the proximity, it seems to be a relationship. It's what is close. My adversary is my intimate adversary, in the sense where he is very close, and proximity seems to be a relationship. So it's a major point, it's a major point, to define the proximity other than by a relationship. Now you have an only way to define the proximity other than by a relationship, it's that there is a common term. It's to say there is something common, it's not a relationship, it's something common. It's that which will define the proximity. There is a common point. common. And so it's ontological and not relational. You see? And that the adversaire has a common common with me. We have to support that. It is not the term exterior which I am related by a negative. He has a common common with me. And this common common, in the same time, the commensurability indicates that he is evaded, disappeared, because if he was there, there would be commensurability by the point common, precisely. You see? Now it's a logical problem, but quite fascinating.

30:00 I tell you that many of the contemporaries of this question of the common point as a disparate point. We call it like that. We call it that the proximity of the common point is a disparate point. but who is there as a disparate person. This common point, as a disparate person, will constitute an incommensurability because, on the other side, it is accessible as an existent, as a disparate person, And on another side, it is, at the contrary, like what constitutes adversity, so like a point essential or, I would say, existent. is the fact that the common common, which is the common common, which constitutes the proximity, is a common common which, on the side of the adversary, if you want, is pensé as an enemy, it is pensé as a rien, pensé as an enemy, and that is on the other side, the side of the identity which constitutes the adversities, is, at the same time, considered as existent or essential. Even if, in fact, non-existent. So, finally, the general dialect of the incommensurability at the interior of the proximity depends on a common point evanousant. But, obviously, a common point evanousant, you can consider either, according to its evanousness, it's to say, as a rien, or according to its being, it's to say, as a interior of the adversity, the totality. I will give you some examples. But what we need to do is keep in mind the general logic of the thing. In the contemporary society, What can we say of what is really intimate, for example, I'm going to take an example of political, then an example of artistic, what is what is in proximity to incommensurable the two positions that would be really heterogeneous?

32:30 Well, you can do it in searching the term common. And the term common, in my sense, in the contemporary society, it's the ouvrier from the foreign language. And his importance is there. His importance is not numeric, classist, etc. His importance is that he is the discriminant radical as a common term of what can be a synthesis of proximity and incommensuality. Why? Because it is common to an orientation, an orientation of an emancipated or progressist, and to an orientation reactionary, to an adversary, it is completely common by the importance that he is recognized. Even if you listen to Sarkozy or Bill Payne, you have the impression that it is the monster who really menace. Véritablement. Rien n'est plus urgent que de faire des plans, des lois pour le persécuter, le traquer, etc. C'est un point majeur de la disposition politique. Puis de l'autre côté aussi, parce que c'est un exemple particulier du sans-droit qui devrait avoir des droits, etc. Nous n'entrons pas dans les détails, si vous voulez. Mais vous voyez bien que d'un côté, ce qui est énoncé, c'est qu'il ne devrait pas exister à proprement parle. It's that, it's his existence that is his essence, it's to say that he is here but he doesn't have to be, he doesn't have to be, and so it is absolutely affirming his existence as principally, On dirait au contraire qu'il est l'exemple même de la positivité du droit possible, tel qu'une société en autre pourrait le pratiquer ou l'admettre. Et naturellement, ça va être aussi une querelle des noms. Parce que si vous le nommez comme inexistant, vous le nommez clandestin. Clandestin, ça veut dire qu'il est là, il ne devrait pas y être. Et si vous le nommez sur l'autre bord, vous allez le nommer ouvrier ou comme vous voulez. You are going to call it a non-positif.

35:00 Or, this articulation is not an articulation relationnelle, you understand. It is an articulation by a proper term, which is common to two spaces, which the status of existence is recognized in a certain sense from the two sides. From one side, because it is recognized that it should not exist. of the other because it is considered excluded from the sphere of the right and in this sense, affected by the existence. Simply, of the one hand, the existence will be assumed as the effective status of the term and of the other, in the other hand, all the orientation will be to change this existence in existence. It is to be a part of the fact that this existence exists because it becomes the existence that all the politics can be done. Now you have, I think, I don't know the general scheme, but it is to my opinion absolutely fundamental because in all the spheres of the proximity incommensurable, as it constitutes l'adversité véritable, nous allons, le point fondamental est d'identifier le terme et d'aller jusqu'à la racine de son inexistence affirmée. Un exemple esthétique, alors maintenant tout à fait général, en fait, si vous regardez bien, an artistic mutation constitue, se joue à propos d'une disposition formelle qui est considérée comme le devenir forme de l'informe ou qui est considérée comme informe du point de vue de l'immédiat de la situation artistique. Well, the form plays the same role that the existence, the exclusion, or the abstrait of all right, etc. And on one side, you can say that the form, as an informe, is exterior to the art. And on the other, you will at the contrary soutenir that it's the devenir form of this form, which is precisely the open source of the moment. And so the same term, it's to say the same constellation formelle, is apprehended from one side, it's the same term, so it is shared, it is common, but it will be considered from one side.

37:30 quant à son inexistence formelle ce qui est bien reconnu par tout le monde mais de l'autre cette inexistence formelle doit précisément advenir à la surexistence de la création et on peut montrer que n'importe quel conflit artistique majeur se joue en effet là aussi autour non pas du tout d'une négation dialectique mais autour de l'identification d'un terme singulier saisir sur son bord d'inexistence ou sur son bord de surexistence je donne un dernier exemple which is an example which is an example which is an example of the theory of numbers on appelle on appelle nombre dans les nombres réels on appelle nombre transcendant un nombre qui qui n'est pas qui n'est pas solution d'une d'une équation à coefficient entier vous pouvez comprendre ça quand même pas horriblement difficile parce que vous avez equal to zero with the coefficients entiers, well, if x is inconnu and solution to that, we say that it is a number algebraic. If there is no equation where the number is solution, we say that it is transcendent. Well, of course, you imagine that trouver a number transcendent is quite difficult, because to find a number algebraic, it is to find a equation that corresponds to a number transcendent, it is a negative definition. And so, for a long time, we thought that the number transcendent was a rare, that there was not many, that they were really particular, very inaccessible, if I could say, from the point of view of the protocol of calculus. And then Cantor demonstrates that in reality, almost all the numbers are transcendent. It is to say that in reality, the numbers in Algebrie, there is not many. It inverse absolutely the thing. It's a typical example of the same point on the definition of which everyone is aware. It's to say that a number of transcendence is a root of any algebraic equation. It's a very simple and very clear, negative, but very simple and very clear. It bascule from the quasi-existence, we know very very few, it's very difficult to show one, to the coexistence, it's to say they are in fact almost all transcendence. And in reality, those who are rare, they are the algebraic, not transcendence. Because there it's a very strong metaphor, as always the best metaphors, it's a very strong metaphor, it's a very strong metaphor, it's a metaphor exactly what we need to hear from passage from the quasi-inexistence to the sur-existence.

40:00 You can see that there it's the version mathematiques of we are nothing, so we are all. It's the international number, the international number. The transcendent, it was nothing, in reality, it was everything, via Kantan. The metaphor can be pushed further, it will introduce us to the third time of the record. The transcendent number, Cantor démontre that almost all the numbers are transcendent. But it is very difficult to show one. It is not the same thing to show massive numbers, but to show one. And we thought that they were almost inexistent until we had as the only protocol to show one. For example, we showed that the number Pi, the famous number Pi, was transcendent. This is a demonstration extremely complicated. Just to show that Pi is transcendent, we have to seriously tremper his chemise mathématiques. And it is very difficult to say that it is a number transcendent. Par contre, en paquet, vous pouvez dire qu'il y a beaucoup de nombres transcendants. Ce qui veut dire quoi ? Ce qui veut dire qu'en réalité, la transcendance, c'est le générique du nombre. C'est-à-dire que c'est ce qui, si on prend les nombres dans leur indiscernabilité générale, est leur attribut essentiel. C'est-à-dire presque tout nombre est transcendant. Ce n'est pas un prédicat facile à attribuer à un nombre particulier. But it is a predicament that can be attributed to almost all of them. You see that we touch on there a protocol of distinction between constructible and generic. What we will say is that it is very difficult to construct a number transcendent and to demonstrate precisely that a number is transcendent and that, on the contrary, what we have access is to the genericity of the transcendence as a massive characteristic of the numericity of the real numbers. which is really a typical example of a bascule of the existence to the sur-existence with this remarkable point in prime that the quasi-inexistence relates to the constructive demonstrative while the sur-existence relates to the généricity it relates to the non-prédication general

42:30 or that is perhaps a law also On peut peut-être faire cette hypothèse qu'à chaque fois qu'on passe dans la construction de l'adversité d'un point d'inexistence à un point de surexistence sur le même terme, on passe aussi d'un protocole constructible à un protocole générique. C'est-à-dire qu'on passe aussi de quelque chose qui est de l'ordre du prédicat, de la propriété, à quelque chose qui n'est pas de l'ordre du prédicat ou de la propriété. And this is, for example, the first example that I took, it's to say the workers of origin is absolutely manifest. If you continue to consider that their identity is predicative, it's to say that it's their nationality, their paper, their state, etc. that they define, that they define their... Well, you never enter, of course, in the commutation which declare that it is in reality to give them their rights as they are here, as they are here, as they live here. that if you change the predicative logic in a logic that is a logic that is a logic generative. It is to say that it is people like us. It is all what we will say. We will not start from the fact that they are sénégalais, noirs, arabes, musulmans, etc. We will start from the fact that the logic egalitarian is that in fact that they are there, they are like us and there is no reason to discriminate. But you see that if you abandon You abandonnez la discrimination, you abandonnez les protocoles de constructions prédicatives au profit, évidemment, d'une affirmation qui est une affirmation générique, une affirmation d'égalité générique. Et peut-être que c'est toujours comme ça. Il faudrait peut-être que chaque fois que l'adversité se construit sur la commutation du même terme de l'inexistence à la surexistence, en réalité, ce qu'il y a par en dessous, c'est le passage d'une logique de la constructibilité, une logique générique. Sur l'exemple artistique, c'est très clair. C'est-à-dire que si vous abandonnez le fait que la discrimination entre la forme et l'informe est structurée par des codifications constructibles, vous allez incorporer de l'informe à la forme, en réalité, vous allez incorporer ce qui était informe à la forme en déclarant une nouvelle vertu générique de l'informe lui-même. You are obligated to enlarge what you recognize as a form in order to include egalitarian the form anterior discriminatory.

45:00 C'est bien que toute mutation artistique est aussi toujours une orientation qui bascule certains éléments informes du côté d'une généricité formelle. Entraînant quoi ? Entraînant les réactions académiques du type vous faites n'importe quoi, les gardiens de la forme, c'est-à-dire les gardiens de la constructibilité vont traiter les nouvelles formes comme ils traitent les ouvriers étrangers. C'est-à-dire exclusions, réglementations nouvelles, etc. Donc ne croyez pas que tout ceci circule. Et là aussi on pourrait faire de l'investigation sur d'autres procédures génériques. Je pense que l'investigation sur qu'est-ce que c'est que le passage d'un terme commun en amour du champ de la constructibilité au champ de la généricité est une enquête extraordinairement intéressante. It's very interesting. And in fact, she says this, that the incorporation to the duality amoureuse, whatever it is, her proposition, the incorporation has for adversaire the point inexistent, the point inexistent common. And this point inexistent common, it is just or simply the difference itself. The two, the two, the two as well. And the question is to know if the two as well, or the difference as well, is treated in the love of love as the point which should exist or as the point which should exist, is the real debate of the trajectory. So, it was on the second point. We can really support that Quant à la forme, l'adversité est une synthèse de proximité et d'incommensurabilité, c'est-à-dire en définitive le système de devenir du terme commun. Du terme commun en tant que terme évanouissant, en tant que terme disparaissant, en tant que terme suspendu entre inexistence et surexistence. Et donc, j'insiste, il y a toujours là des analyses de situation. In general, the analysis of a situation of adversity is always the identification of this term. And so it does not relate to a general relation.

47:30 This is a point of a big conflict ideological between those who think that adversity relates to a general relation and those like me who think that it does not relate to a general relation But it relates to a procedure, always singular, of identification of the common term, which, in fact, constitutes the intimacy of adversity. And then the third point, the third key, it was the content. Well, we are already entered. We have said that, finally, all this is in opposition to the multiplicity constructible and the multiplicity generics. And in reality, in a situation determined, the adversary, the adversary, is always presented as the propos of a reduction of the generic constructible. It is always to say that a certain type of universality should be brought to the particularity of the constructible. That's why the adversary always manifests itself as an appel to reality. To say that every adversary is reality, not in all the domain. There is a political reality, but then the terrible reality matrimonial is not less perilous as to the generic value of the two, of the two. So it's always the idea that the genericity pretend, or the genericity affirmation, or the element generics that we have touched, can't be stabilized, can't be normated. There is to bring it, to reduce it, to requalify it, to give it the predicates of its constructibility. Ah, ça c'est une identité qu'on peut poursuivre partout. And then, the problem at which we came about is that, the procedure of identification of adversity, which is so constructible and generic at the end of the end, should well have its own protocol of constructability.

50:00 Otherwise, we would only be liable to the experience, in a way, mystic of the generic. If the generic was entirely liable to any constructions, you would have no procedure to talk about the orientation in the existence, in the thinking, in the politics, where you want. you would have simply the epiphanie of the generics of time and time like miraculous it is a theory which can exist you can say that finally there is no matter that is a miracle and there is the epiphanie of the generics of time and time we touch like that the multiple as an being multiple absolutely non-reductible to a certain predicament it is an intuition it is an exception which doesn't give any procedure, and so, and this is obviously the important point, which is not source of orientation, which is not oriented. It is called, but it is not oriented. You are surrounded by the eventual epiphanies of the généricity, but it doesn't result in any orientation, and that is not the result of no orientation. So this is what we could call the mystic procedure. It's still a voice. We can show, this has been done for a long time, I don't know, that she has an appearance profond with the voice nihilist, in reality. Sauf that she pretends that what appears is the being and not the nothing. But as it's an epiphanie pure, it's very difficult to distinguish. It's a long time that Hegel has said that if you are in the epiphanie pure, distinguishing the being and the being is impossible. because of the being in the pure apparition, how can you distinguish it from the neant? There is no predicament, there is no constructible, there is no element of difference. So we know very well that the question of knowing if the mystic is a disparition in the abyss of the being or in the abyss of the neant is a dissent. It cannot be tranched. And this voice is the one of the epiphanies of the généricity. in politics, it's the way that in reality the only thing that we can expect it's the movements it's to say there are sequences of movements and that and there we have the epiphanie of the généricity because the movement

52:30 it's a thing it's something that doesn't come without a predicament if it comes without a predicament it's not a movement it's another thing it's a revendication it's a corporation It's a real movement, it's a generic movement in its essence. December 1995, it's an indubitably generic movement. There are masses of people of all sorts who descend on the street, they don't even know why, but it's that which is good. It's epiphanic, it's epiphanic. It's reproduced with the non, in a certain way. There is a flagrant parent between the movement of December 1995 It's the same genre, it's the same disposition. What was done once in the street was done once in the street once in the street. And that, it's epiphanic. That, if there is that, there is, in the field of politics, but in the other fields, there are illustrations amoureuses or artisticals of this point, there is no intuition of the generic in its appearance imprevisible. And nothing can be oriented, it doesn't give an orientation, it gives an satisfaction, a joy. And so if we want to have orientation, we have to propose that there is a type of constructability which will make the generic appear as a result of the constructible established. It is to say that there is a procedure, which is something constructible, where the unique destination is to make the generic appear like at the inverse or at the fault or at the fault of the constructible established, the constructible dominant, the constructible which makes everything there is. And I propose to call it a diagonal constructibility. So we could define, if you have a representable, you would have a procedure of constructibility established in a field determined, who accept as multiplicity that the multiplicity predicative, so it's a procedure constructible effective, is not admitted that what is present in a discipline

55:00 in a discipline under a predicat hierarchical. Okay. And then you would have a procedure, a procedure, a procedure, a procedure, which would be in a seizure of the one, and which, at the point of intersection, if I could say, would appear that at the inverse of the constructible established or in its own own own, something generic could be shown. And it's that, it's that the constructibility diagonal. Now, diagonal is a word, I'm going to say here, which is a word used for a certain type de démonstration en mathématiques. Il y a un argument, un type d'argument qu'on appelle un argument diagonal. Et l'argument diagonal, c'est très intéressant à voir, je ne vais pas vous donner d'exemple ici tout de suite, mais l'argument diagonal qui est un argument fondamental dans l'oeuvre de Cantor, c'est dans la théorie des multiplicités, c'est un type d'argument par It's an argument that's absurd. It's an argument that consists, I'm going to metaphorise a little bit, that if a type of predicament applies to a multiplicity, I make this hypothesis. For example, I suppose that all numbers are algebraic. so if a type of predicament applies to a type of multiplicity I will show you that because there is this predicament for everyone there is just one who doesn't have the predicament so it's not an argument so it's not to conclude that there is not the predicament for everyone but the interest of the argument diagonal retenez-en bien the form it's that we talk about the hypothesis there is a predictable construction applicable to all the multiplicity, and we show that this predictable construction is such that if we suppose that it applies to everyone, we will just show that there is no one in which it does not apply. And this will ruin naturally the initial hypothesis. In this sense that it is a reasoning by absurd. It is interesting to look at examples, but for example what I told you earlier, showing that the majority the majority of the real numbers are transcendent, it is shown in this way,

57:30 because it shows that if we suppose that all the real numbers are algebraic, or that the majority of the real numbers are algebraic, then we will always exhibit one who is not. So one who is transcendent. What is interesting in this argument diagonal, and for our purpose, is that it is an argument which is an exception. It's an argument, so it's an argument, so it's a construction, it's a procedure, but it has no other meaning that to exhibit an exception to a supposed predicate general. the hypothesis that there is a general rule of multiplicity, and in examining the procedure itself, we will mount a diagonal procedure which will exhibit an exception. And then, obviously, this leads us to a fundamental consideration on the link between genericity and exception, which are contrary. Because the generic, it is precisely the essence So non-prédicative, of multiplicity. Que lien peut-elle avoir avec la singularité d'une exception ? Justement, on montre le défaut d'un prédicat en exhibant une exception et après on montre que l'exception est générique, en fait. Que c'est l'exception qui est générique et pas le prédicat. Ça c'est une démarche fondamentale de la pensée contemporaine, à mon sens. C'est-à-dire que le générique n'est désignable que par la construction d'une procédure d'exception. Autrement dit, il n'est pas, il est absolument rebelle à toute approche statistique. It's to say, what is, or majoritarian, or all that you want. And the generic n'entre in scène, n'en s'annonce, if you want, in a procedure, that's what the argument diagonal demonstrates absolutely. And this is a major lesson, which is that the dialectic, the dialectic ordinary, remain liées à la conviction qu'on accède aux choses par les traitements de masse, par les

1:00:00 traitements majoritaires. La loi de la démocratie elle-même est, comme vous le savez, la loi majoritaire et elle affirme que, en un sens qui est ici numérique, la majorité exprime la généricité. of the multiplicity considered. That is a fundamental argument of the democratic argument. Because otherwise, we would say, why the majority? What is the virtue of the majority? The virtue of the majority is to be expressive of the multiplicity of the multiplicity. That's why you can read in the journal, when there is a vote at 50,5% against 49,5%, the French have said that, the French have decided that, etc. And you read it like a natural literature, it does not indign it. It does not indign it. It does not indign it. It does not indign it. It does not indign it. It does not indign it that the majority is absolutely represented as what the French have said or said. And why? Why 50,5% of the people would be more French than 49,5%? Franchement, there is no reason. Sinon, the hypothesis quasi-ontological is that you find, that you find, as well as Rousseau, in the social contract, that you find as funder of the designation of the majority, is that the majority expires the generisity of the multiplicity. and that it is the procedure constructible of something that will finally express, we don't know very well why, but it is the thesis fundamental, it is the genericity of the multiplicity. So we are in a context which, of long date, appears that the procedure constructible proper to the genericity is massive, majoritarian or movementist. It is necessary to show that the genericity is in its mass. Or, what I believe that we need to support is that it's not at all like that. It's to say that as the argument diagonal shows it, and as in fact, after all the singular experience, it shows that the genericity enters in the mode of the exception, and not at all in the mode of the exception.