Michel Serfati / Antoine Rusco Des Idees Mathematiques, IHP, Paris 2005
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Recorded at Des Idees Mathematiques, IHP, Paris (2005), featuring Michel Serfati, Antoine Rusco. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.

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mw0000679-cc-b_p
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Michael Wright Collection
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Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy
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0:00 Comras presents an essay to understand the poesie in this way and thus to reconcile the unity of Freudian thought in this great sense and therefore all that I have to say, all that I criticize in my article, but I think it is not necessary to go into too much detail, in any case we will read the texts and then I will tell you at least what is possible in relation to what is written. You can take it back if you want, the discussion if you want to discuss it. According to the quote, the only way to do well is to appreciate it to its full extent. I would not say that it is wrong to denounce an object that has been denounced as a concept. It means that it exists, that it has been denounced as a concept, and that here we denounce it as an object, and that this is why it is true. So we have to understand that it exists. In me, the concept of an object is enunciable, and that is the difference between the property of an object and the property of a concept, which cannot be applied to objects. The starting point is that if you think of existence as a property of an object, there is a contradiction. If we think of existence as a property of an object, we come to a contradiction. So, it is impossible to think of existence as a property.

2:30 So, as existence is a fundamental notion, it cannot be mined, it must be preserved. Frege, it is important because we must see Frege's past on it. You think of existence as a property. You have only one notion of property. It is implicitly the notion of the object's property. The white pole, the door. So, it is the only notion of property we have. If you say that existence is a property, then your notion, logically, is that there is no notion of existence. You don't want that. You don't want a notion of existence. There is a notion of existence. So how does he get out of it? Well, instead of keeping the notion of property, he talks about object property. And then he says, if I consider it as a property, it gives me a correlation. So it's not an object property. And it leaves the door open. Now, there are a lot of very good people who have never been there. It does nothing. We can see very well what it's for. It means that existence is not evacuated from the philosophical and logical reflection. It is there, and there is the name of the concept. But it is that we pass from a notion of property of the concept, and therefore its number of properties of objects, it is the passage from a notion of contradictory property to a notion of copyrighted love.

5:00 You see that propriety is exactly like being in a category, even though the notion of being in Aristoteles is only said immediately in the categorical diversity. It only makes sense in this diversity. The notion of propriety only makes sense as a propriety. You will find a categorical type structure in the classical sense of the notion of category. To progress towards what I just told you, it is necessary to establish here that in the introduction of the notion of property of constructs, there is a radical heterogeneity. That is to say that you really have two separate things. A property of constructs cannot be one. If a property is a property of an object, it is a property of an object, which means that it cannot be a property of a concept. So you have a notion of a level which is immediately associated with the notion of a property. So you have the notion of n properties. And I made the exception of agreement, agreement, correlation of properties. So, the consequences of these combinations, the equivocity of the notion of property and its problems, as I have just said. So, a property has a definition at a certain level. If you have a term, a word, or a word, like Einstein who said, I'm going to tell you this text here, I quote you the Atatus of 5.4733.

7:30 And it is Jacques Mouvresse who translates it. It is in his book that I find this translation, page 93, page 94. Thus, Socrates is identical. Identical is the kind of thing that does not exist. Socrates is identical does not say anything because we have given no meaning to the word identical as an adjective. The word that names a property, this property, defines it as a place. It's common in Wittgenstein and in Frey. Places, places, they separate. Place is M in M property. So, not only the notion of property is given as M property, but definitions, all definitions, are themselves valid at one level in the hierarchy. So they are themselves... These are N definitions, if you will, and so the meaning of the words, if you have the word that names the property, the N will be transposed to the meaning of the word. And here, we reconstitute that the word contains a category. If you admit that the N and the N-propriety, well, it has a categorical meaning.

10:00 We can easily reconstruct a large part of this structure. This is what allows Ryle to have a notion of category that is in consonance with the classical notion. And we understand why, and we start with what I was going to say. And we must not forget what I said earlier. When we are in 11 and 1, there is a radical elimination of the notion of category. It is deciphered that the two coexist. It certainly gives a lot to think about because in fact there is implicitly, here we are after Descartes and after Kahn, there we are in thought, obviously, there we are in reality, while in Aristotle this opposition does not exist. Earlier when I told you that the sky is blue, there was one being and one being, and then there is SCP, Aristotle speaks of one being and one being, but he does not get to SCP, it does not exist in all SCPs. They come out of a being and a being interpreted according to an identity scheme. That's for sure. How do we go up the floors to get to a tree in the sky? To go back, I missed the words. It's a French translation of a version from Frege that comes from what?

12:30 In Frege, there are just trees. No, no, no. In the case of the verbatim, we find the three European roots, the false three European roots, which are not necessarily in Greek, so it inevitably makes sense if it is the case. Yes, maybe, I don't know what you mean. But it's the one we need to have the three roots. I would like to speak in French, because there are four roots in all of this. If you don't mind, of course. But it allows me to make a remark on something I said about Freud that I was not going to talk about. It's the relationship between natural language and the language of the same shape, which I said a few words about on my desktop, but not in French. And here, the question you are asking is the same, of course. So, in relation to what I have just told you... It does not intervene, since he speaks of the symbol, of the symbolic symbol that Macron represents like that. He exists. Existence. He speaks of that. So in the 5th natural language of art and its ideas, it is the sense, the idea exists. What exists there is this human. It's still a bit of a different thing. Maybe, but there is already, to get to the formal language, there is already a work of evacuation of ambivalence. Yes, because I do not agree that there is no ambivalence. But well, the formal language, that's what he's going to say. But already, it is often said that it is necessary to correct the natural language.

15:00 Because when we talk about the identity diagram and the ability to correct the natural language, it was an evidence. The president and the visitors are different, but the evidence is like that.