Putnam's Paradox (contd.)

0:00 So then I want to say, so it's not that objects aren't there, but it's just that they quite quickly become such that you can't refer to uniquely. So when I speak about the object at this patent position, what I mean is a object. And I'm still talking about an object and a pattern, so that doesn't lose the objects in time. You know, although it kind of makes, which one is there, and maybe that's perfect, something like locking the substance, which is really what you get to know. I don't know whether this is not deeply connected with the problem you raised about quantum statistics in the past time. Because this gives exactly the difference I was referring to between indistinguishability and impermeability. If there are objects which are strictly indescendable, which are x1, x2, x3, and you even remove the labels 1, 2, 3, they are absolutely discernible, then there is a sense in which you can permute them on their positions in this line of things. Whereas if it's clear that, well, if you accept that there is nothing more than repositions, then it's no longer possible even to conceive how to permute them. It's just impossible. So there is clearly two levels which are seldom distinguished between discernibility in the ordinary sense and an absence of even possibility of referring to the truth. So when you were saying that your solution was the only one which explained what the ethics is, I was not completely convinced because of that perspective, which is, I think, which which underlies many of the usual solutions to the problems that one is there.

2:30 Well, I think the point there is, I don't want to talk much about it, because I'm going to be talking about it at a moment. I think the thing is that one is, if one restricts oneself to totally symmetrize predicates, then the one, two, and three is not being used as names. These are just variables. They may take values of the same . So I don't think there's any presuppositions such as one can speak meaningful presentation. On the contrary, exactly by restricting myself to totally switches and predicates, one makes it clear that one can't say anything about one and one doesn't say anything about another. But look, there's something very funny about this. I'll be saying this on Monday, but I can't have to say anything now or how funny it is. that it's, when you do this, and then you have some non-sexual predicament, that this mode of expression, which is very standard, This is logically equivalent to totally symmetries and tens, because you can commute the X1, X2's, X3's, of course, and then because these are just dummy variables, you can commute these as well, so this is logically equivalent to X1, X2, X3, X2, X1, X3, for example. I mean, in a way, you already build in the symmetrization with this mode of expression. So, whatever you think you're saying with a totally symmetrized predicate, you know, it might seem like it's a terrible limitation. It's actually not much of a limitation in any way. you know but where what the thing is what you can't do is you can't you can't say admit the x1 that you know right and say x1 is the one that satisfies that that's what you can't do that's the sort of thing

5:00 Can you ask you a bit about how you characterize the solution to the whole, as I was saying, alternatives? I suppose that the one thing my theory tells you is to have the evolution of some existing that's going to be a falling equation. That means then, of course, that the solution of that equation will be correct. And if I give you some individual, some initial values, and the equation is supposed to predict what happened. So, suppose that the, like, there's my time axis, right? And there's a certain characteristic that describes the state. let's say pi, OK? And I give you pi of . And now it turns out that this equation has several solutions that look like this. Then it certainly looks like an indeterministic system, right? You want to say it isn't really, because suppose you give this solution, you get the other one just by applying symmetry, basically, you know, two different terms. Now, then the solution might be that you say, well, you know, we're trying to represent a real physical quantity, capital, capital, capital, sorry, capital. So, psi, so I should have made this in psi, okay, little psi, right, and, um, you're Here, we are representing this real digital property, and it's W. Now, one of these is representation little psi, and the other one is little psi prime.

7:30 And, of course, the fact that little psi of t has a certain value is exactly certain to little psi of time having the other value at t. Well, in that case, of course, we now still have a problem. Because we want to say, we want to predict what's going to happen to this. then you better tell us which is the one to use for our prediction so that would be the main problem so then it looks like what you're suggesting I think is that the real thing is to say no it's this whole family of things you get by your sympathies that represents right so that when you ask for what is this going to be like at time t you should give right all right but then of course I still have a problem which is to say well exactly what value of the real property does this stand for it can't be this number or this number it is we've got a signal. What was the step? Right? So, I still want to know how is the real thing represented by the model. Right, right. I think the right thing to say here is that you're not just plotting sign, you're also plotting five, and then you're getting something that it does something different, and which also splits. And then you've got another color. And what happens is that the way this splits is matched by the way this splits and the way this splits and so forth. And it's the relationship between the value of this one and the value of this one that doesn't change. Which is the same as the relation between this and what is the same. That's right. That's the same thing. So if I'm interested in the differences, you have the difference between this and this. And it's those relations between two different... That's right. Actually, there's what this thing is. But I think the same formula will come back and I say, you know, it's the combination of these two, and that is the quality that I am interested in. And it's evolution.

10:00 Yeah, but when you do that, it becomes difficult for your own thing. It isn't subject to its splitting like that. If I say that the phi field takes value 3 where the side field goes, then that becomes absolutely determined. But I feel that the way this isn't quite getting at the guts of the question, is, and I do think that it sort of leads you to something like a qualitative description by this one thought, perhaps, this business about values of fields taking the same value where some other field takes the value where some other field takes the same value. It's probably better to do it in terms of how do you find yourself, how do you find your way around in general relativity? Well, find some value, say, of the scalar, the sort of Ritchie scalar. It takes a maximum value, smaller values, in a neighborhood. And then Well, find some asymmetry in the way the Ritchie scalar changes. In fact, there's 10 scalars you can construct out of the remote sensor, which are more vanishing. And in the general situation, they do take on different values, and so forth. So you can imagine a quantitative description that says, take a saddle point, go in the direction of the saddle. Then, after you've proceeded, you can fix a distance by integrating a metric along the line of the cycle and pursue a certain distance and then, you know, make a 90 degree turn, you know. And that's how you sort of map your way out and create a representation, a description of where things are located. And it's very important. I thought state your thoughts in the energetic field in the GL. Well, that's how you, yes. I mean, that's, I mean, this would be an energetic field constructed out, you know, the scales of which it has that. But, um, I think the point about that is that

12:30 where it's actually much closer to the bone is the problem of time, where you've got the, You don't have equations of motion for any of these dynamical variables. If you take a view that only the invariance of the phase-gauge transformations and the invariance are physically meaningful, then you don't have dynamical equations of motion for any dynamical variables. and then you are looking just at this kind of qualitative description. It's giving you relations between field values and nothing but. What it seems to me is it's not... I don't really understand whether this amounts to anything like an algorithm to determine what physical qualities are. I mean, all right, the physical qualities of these invariant data are constant, but I don't think that you can have an algorithm for computing them. In some sense, if you've got the solution to the equations, then of course you can define it as a standard structure. But that's not a point that anyone's made in the literature, so maybe I'm wrong about that. And it seems to actually compare it to what he wants. But suppose even that you insist that all the real physical things, processes, properties, and so on, should be represented by diffeomorphism and varying objects. Doesn't it still remain, then, that you have to have an independent description of what identify it as whatever it is that's represented by this function, without making it feel useless. Well, I don't think it makes it feel useless because we have some interesting idea of what

15:00 Well, but that's what I'm asking. We shouldn't be backing away from that. I think that's taken for granted. But then that's part of the solution. Well, okay, but look, the way to do it, for example, is to get a collection of particles of motion that, say, sweep out planetary trajectories that we can do in a certain system. Describe that in a diffeomorphic, empiric way, and we ought to get something that is recognized if we've got the geometry and all the data sets that we've got. the relative angles and relationships of time maps pretty directly on to the different American artists. So, I know it's a long road to go, but I think eventually we arrive at a special temporal description, which is just recognizably what we deal with in our ordinary lives. I mean, I'm not saying that there isn't some background in Dexacore questions, by the way, because, of course, you may have such a description, but one could imagine another description It's important to what I understand by doing the descriptors that one can say they're the two identical sets of data, but it doesn't seem to be terribly important that we have a problem saying which one is ours. That's just a function of fire naturally, whatever. Indeed, if we had a finite universe, the problem would really arise. So that's strictly appropriate to do. So it's part of your solution, then, that the

17:30 The bifium, morphism, and equivalence classes do develop determinants, isn't it? Oh, yeah. Yeah. Okay. Oh, yeah. But they don't... Listen to the thing, you can't work with them to get equations in the bifium. I don't mind that. It presents a problem of quantization. It's important time. But I don't think it's a conceptual problem, except maybe this issue towards algorithmic. Well, I mean, the truth of it is the way we do it algorithmically is we work with some coordination system, and then we solve equations, and then we can define the equivalence concept So that's how we do it to the classic, because we cannot do that more mechanically than the problem. But I think in your heart you must see this as a solution to the paradox, as not being in the right direction. Well, you see, I was asking a leading question, because at a certain point he said, yes, but we do have an antecedent understanding of what it's referring to. That I think is crucial to eventually this dissolving process paradox. What I wonder a bit is the connection with Lewis, because this insists on these There's no question of ramsifying over these fields. I mean, we don't do that in physics. Or if we did do it in physics, it would be because we had something like a reconstruction of self theory in the physical theory. Does ramsifying make sense unless you've got it symbolized in the standard That's right. anything like that, we never answer, I mean, we're talking about specific field states and values, and we, in interpreting physical theory, we'll use natural language, and we'll talk about the image .

20:00 And those things are not being extensively defined in terms of the manifold points. They're not what a certain set of points have, and then if you shift the points around you've got a different extension, a different predicate. It just doesn't work like that. Rather we work with the predicates. We work with the predicates of physics, and from those we get to the construct objects. The amount of points that come out of your pattern is of interest, and that's why I was talking about that position, you know, we'd rather start talking about the space-time being at least that position or not that. So, none of that seems to me to be particularly bound up with having some antecedent understanding. I mean, that seems to be something in the semantics that is developed in physics. you know, some of the way the physical theory's leg couldn't come back in the world. And, yes, there's a bit of antecedent understanding, they're sure, but that doesn't seem to be the bottom line. The bottom line seems to be rather than those, you know, we don't define the concepts in terms of extensions. So that's why I think it might be a lesson for Putin's power. I mean, I'd really be sure there's a pragmatic background involved in real life, you know, in real life we're not sort of building into place, but how do we theoretically represent our situation, and I think in physics, if you imagine a photograph of this room, in physics, you could give a physicist a photograph, and she will devise some diffeomorphic invariant description. and fits the photograph, and display it as being diffeomorphic invariant, you know, show the ways in which we don't have to know each medical point and undermine each field. So I'd rather want to do the same if I'm with parents, you know, give a photograph, here's the parents, give a photograph, and I want somebody to construct a theoretical description,

22:30 which is invariant under the, the proxy function business, you know, under Quine's Antwerp's great deal. So that's why I'm thinking that these two do go hand and hand. And that indeed, what they'll say is, well, here's the collection of the backpits and the objects of those which serve as the backpits, and lo and behold, we're still talking about the same objects when you shuffle all the points in your universal interpretation around. And the reason is because you're not, the reason you get out of the paradox is because you're not defining this premise extension. To put it in terms of names is always a bit, because you don't define names essentially If you had cats and masts as these predicates, then what's the mystery about having a permutation on the interpretation of the discourse, and you end up that, when you say that the cat is on the map, actually it's because the uranus is all around the sun. Okay, and why would you think that, something to do with an unintended meaning is a little of a cat, and some cats in the map is actually mapping the set of things that previously was a cat onto some set of things that previously were planets. And it's as though I thought I meant cat, but no, lo and behold I mean planets, because now it's the planets that are making true my statement of the cats in the map. Isn't that like defining my predicate Well, you see, to me, this is, um, um, it just trades on nucleification, because on the one hand, um, it invites us to just treat our own language as an arbitrary number of the class of all possible languages, right? Um, in this case, of course, there's no way to choose one interpretation over another, and then draw the conclusion that we don't know what we're talking about. But at that point, we're not treating our language as an arbitrary member of the set of all possible languages. So it seems to me there's a equivocation going on to win that part of the .

25:00 Yeah. What if something just says? about Lewis and natural properties, because the point about natural properties is a bit like saying the predicates are fixed and these permutations One way of putting it is that when you produce a permutation like this, you map one subset and because you can choose any wrapping you like any set of elements or any other set of So the extension of the credit code can be anything you like. And then the point about saying that there are natural properties is to say there's a special extension of the credit code. And of course what we don't know is how do we find out what that correct extension of the credit code is. But if one turns it around and says, the predicate comes furthest, it's not that there's this large number of elements and you can end up on what you like, and that one ends up on it to another. But I think that the primordial thing is the predicate, not the collection of the objects. The primordial thing is the predicate. Then it's more what objects can you construct out of the predicates, and it doesn't because of their way. You might say, still, this is unacceptable, this doesn't even work, but isn't it true to me? Doesn't it solve the puzzle in the same way that physicists solve their puzzle?

27:30 We've got our puzzle, physicists have got their puzzle, and they solve their puzzle Of course, at the end of the day, you'll have some universal discourse and some subsets which correspond to predicates, but because you've constructed that universal discourse out of the predicates, the idea that no predicate is primitive, you can just map one end up and onto another, that becomes a bit foolish. Now, when you say predicate is not defined in terms of the extension, you mean that in The interpretation of the language, the semantic value of the product, it should not be a set. It should be something else. That's right. You see, so then you would have to say there are these other things that are not sets. I mean, before, I would accept a solution that, you know, is a contingent statement, and we'd want to be convinced that the puzzle is a real puzzle and not an equivocation. I think I only want to have a real solution to a real puzzle. Sure, sure, sure. No, no, no, absolutely. No, no, fair enough. I can solve this puzzle. I don't need any fencing commitment to property interrogations. I think that you're right that Lewis, to all appearances, talks himself into a corner, you know, or into some sort of circle, because at first, of course, people wanted to say, well, how do we identify the natural trademarks or the natural classes? And then he said, well, the best, isn't just a question of asking what is the best possible theory of the world, but rather what is the best combination of the interpretation of our language and the theory within the language. So, and that will determine which predicates stand for natural properties. The natural properties are exactly the ones that are the values, the predicates, in the

30:00 best possible combination of interpretation and theory. At that point, it seems to be just a circle. And then, you know, there's the posthumous article called Ramsey and Humility, where, you know, he really—I would say admit, I don't know, admit what I've heard—that he's landed in a position where you have a kind of total ignorance of what the community could possibly be saying. Well, I think at that point, I mean, you might welcome the sort of suggestion that I make, even if you think there are other ways of diffusing a problem. So, I suppose, I mean, look, I'd welcome your ways of diffusing a problem. If it didn't imply, tell me, that we can't represent ourselves as within a larger universe, and any use of demonstratives and so forth is just more physical goings-on within that I'm prepared to allow there to be a big background in Mexico because, you know, this is infinite in one spot to pick out some of some region rather than another, but I think he's an exactly heavier price than that, isn't he? Well, I would say that representation itself has an indexical character. that actually represents Y. It only means that it represents Y for us. So I don't know how far you want to take this naturalization, whether you want to have a world picture in this representation itself in an independent relationship. Then, from your point of view, I would be exacting too high at times.

32:30 I don't know, might you tell me sometimes that moral theory anyway needs to be enforced? Well, yes, I've been thinking a great deal, actually, of the last few minutes that you've been talking about. There seems to be the missing dimension here is the punctual reality of very good construction. This seems to me to be deeply found out to be sure whether one can replace an extension in the language you want to research. And I have some intuitions here. I don't know what one of them at the moment is that there's been played. There is an extremely interesting article by Alberto Boruzzi called the Impact of Canada here in 21st century philosophy, which addresses this issue, specifically the issue of the possible relevance of governments, but it has its, it's in Italian. I mean, I think you're right, I think there are issues here in philosophy and logic, which are very deep and deep, whether that's said there is the right, I think there is a quantification theory. One of the things, after all, the whole Quinean picture relies on having this ontological and that's what plans the arbitrariness in our nation which which they help that many problems in training. But look, can I try to, just to start a little bit of a track, I think the problem is that, I mean, I feel much like to understand that better. You know, so will I. But look, I think that there are real issues about how one develops an interpretation for theory, as we've seen it in the whole argument in GR and throughout the history of physics, I think, of using coordinate systems. How do you coordinate? And I think that, in many ways, model theory for regimented syntax

35:00 is a kind of co-ordinatization of the syntax. You know, whereas ordinarily we assign quadruple of the real numbers to events in spacetimes. When we coordinate using the model, it's a conceptual idea of construction, we're assigning subsets of a set to the predicates. Graphs. Yes, exactly. That's what we're doing. So it's a coordinateization. Now, Putnam's Paradox is all about an arbitrariness in that coordinateization, isn't it? Now, I've been focusing on how one achieves a co-ordinatization problem, and that's led me to say things like, the predicament comes prior to the object, and various things like that. I'm hoping that one can sort of forget about all of that when you finish the project. Just look at the end result at the end of co-ordinatization, which is the set theoretic structure assigning graphs of predicates. Now if at that point so-called arbitrariness, so-called unintended models, is just like diffeomorphisms, which leave some structure invariant, then aren't I home and dry? I mean that's, in a way, the bottom line. Isn't that actually enough? And haven't I done that? Because what I've shown is that within set-theoretic When you make a permutation, sure, it changes which elements are in the new graph of the predicate. But that isn't relevant, no more so than which, what are the field values at which points it is when we don't know, but no more so than it was relevant back then. So what is instead relevant is something else, dealing with things like how do the various predicates coincide and so forth. Which is what I had in mind, I said, I think that the missing dimension is spontaneity.

37:30 Well, right, but we don't, I mean, I'm very much hoping that there is some development of the category that will make this of interest, or general interest, but at some level I would have thought I'd done enough to show that. And my only real worry is that in doing that, the question of which object am I talking about when I talk about the cat's on the man it becomes like this business of evil it seems that what I want to talk about is the object is the right angle rather than what is located at the right angle and that's a problem because I don't want to be saying that my resolution means we scrap. That's a completely structuralized way of the notion of object. That's right. I don't want to do that. I know, you want a conservative. I'm trying to be conservative. You want a middle structure. You want a middle way conservative. Yes, that's right, that's right. That's your problem, Barney. No, no, no, no, sorry. Sorry. But the thing is, if I don't do that, if you're really going to throw the notion of object away, then I think you're just throwing away the whole basis. But why don't you say that, after all, to say that there is an object that is at the right angle means nothing more than that the right angle position is occupied. Yes, no, no, that's what I'm hoping for, thank you. It's still theoretical. Yes, yes, it's just saying after all that I will understand the ordinary language. Yes, yes, and when I talk about the cat on the mat, I mean the cat on the mat position. Yeah. I mean, in the case of the whole argument, do you care about manifold points, then you care just about the field value? Well, that's—I mean, in a way, that's the worry. Yeah. And indeed, you start to say that the concatenation of field values is a space-time event.

40:00 And if you were going to reason that way in Patton's Paradox, then you wouldn't care what else would do. Well, that's right. The audience would go, and so forth, and one's really lost... You know, maybe I really have to take that on board. I mean, as far as I can probably do physics to get guidance there, maybe the guidance then is that Simmons has got nothing to do with Patton's Paradox. Or if it does, it's to say that... Yes, it's very similar in structure, of course, as you've been pointing out. But so suppose, you know, to raise a problem for this alternative, you would have to start saying things like certain positions are multiply-occupied, right? What? Right. Oh, you mean that you would think of a conceptual framework in which there would—in the ultimate descriptions would never fit more than would never be more than more than singly occupied well i mean to go back to the whole it would be a very strong identity there's only one there's only one manifold point that simultaneously has a bunch of field versions but you're not saying which well that's assuming your theory you're in a theory that's continuing it i mean It's a new point, I mean, let's not get into quantum reality here, obviously. But if you take quantum... That's another seminar, but... Right, take quantum statistics or something. I mean, it's... Well, just take the triangle. I mean, one... Yeah, yeah, the triangle. One doesn't... One isn't Martin T. referring to more than one of these three atoms. I mean, it's just going to determine as to which one is the one. But you really think that you wouldn't need ever to say the occupation number is greater or any of the positions in your scheme to categorize the world. Well, I think as long as I've got a basically financial framework in place, I mean, of course, if you're talking about infinitas, chemical, otherwise, then you're very unlikely to be talking about. In fact, when I was just talking about field values and so forth, as well as field values of nature, I was just talking about it.

42:30 But if you've got an M-particle system or something, it's so far as they're discernible. I don't think there's any... I don't see a problem. I'd like an example to see. Well, I mean, this is what Michel has been passing on me, actually. You know, like, you can interpret Foxbase without making the existence of particles part of that of the interpretation. But just saying that the occupation number can be any. You can have superpositions of it as well, and so on. So this presupposes it really makes sense to say that the cell is not preoccupied without insisting that that means there must be particles that are distinct from each other. Yeah, well if you're talking about a basonic field, that's the one example, that's where I would say you don't have to settle this. So then I'd say, that's... But that's a very unusual case, and most generally, if you're looking at bosomic systems, you're not talking about elementary bosoms. Atoms of a gas, I understand, or virtually any gas is based on it, but then you've got only on constituents and so forth. So these things are relative to levels of the switch. Yeah, but it's very special cases that test your account. No, no, no, no, no, in the very special case of elementary persons, you know, I deny the objects, that's exactly what I mean. The alternative story is that the mode of the quantum field is the object, which can take on different quantitative values, which happen to be interval valued. You know, we mistakenly think that that's a certain amount of objects. So, I mean, I... So, suppose, the space would be a lot of the occupation that was a part of this, and clearly not objects, and they're not campers. Um, well that would then apply also to the superpositions of public numbers for fermionic, for bosons of fermionic constituents. Ah, would it?

45:00 Yeah. I think, I mean, you've got a mass superselection and all that. I'm just thinking about super-selection operators in that case. What you do have, you have mass super-selection in the non-realistic number, and if you're going to talk about how many of the bound states and the relevant stigma, then that's a part of it. Yeah. Basically so. I wouldn't myself push everything on the question of determining part of the number as to whether or not you've got objects. Why do they? That the Russ's definition of an object is a definite definition of space. That goes by the board, so the number has to be determined at the core. Well, I was thinking more of your attachment to the Freudian core of object 13. Accountability does feature pretty. But I agree, I mean, we can see predation here. I can certainly see that bosons are a more clear-cut case of non-object hood. I don't really care about fundamental truths. People have truth in approximations. So, if the non-humanist is limited, I have all of the atoms as objects, I would do something else. I would get bothered if atoms don't talk to us. Maybe our genes would break down. and that sort of thing, and we'll make it to shows what it is. But maybe, in special circumstances, that's a matter of stimulation, so the uncompersons should not become objects, maybe because the number's not determined, and they're not happy for them. So, maybe I want to. Well, but so if I deal with multiple occupancy in the very extreme cases in the way that I just had, what then is the— No, then I was just wondering if you want to stay with your conservative middle of road position, what you would do in that case. Yeah. You know, that's what I did in the training was really good. It would stop being so conservative. Well, to refuse to call Boson's elementary business objects, I think, is to insist on being conservative.

47:30 You could have the textually relativized theory of objecthood, I think, and still be what I'm wrong. So then your conservativeness would not consist in trying to keep the objects. Not in that case. I would be bothered if I had to give up things that were more clearly cut. Yeah, I mean, it's like everything. You can be a little bit radical about certain things, but... ...you have to, if you're going to be... Is it possible to make the same type of reasoning that is in decoherence when they think that you are trying to understand the emergence of objecthood out of non-objecthood? Yes, yes, yes, absolutely. Another way where this sort of thing comes up is in decoherence. It's a bit remote actually though, it's more I can't ever say after that before. But how many branches are there? I can't think about this extension. You've got to define it with some language and then you can talk about... You need predicates to define them. And then the mere fact that it's language, how do you carve up face space, you have coarse grainy in face space. How many different branches there are very well, you know, how far you can carve up face space. So that shouldn't be something that's not really in the furniture of the world. It's clearly language. But, I mean, I don't want to push that too far, because, I mean, the whole approach is to say that It's at the level of language that one says what objects are there, that's the approach. And it's not that it's in the physics of what objects are there. If you think that the notion of objects is most clear about the language of communication, But unless the physical theory is already formulated and predicated cultures, then that's not going to answer your questions.

50:00 If you want to know about object, you've got to start interpreting. So that leads you to questions of language. And of course then you might think, oh well, so it's entirely, we make up what objects there are, don't we? here. And I think that's not really right either, is it? Because one tries to say correctly, one tries to speak correctly. I almost said the wrong thing there. I mean, one tries to say correctly what there is and the point is that. One tries to speak correctly. And the fact that so much does hang on it because nothing else is going to tell you one large This does seem to bring you back to a rather Putnamian, you know, internal realist notion of composition of that object. Well, I didn't really understand the internal realism. Nor did I, until I heard what you just said then. I thought you'd rather put your finger on what it was that he meant by. Well, perhaps that's being a huge generous department. I have to say, I have been very privileged about this sort of stuff, because after all I was in Harvard's department at the time, the choir was still there, and at least they were arguing about this stuff, and I was up there with them. And we had a number of meetings in which we tried to run it out, and we got nowhere. And that's very frustrating, you know. And it's remarkable just how hard, and it's not so much meaning they make as much remember. These people have been colleagues for 20 years. They're not able to communicate. And that's just even worse, because people like Warren Goldfeld, in a book that made it to be a ridiculous band. It's a real shame, actually, because friends might have wanted them to be in the best. But Warren was pretty good, but Warren was not able to get them to the same way I was.

52:30 So it's very frustrating. It shows, I think, just how far-reaching these issues are. It goes into so many different ways. the one that has been sort of cool. And Bertram Dillacouf would write a paper about that, and his criticism is quite about Do you know his paper? And it was, it made Henry very angry. And it was Bertram Mocky. Very clever. The way that we talk about this is that he had a mountain to climb, and when he got down the other side it was okay, and when he had to climb this, this is all about a misconception So, you know, this is Baird understanding everything. He understands quite any other side of the problem. But I don't know. And when you read this paper, it's... It's a trouble. Drebin has this whole sort of Frankenstein line, And then Traktatis was written to get us to see the misguided ways of thinking, which doesn't seem to make me think so. And that Wittgenstein was saying exactly the same thing that Traktatis was saying. Wittgenstein himself would have disagreed with it. I mean, he did have an interpretation of, in fact, artists himself. Yeah. But he also seemed to think that he had rejected a good deal of this earlier enterprise. And I think it was the texture. So I'd rather think that this is a genuine problem here. And as I say, I could now understand that his clients is to, this passage I read out about, you know, the gravity's sensation in it, I don't understand it, I mean, it's, well, I can put it into my framework, because my framework

55:00 So you do have these neutral merits in the way. You know, coming back to the triangle business, which absence is which, and it ceases to be really what we're interested in. We're just interested in which is the right angle, which is the right angle. So I could say something a bit like quiet, but I wouldn't talk about gravity stimulation. And, of course, he's giving a privileged status to the stimulation descriptions on his own grounds that it might be warranted. Well, it's obvious for me that Quine's position at the time had been in the Gabba diagram I think it does seem to be very strongly influenced by the behavior of the psychology of the period, or the immediate receiving period. It's one of those kinds of times where I think it seems to particularly bear the stamp of a particular epoch in the science, in this case. I could see more of a point to what Prime was trying to do there, as it was all in service in terms of translation. But the later business, when I was writing a letter, it seems almost as though he just has a problem and didn't really have a result. And yet he clearly doesn't think it's the same puzzle that Cundon has in what he's in there. Oh, I think he does. He did what he quite... did that come out? Well, I think it's not that Cundon pointed out to Cundon. Yeah, like a lot of years before, you know. Be careful what one says. Of course, that's not the only instance of that. Right, right. Don't get that. Yeah, but Tottenham certainly had very strong feelings about this. I mean, I remember at one conference where he was asked about the connection between, you know, his fusion and what.

57:30 And he said, any position that implies a flight of relativity Yeah, but he induces himself to observe him as well. He's had a print as well. Yes, that's why I made the remark ahead, that he didn't seem to be Wilson. He didn't, no, Pallum saw it as, you're back to your position of mentor. Quine seemed perfectly at ease with it. I even remember Quine. You can't, you can't say that you're talking about the cosmic mind, it's the can, you're talking about the can, and that's it. I'm not so sure. You really seem to be saying, maybe I am talking about, maybe I am talking about the cosmic compliment. And he really seemed to be saying, I embrace the paradox, and I didn't mind. And that does sound bizarre. Yeah, especially when he complied. Well, the thing about Quine, and this is the only kind of light to really get on him, and he did say this in Pursuit of Truth, which is one of his last words. Oh, yes, that's right. Kindly, readers, have sought a technical distinction between my phrases of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity that was never clear in my own mind. But I can now say what ontological relativity is relative to more succinctly than I did in the lecture's paper and book of that title. It is relative to a manual of translation. And to say that Gabagai denotes rabbits is to offer a manual translation which Gabagai has translated as rabbit, instead of opting from the alternatives. And listen to this work you have here, which is interesting. And does the interdependency of relativity extend also somehow to the home language? It's very much in your territory. In ontological relativity, I said it did. For the home language can be translated into itself by no mutations that do part materially

1:00:00 as proxy functions there out. But if we choose as our manual of translation the identity translation, thus making the home language interface value, the relativity is resolved, references then explicated in discretational paradigms and randomness to task as truth paradigm. Thus rabbits, rabbits demands rabbits, whatever they are in Boston. But I think the problem for him is that, on his own ground, there is no warrant or justification or account of this choice of the identity transformation as opposed to some other manual translation. Maybe not, but maybe the point he's making is, as long as I'm just going to talk in some, you know, whatever, and I'm not going to worry about translation into some other language, and I'll just stick at the level, in a way it's like sticking at the level sometimes. No, but I think, of course, that is what one should do, but given the way he has set it up, it's not even clear to see what, on his ground, the choice of manual translation consists in it. Look, I don't get it like this, it's that I don't think there's anything more to speech than the words. Well, that's the Wittgenstein line, you see? Well, that's right. That's what Quine didn't seem to have. Well, I think that Quine is... I can say that's what Quine is saying there, that acquiesce in terms of language as well. If that's all he had said, yes. But instead he's got this theory of language with the manual of translation and so on. And within that framework, I think... But in that, he's happy to set that up. He's happy to set up the problem of radical translation, and he's happy for it to be a corollary of radical translation, which you put on to much of a relativity. I think that's accounting for him, and the reasons for all of that is because he's making clear that there's no interest in his basis for authenticity, and the person to see both of them and sort of that stuff. But why does that not allow him to, at some level he's acknowledging to, in fact, what I'm talking about, at some level he's, is that your point, that he can't be saying all

1:02:30 of that and yet pretend that he knows what he's talking about? In effect, because in other contexts, you will say, ah, but your speech behavior could be interpreted with another manual translation. Well then, whatever behavior he's referring to when he says, choose the identity transformation for your own language, is something that could be reinterpreted using another manual translation as actually being something else altogether. So, on his own ground, he can't really do this, it seems to me. But what if his position is rather trying to say, look, don't worry about what will those really mean and what will be the current, and this is our driven person. Don't worry about those things. This is being preoccupied with mentalistic or not meaning and so forth, and it's all nonsense. But then he should have said that before he wrote on project relativity and not written it. I'm sorry, I'm being unsharedable, I realize that. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I think about that painting of such creativity, as he had a lot of other things he was doing. Yeah, of course. You know, I realize that it ties in with what he was doing. That's correct. It was very nice to spend some stuff. I wanted to, and I'm supposed to talk, so I wanted to ask, you know, what really I should do, or plan, or, um, you know, um, what, um, what sort of, no, um, whatever you want, I mean, one, uh, I mean, one, one thing, first possible, still the format, uh, Thank you.