L'operation de mesure d'un point de vue pheomenologique

0:00 Good evening. First, I would like to present very quickly calcaryflexion husserlienne, D. Husserl lui-même et j'espère pouvoir aller plutôt rapidement et après je vais essayer de développer. Je voudrais tout d'abord dire qu'au fond les problèmes à la base de ces considérations est celui de la mathématisation de la nature. Alors il faut First of all, we have to be very attentive to the meaning of this expression, Mathematisation of nature. Because, as everyone knows, Husserl is passed by the great criticism of the Mathematisation of nature. When we read the Crisis, we find criticism of this conception that Husserl attributed to Galilée, It is to say that nature is the same, a multiplicity mathematic, a structure mathematic. The world all in the entire is idealized in itself. It is true that in this book, Husser developed a critical point of view, because it is interested in the crisis of science, it is to forget the role of the transcendental subjectivity in the scientific activities. But it is also true that we can also criticise the idea that nature is even a mathematical idea, all in accepting the effect, obviously incontournable, that the physics is mathematical. It is clear that when we talk about mathematisation of nature, we have to distinguish, let's say, the ontological issue, is it the nature itself or something mathématiques, as a certain point of view physicalist would say, from the methodological issue, which is applied to the application of mathematics to nature. Oh, that's a fact. We apply the concept mathematics to the nature.

2:30 That's a part of the physics. The physics is mathematics. And so, in this sense, the mathematics of the nature is a condition of possibility of the physics. And Husserl, of course, must always remember the fact that Husserl was very interested in finding the science. So, for him it was essential to be aware of the principle of every activity scientific. After, unfortunately, he has not developed this point of view concerning the empiric science in general, but the phenomenology, in principle, should also give a contribution to this particular activity judicial which is the measure, which is the application of mathematics mathematics to nature. Or, this is what I will try to do today. First of all, I said something very quickly about what Husser has said about the measures and its role in the construction of physics. And then I tried to propose a few developments from a point of view phenomenological perspective, trying to be somewhat faithful to the Husserl method, trying to give a control of the phenomenological approach to the application of the mathematics to the nature, so, at the base, as a condition of possibility, and the operation of the measures. Alors, du point de vue phénoménologique, ce problème fait partie du thème plus vaste, qui est celui de l'origine de la physique dans le monde de la vie. Alors, Husserl, dans la dernière partie de sa vie, essaye de montrer comment les sciences objectives se développent à partir de ce sol universel et primitif qui est le monde de la vie. complicated, but we can give a very simple definition which for us will suffice. The world of life is the world spatio-temporel of things such as we have experienced in our life great and extra-scientific and beyond this experience, such as we know that they can be experienced. So the world of the current experience is possible in the everyday life

5:00 Well, first of all, we can say what it is not, and Hussar has said very quickly, that the world of life is in contrast to the sphere of mathematical ideas. It's a complicated reality, but we can give a very simple definition, which for us will suffice. The world of life is the spatial-temporal world of things such as we have experienced in our life, very scientific and scientific experience, such as we know that they can be experienced. So the world of the current experience is possible in our daily life. We can say what it is not, and Hussard said very quickly, the world of life is placed in a contrast to the sphere of mathematical ideologies. Karusser said, but here, in the world of life, we don't find any of the geometries, nor the space geometry, nor the mathematical space with all its forms. We can add objects to the mathematical physics, such as magnetic energy, magnetic, magnetic, etc. So, for so to say, the TOF conceptually even is a final analysis of mathematics. So, if it is true that in the world of ordinary experience, we do not find the perfect form, we do not find the mathematical structure. It is also true that we do not find these objects a bit bizarre, which are the objects of physics. So, what is the object of an electromagnetic field? Au nom de l'électromagnétique, c'est une fluctuation dans un champ vectoriel. Alors un champ vectoriel, c'est une fonction à valeur vectorielle définie dans un espace. Alors ça, c'est un objet complètement idéal. C'est ça le problème. On ne trouve pas dans le monde une fonction à valeur vectorielle définie sous l'espace réel à trois ou quatre dimensions.

7:30 Personne n'a jamais vu au nom de l'électromagnétique dans ce sens-là. C'est ça les problèmes de Husser. Alors, donc il y a un dualisme. D'un côté, nous avons la physique qui est mathématisée. D'un autre côté, nous avons un monde de la vie environnement qui n'est pas mathématisé. Alors, ce dualisme commande une clarification du type historico-phénoménologique. C'est-à-dire, d'un côté, la situation culturelle et l'état auquel la pensée scientifique est parvenue aujourd'hui. And from our side, the world of life, with its historically invariant, it is ensued that from the world of life, it is ensued that from the world of life, it is ensued that the mathematical and physical should have existed. It is very simple, finally. Nous avons la physique mathématisée aujourd'hui, c'est un fait, mais nous savons a priori, je dirais, que d'une façon, d'une autre, nous avons bâti cette physique à partir du monde de la vie. Il ne peut pas y avoir d'autres sources. Alors, voyons. Les rangs multiples de l'opération de mesure dans la reconstruction de Russerlien de l'origine de la physique. Alors, il s'agit bien pour Husserl de décrire comme l'opération des mesures intervient dans l'objectivation du monde de l'intuition. Alors, pour comprendre ça, il faut comprendre pourquoi d'abord le monde de la vie serait... pourquoi il aurait besoin d'être objectif. C'est parce que, comme l'a dit Husserl, le monde de la vie a un caractère relatif subjectif. Alors, la mesure intervient pour éliminer, en tout cas pas pour éliminer, parce que c'est impossible, mais pour, disons, essayer de remédier à ces caractères relatifs subjectifs du monde de la vie. Par exemple, essayons d'expliquer qu'est-ce que c'est que ce caractère subjectif relatif. Husserl dit que chaque forme dans cette infinité ouverte, même si dans la réalité elle est donnée intuitivement en tant que factum, est pourtant sans subjectivité. Elle n'est donc pas déterminable entre subjectivement pour chacun, pour chacun des autres qui ne la voit pas en même temps de facto ni communicable dans ses déterminations.

10:00 Je sais qu'il vient réparer manifestement l'art de la mesure. Alors, qu'est-ce que ça veut dire ? Ça veut dire que, au fond, dans la vie, évidemment, le fait qu'il y a des objets, qu'il y a des objets et que l'objet est une forme, bon, ça c'est ce qu'on appelle un factum dans le sens que, bon, ça fait partie de la structure du monde de la vie. But, for example, the form, but the same thing for the quality sensible, like the colors, etc., they are not defined in a precise way. It is to say that the form of an object appears different. It is in the orientation with which we look at. It is to say that the dimensions... It is to say that we have simply some very precise terms to classify the form. So you say that we have a morphology of form. You say something more or less round, etc. So, in the end, when you see something, you understand what you're talking about. After, if you explain to someone who doesn't see the same thing in the same time, it becomes difficult. You don't have a objective description of the thing. There's no judgment in the sense of science. Dirait Husserl, la forme donnée intuitivement, tout comme la position, n'est pas encore une identique qui se laisse saisir toujours à nouveau par une communauté ouverte du sujet et qui peut être exprimée d'une façon précise par des prédicats univoques. Elle n'est pas encore un véritable objet. Well, that's the formula that we find very often at Husserl. What is it that is an object in the real science of science? It's identical. The thing is always the same. It's one for everyone and for everyone. It's something that is determined, one for everyone and for everyone. In the world of life, there is nothing else in this way. Quoi que l'art de la mesure constitue un progrès dans cette direction, elle conduit à identifier, par exemple, deux longueurs dont la différence est insignifiant pour les bouts pratiques qui ont motivé son développement. Alors, l'art de la mesure, c'est important, est motivé par cette nécessité d'objectiver, mais elle a encore un art, encore un art. Qu'est-ce que ça veut dire ? Elle n'a pas « kunst », elle n'a pas « science », c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne vise pas vraiment, elle n'a pas comme but, la détermination de l'objet en tant qu'elle. to determine the things in the museum where it serves us for practical purposes. It is clear that the champanthier can identify the length of the stone if it serves as a table.

12:30 But for other practices, what was considered equal to the champanthier is no longer. So the art of the measure, at this level, there, the art of the measure has not really already, not yet, not yet, the absolute objectivity. The exact value in the practical is determined by the legal and also valid, i.e. indifference. A regard to a but for which there may be a difference irrespective, which does not enter into account. could be formed by exclusion of these limitations pratiques, the idea of the absolute equal, the idea of the exactitude mathematique. The idealization of the art of the museum allows the development of the geometry of the science of the idealism pure, now detached from the facts of the real. So, what happens is that, at a moment, by exclusion of all the practices, we start to say, But I am more interested in determining a thing, what can I do with this thing? I am interested in determining it once for all. It is the idea of an object, of exactitude. In reality, this passage to the limit, is first to say, it is the origin of the idea of a limit. In the end, I was asked to think that things could be more or less round, and I began to say yes, but there will be something that is perfectly round. At this point, there is the naissance of the geometry, by the way. First, we pass from the art of the measure to the abstract ideas, which are limited and which are not limited, but which are the result of the limits. and that they are objectives in a strong sense. There is a part in the crisis where it says that the geometry has created the first objective world. It's the first objective world, because the objects and the judgments of the geometry are the same for all, and are perfectly determined.

15:00 It's the development theory that has implications on the art of the measure. So there is a complicated movement. First of all, the art of the measure gives a sense to the geometry. The geometry has implications on the art of the measure, because the geometry affects the practices of quantitative determination that have been in the world of life, introducing the idea of approximation of the limits. Otherwise, after having given a sense to the geometry, the art of the measure is then guided by this. It's obvious that when you have the concept of geometry, the art of the measurement can be developed in a way more scientific way. It can be guided by the idea of an infinite improvement of the results. Les protophysiciens comme Galilée, conduits à fonder la science de la nature sous les redirecteurs des idéalités géométriques, idéalisent la nature en l'identifiant en multiplicité mathématique. Cela exige la mathématisation des remplissants sensibles et donc une mise au jour de la technique des mesures. Well, in Timor-Sol there is a little paragraph 9 of the crisis, in the sense that, Selon Ousserl, at a moment, we have the art of the measure, we have the geometry, and we have the art of the measure guided by the geometry. Selon Ousserl, Galilée, It was the historical figure, or the moment of history, we could say, or we could say, if we can apply the language of the geometry to the physical world, to all aspects of the physical world, we will completely objectify the physical world. It is to say that we will also be able to say That is to say that we have an object defined completely as a principle. We have an approximation of the more and more affinable. And to do that, obviously it is necessary, it is necessary, it is necessary to mathemate the replacements. What is the replacements? What is the replacements? It is to say the colors, the sounds, etc. Alors la géométrie elle s'occupe selon vous ça de l'espace et du temps à la base alors l'élément physique lui il n'y a pas que ça évidemment il y a si cette chose qui donne la substance disons cette qualité qui donne la plénitude aux choses alors si vous voulez objectiver complètement l'élément de la vie c'est à dire les traduire complètement en détermination objective au moins un principe un principe parce qu'on sait qu'on n'y arrive jamais

17:30 So, you need to develop some means to measure also the sensitive qualities. And so there is what Husser calls the mathematicalization indirect. It is to be able to associate colors to oscillations in a field of different types, to be able to associate sounds to vibrations, etc. Donc vous avez, disons, des objets mathématiques qui sont associés à chaque qualité sensible. Alors, en conclusion, ce qui est important pour nous, c'est que cette démarche pusserlienne est utilisée par lui surtout pour arriver à critiquer un certain point de vue ontologique. But in fact, it is very useful to understand the nature of the physical connection. The first thing that you should notice is that when you look at this approach, you find that the measurement operation is not important simply from the point of view genetic because it is at the base of the geometry, which is at the base of the physics, etc. No, after the development of the geometry, we have to use again the measure. When we arrive at the physics, when the physics is accomplished, the physicist is a geometry, but he is also someone who uses the technique of the measure. And it's clear because, obviously, the physics is not a science completely ideal, it's a science of the world. So, the measure is not indispensable to the physics only from the point of view genetic, because it is part of the conditions and possibilities of the math physics. The study of the conditions and possibilities of the measure is therefore indispensable to understand the nature of the knowledge of the physical world.

20:00 I asked two questions about the measure. I said that it should be studied in particular the operation of the measure in itself, from the point of view phenomenological, because when the geometry and the mathematics are applied to the world, everything we have said about the measure, even about the measure of the art of the measure, at the level of the arpentage, at the level of scientific science, everything we have said about it, will also be important for the physics, because the physics will inherit, let's say, the characteristics that are appropriate to the art of the measure. Well, I'm going to pose two questions. Quels degrés d'activité du sujet sont nécessairement mobilisés dans ce type de connaissance ? Alors, vous savez que chez OSA, c'est très important, dans le sens qu'à partir de la réceptivité, qui est le moment où on s'ouvre à l'expérience et jusqu'au jugement, il y a des degrés d'activité du sujet. Il y a des différents types d'activités qui sont mobilisés par les sujets and which are always correlative to the objectives that are constituted. And then I ask this question from the point of view phenomenological. To constituer, to apply the mathematics concepts to nature, what are the activities of subjects that are mobilized? Pardon. What does it mean for the science of physics as a tradition in the world of life? That, on the other hand, it's more of the objective, in the sense of the results. We'll see what's going on for the physics, when we understand the character of the operation of the measure. regressives d'Ausser, de combler l'écart entre perception et détermination mathématiques du perçu, en observant l'édification graduelle des déterminations quantitatives. Alors, ce que je vais essayer de faire maintenant, c'est de partir de la perception et d'arriver,

22:30 je ne dis pas peut-être vraiment vraiment à la physique, mais au moins à des opérations measures which are already almost at the level of physics, and to see how we do to accomplish this task, which is, at each instant, there are obviously different degrees, and each degree corresponds to a step in the objectivation of the world of life. I call it a genealogy of the operation of measures in the world of life. I use the word genealogy because I want to show that there are different versions of the quantitative determination of the world, and there are versions that are more primitive and which are, at the point, the ancestors of the measure that we have in science. That's why I think we can use the word of genealogies. So, from the perception to the measure. First of all, at the level of perception, we find the quantitative determination the most simple, which are the multiplicity and the gradation. The multiplicity, first in a vague form, in a form numerically determined, there is a possibility of knowing each other's consciousness of consciousness. It is very important, we know, we are able to have consciousness of the multiplicity. It is very evident, that we need to distinguish between multiplicity determined and indetermined. There is an example very simple, which are the stars. It is very easy to realize that the stars are many. In fact, everyone is d'accord there-dessus. In fact, the comptage, in fact, is the form of quantitative determination the most simple. And we will see that the comptage is the base of everything. But there is also the gradation. C'est-à-dire, la gradation caractérise certains contenus particuliers qui présentent la possibilité d'être déterminés selon le plus, le moins, le plus, le moins, et approximativement égales.

25:00 Alors, tout le monde le sait. Grandeur spatiale, temporale, temporelle et qualité spécifiquement sensible. Well, the quality specifically sensible is the expression that Husser uses for the replacement of the colors, the sound, etc. Here, we are doing a genealogy because at the beginning, we don't have anything. So, you have to think that at the beginning, we have only the possibility of judging that something is more far than another, that today, it is more hot than here, etc. So, we have this form of evolution. It is on the one side. It concerns the duration, it concerns the distance, etc. On the one side, the multiplicity. On the other side, the gradation. Well, within the gradations, Husserl has obviously established a distinction. Because he said that there is space and the time, and there is the remplacement. And he said that it is clear that it is easier to mathemate the space and the time, because at the bottom, the space and the time are in a unique, universe. And that's why there is a geometry. and it's the reason why there is a limit in the space, while there is no limit in the dimension of the color of the sun, etc. I think that we can accept this point of view, but we have to say that first, when we don't have the geometry, when we don't have anything, here we are trying to make a difference because we try to describe the measurements of the measurements as an art in the world of life. Au début, il n'y a pas de géométrie. Alors, au tout début, quelle est la différence entre la grandeur spatiale et la chaleur ? Alors, du point de vue simplement descriptif, il est possible de mettre en lumière les différences qui se présentent déjà au niveau pré-scientifique, avant le développement des ports idéaux de la géométrie et l'établissement de leur rôle directeur entre la détermination quantitative de grandeur spatiale et celle de qualité spécifiquement sensible. C'est très, très simple.

27:30 Quelle est, par exemple, la différence entre l'énoncé, aujourd'hui il fait plus froid qu'hier, et l'énoncé, la distance entre le sapin et l'arbuste est plus grande que celle entre le sapin et l'entrée du jardin? Quelle est la différence? Well, if the sapin, the arbust and the entrance of the garden are approximately aligned in this order, it is evident that one of the two longs, other than the biggest of the two, contains the other. It is simple. So, there is what we can call the fragmentation or division of space, which is something quite common, quite important in the metaphysics, but, obviously. So the space is something that can be divided. In other words, the space space can be considered as a union additive of parties homogènes. In other words, it would be all sense to say that we need to add the froid of the air to the front of the air to obtain the froid of today. That we can't do it. It is the possibility of the fragmentation that allows us to progress in the case of the grandeur spatial, to have a determination more fine, we are going to see how it is. But it is clear that if you take the sensation of the heat, it is a fact that I do not describe it well, the sensation of the heat, it does not have a part. And if you have the sensations like the sound, for example, which have a part, because they are not homogenous, so it's a form of myriology at the base. So it's the space that can be divided by the parties that are homogenous, not the sensitive qualities. This is really the first difference. So, we'll see how, from this fact, we can progress first to first to determine quantitative of the space's grandeur. spatial. Il y a un autre exemple. Alors, imaginons une rangée d'arbres. Pourvu que les distances entre chaque couple d'arbres successifs soient plus ou moins les mêmes, donc on a de la chance, et qu'on puisse les constater à coup d'œil, il devient possible, sans aucun instrument de

30:00 mesure, d'établir des rapports entre les distances entre chyproques des différents arbres. Alors, It's to say that we have, at the start, the sensation of spatial equality. At the start, we say... At the start, I'm able to understand, in certain conditions, that these two things are more or less the same length. Also, one is longer than the other. It's from this point that I can, at the point, if there is a chance that there is a grid of objects which are separated by equal distances. So, without any measurement of measure, I can establish a rapport between the distances of the different arbres. One distance between the other, the half, the half, etc. All the reports of this type are obtained on the basis of the comptage which brings for unit the distance identical between the two arbres successives. On pourrait établir des rapports entre le déplacement, les extensions et les distances dans les strictes limites de ce type de fragmentation spatiale. Imagine that there are children who play the ball, and you look at that. This situation, this particular perspective, allows you to make a little progress in relation to the simple evaluation, right? Because you are not just able to say, yes, there is a ball that arrives more than the other, etc. you could even say that this boule arrived two or three times more than the other. And this is a decisive passage, because this example shows that the possibility of fermentation and the capacity to constate the quasi-equality of two grandeurs spatiales suffisent to surpass the stage of evaluation in strict sense of the word, there where there are concepts perceptibles that allow them to mark the rapport. So, we can say that we can pass the evaluation to the rapport. There is a progress, because it is conceivable to try to translate the evaluation of gradations into a number of numbers. because it is already said at the beginning that there is one side of the comptage and the other side of the evaluation of the gradations.

32:30 Well, in this particular case, you can see that the comptage, we can put it on the comptage to determine better the spatial grandeur. spatial. C'est le premier moment où on utilise le comptage qui, quant à lui, marche plutôt bien, disons, il est déjà plutôt objectif, comme forme de détermination, pour améliorer la détermination de l'espace. C'est clair que, comme on sait, si vous essayez de continuer cette ligne, vous trouvez très bien qu'il y a les frais de nombre irrationnel, le monde So we can't always find pieces of space that can establish a rapport between the two couples of grandeur. The rapport is rational, but it doesn't suffice. However, the gain in precision is local and bad. Here we have a second level, we have seen this second level, the passage of rapport. But is it possible to call it a measure? Well, of course not. What is interesting is that we have already accomplished a little progress. But there is something that doesn't work, that if after you move and go elsewhere, you are absolutely not able to use the quantitative determinations that you have in the perceptive context, which have the chance to be structured rupturé comme une sorte d'axe cartésien, discrétisé et grossier, disons, c'est ça, il est là-bas, les contextes perceptifs, vous ne pouvez pas l'amener avec vous. Alors, on peut dire que les gains en précision est local et caduques. Il n'a qu'une intersubjectivité éphémère relative à une communauté créée par la coprésence actuelle, because the grandeur assumed as a unit are, in the last analysis, defined by indexicality. At a moment, we must say that it's three times the distance there is between this tree and this tree. You say that. So if you are ailleurs, it doesn't have a sense. If you are not there, it doesn't have a sense. Chaque rapport se référence ici qu'il est impossible de détacher du contexte perceptif particulier à l'intérieur duquel les rapports se manifestent.

35:00 Afin de pouvoir objectiver les formes spatiales, les sujets doivent être à même de les déterminer quantitativement de façon à pouvoir, pour ainsi dire, les amener avec soi. C'est ça le problème. C'est vraiment un problème qui traite au caractère portable les déterminations. Les communiquer aux autres et les utiliser dans des contextes perceptifs différents. J'utilise cette expression de contexte perceptif parce que je pense que c'est intéressant pour désigner, au fond, tout ce qui, à un moment donné, est nécessaire pour formuler un certain jugement. So a context perceptive is not an object, it is the scene in which you move, perhaps, but it is the scene in which the elements serve to form a judgment. In the case of the simple report of the ringer of the arbres, the ringer of the arbres belong to this context perceptive. Alors, ce qui est requis est une sorte de reproduction décontextualisante qui transforme une présence confinée dans l'expérience actuelle à une monnaie courante que l'on peut garder avec soi et dépenser partout. Or, le langage ne suffit pas pour cela. Il ne peut pas à lui seul abriter la structure spatiale concrète de quoi que ce soit. The language also allows us to describe things and then tell us what we have seen. But it's a case here where the language doesn't serve. There's no description of a space length in such a way. We can't describe it. It's impossible. You can name something, obviously, when you name something, and then when you use the name, d'évoquer ce qui n'est plus là, ce qui n'est plus là où vous étiez. Mais les nommer, mais aussi tout type de description dans le langage ordinaire, ne suffit pas. En effet, le dépassement du niveau des simples rapports contextuels ne peut se faire qu'en conservant le caractère essentiel de ce type de détermination.

37:30 l'intervention d'un élément objectif ou d'un objet, au sens large de terme, ayant la fonction d'objectiver les formes spatiales. Dans l'exemple précédent, l'élément ayant une fonction objectivante est la grille d'arbre à distance quasi identique, qui se comporte comme une sorte d'axe cartésien primitif et grossier, solidifié et inséparable du contexte particulier donné dans la perception. Nous avons, par contre, besoin d'un élément objectivant qui, d'un côté, peut intervenir d'un ou sur la scène perceptive participant à la détermination spatiale de tout ce qui a lieu, mais qui, en même temps, peut en être extrait sans porter préjudice aux déterminations acquises grâce à lui. C'est bien cette double exigence qui définit l'idée et la fonction de l'instrument de mesure comme objet objectivant. Alors, je pense qu'ici, on pourrait appeler ça l'origine de l'instrument de mesure. So, if all the people know very well that, to measure, it is necessary to use instruments. So if we say that, if we say that the physicists always use instruments, and if we say that the physics, we should do it with the instruments, everyone is sure. But this type of consideration has been motivated by the question Why? Why is there this need, in the case of the application of the math language in the world, to rely on objects that are other than those that are indeterminable? That's what's interesting about the measure. The problem is to form a judgment on things. But in general, we form a judgment on the basis of perception. However, when you use an instrument of measurement, there is an object that is different compared to the one you determine and on the one you support. And that's why I think it also deserves the name of object objectivant. In the sense that if we follow the direction of objectivation, it is an object that intervenes to objectivate. Alors c'est clair que, historiquement, la rigidité joue un rôle fondamental dans la mathématisation du monde de la vie, car un objet rigide est approximativement invariant dans le mouvement, c'est-à-dire il demeure géométriquement le même après son déplacement d'un lieu ou d'un autre, il est par conséquent un objet qui unifie les différents contextes perceptifs en vertu de son identité spatiale. It's to say that, as he is the same, I am with him, and he doesn't change.

40:00 So he serves as a union between two different contexts. Or it's clear that we could all of a sudden object, yes, but we know that it's not as simple as that, that the rigidity is not as simple as that, because there is the contraction of Lorentz, there is the transformation of Lorentz and all that. But here, I'm not trying to define the language of physics, I'm trying to do a genealogy of physics. Here, we are still at the primitive level, and the concept of rigidity, effectively, at the intuitive level, are the concept of something that doesn't change. It's all. Dans le monde de la vie, on trouve et on a surtout tout trouvé pour produire aisément des objets aptes à remplir la fonction des formes fondamentales, objectivantes, des bâtons, des choses comme ça. Mais parmi tous ces objets, il y en a un qui est en précédence incontournable, c'est le corps. Alors là, je vais maintenant parler du rôle dans la mesure du corps, dans le sens que s'il est vrai que vous avez besoin de quelque chose que vous pouvez amener avec vous, Eh bien, il y a une chose que tout le monde emmène avec soi, c'est le corps. C'est le corps. Le corps est le seul objet qui nous accompagne toujours et onifie systématiquement tous les concepts perceptifs qui se présentent successivement. Le corps est, de ce point de vue, l'objet décontextualisant et donc objectivant par excellence. In the first place, these rigid parts and repetitive movements make possible a constant intra-subjective determination of space. In the second place, the existence of an adult-normality can guarantee that these practices can be valid collectively. The body is an archi-instrument of measurement." What does that mean? It means that, at the end, everyone knows that if we are intra-subjective, we know that the pas is a good way to measure space. It is because there is a normality, adult, intra-subjective, that we can just eliminate the reference to my pas and the pas of someone else, and we can talk more or less about the pas. So it's clear that it's enough until a moment. What's interesting is that this possibility is always there. The possibility of using the body as an archi-etalon,

42:30 as something that has in itself an etalon, is always there. And so, all the people know that the first unit of measures were exactly the gras, the palmes, etc. Everyone knows that it's a rather universal thing, it's also true in China, it's true In fact, I've read that in China, they used his hand as an unit of measure, etc. But I believe that, again, it's a fact that everyone knows, but it's a fact that everyone knows, why the core has this privilege. However, the human arms must necessarily be replaced by a standardised, by a core rigid, which can be reproduced in an arbitrage exemplary. The instruments of the measure in the ordinary, the etalons and the unit of the measure, make their appearance, and with them, the real art of the measure. We have for now mentioned four steps successives of the objectivation of the scientific world of life. The primitive level of the comptage and the evaluation of the gradations of all sorts. 2. L'établissement rendu possible par la fragmentation des rapports spatiaux et spatio-temporels à l'intérieur d'un contexte perceptif individuel. 3. Les passages à l'établissement des rapports quantitatifs avec des parties du corps et la mise en relation subséquente des différents contextes perceptifs unifiés par l'ubiquité du corps. Four, the creation, suite to the autonomization and uniformization of certain forms empirically, is the object instrument of measures, comporting the existence of the talons and of the unit of measures. Let's say one, two, three, we can call them proto-mesures, while here, with four, we have the arpentage. We have really already arpentage. If we mention a problem, we could say here, on voit bien une chose, on voit bien qu'on ne peut pas mesurer sans l'intermédiaire d'un objet, mais alors on pourrait objecter qu'au fond nous sommes habitués à faire des mesures à vue d'œil. Alors vous trouvez ça même chez Marc qui explique très bien, c'est évident que ce type de mesures

45:00 n'interviennent qu'après qu'on a développé la mesure physique. So we are used to associating numbers to sensations of length. So it's not at all a measure that we say that it's more than 30 meters. In fact, if we say the contrary, to convince ourselves, we have to ask the question the following. Is it possible to give the approximate value of a distance, not a meter, but in some other unité de mesure. But you don't know what we want. We could show you the unité de mesure. But you don't arrive. You're not conditioned to do it. So it's not a good critique. Alors là, je vais m'occuper justement des degrés d'activité, donc c'est la première question, les degrés d'activité du sujet qui sont impliqués dans la détermination quantitative du monde à la vie. Alors, les degrés d'activité du sujet nécessairement mobilisés dans ce type de connaissances, nous avons notamment une évolution du rôle L'element de chose ou de propriété qui est toujours déjà l'objet de détermination du premier niveau, comptage, évaluation, dégradation, est constitué en vertu des sensations kinesthésiques. Donc ça, c'est l'erreur du corps au début. Le deuxième niveau n'apporte pas de modifications considérables de ce point de vue. De nouvelles fonctions de l'attention et de la mémoire sont mobilisées. Mais pour l'essentiel, l'activité requise prolonge celle de la constitution d'un band d'objets, is given in the perception. However, on the third level, so on the level of the corporal measure, the function of the body obtains an essential modification. In fact, if the body maintains its role in the constitution of the spatial reality spatio-tempore, simply intuitive, from the other side, it is used himself as transcendental part of this reality. It is in such a chair, that my body is always with me, and so unifies the different perceptive contexts. And it is as a body that it is part of the world, in the same way that all the other objects,

47:30 and that it can be used as a pair of touches to determine quantitatively. At this level, the body is at the same center of subjective operations, spontaneous activities and voluntary activities, and tools, the exterior objects are used in a practical way and conventional way. There is an interesting example. It is clear that when you use the arms to measure, it is clear that it is your body, it is the body that you use. But in the meantime, you could very well cut the arms and use it exactly as if it was a stone. It is really in this sense that the body is the first tool. Alors le quatrième niveau est celui où l'on trouve des véritables instruments de mesure. On pourrait objecter que les déterminations effectuées à l'aide des règles ne sont une dernière analyse que des rapports. Quelle est donc la nouveauté essentielle? Alors vous avez vu qu'il y a quatre niveaux pour arriver à l'arpentage à l'art de la mesure. Alors déjà dans le deuxième niveau où vous n'utilisez pas d'objet, vous n'utilisez que la vue, You just rely on the chance to find, like in this case, an space that is already prepared, we could say, to establish a rapport, because there are parts that are all equal, and so we can use them. But in the end, we could say yes, but when you use a meter, it's more or less the same thing. What is the difference? Alors, la différence est que la mesure ne se réduit pas à la détermination à l'intérieur de la sphère de la perception, ce qui est le cadre du rapport, d'un rapport entre un objet et un autre objet. Car encore faudrait-il que ces derniers soient considérés comme un représentant d'une classe d'équivalence ouverte d'objets reproductibles définis par des opérations pratiques particulières. C'est la définition d'une telle classe d'équivalence qui fait des défauts aussi au niveau des déterminations fondées sur des concepts ordinaires comme bras ou palme. Là est le progrès dans le processus d'objectivation. Le vrai dépassement des rapports contextuels, c'est lorsqu'une communauté développe un type d'outil et les procédures nécessaires pour son emploi et sa reproduction que le progrès vers l'exactitude devient concevable. It is also manifest that the simple perception is sufficient for the quantitative determination of reality.

50:00 That is what everyone knows, of course. And why does this make necessary the practical activity of the subject? So, the highest degree of the activity is really an activity in the ordinary. It is a practical activity. It is the manipulation of objects, which is essential for the application of the mathematical ideas in the world. Ces objets, au fond, doivent déjà être, d'une certaine façon, idéalisés, car ils ne doivent pas être des choses que vous trouvez là-bas dans le contexte. Ils doivent représenter une sorte de... Ils doivent être comme des monnaies, finalement, comme des pièces. Ils doivent représenter une classe d'équivalence ouverte d'objets pour lesquels on a défini une procédure de reproduction. In fact, what is interesting is that there is an ideality sui generis de unité de mesure. Are you able to read there? There is an ideality sui generis de unité de mesure, because, as I just said, in the fourth level, On n'établit pas de rapport par n'importe quel objet, mais on a un objet qui n'est pas là en tant que lui-même, mais en tant que représentant de quelque chose, et cet quelque chose a une sorte d'unité idéale. because the maître is not the name of an object in particular. He has a particular object. Because as we can see, the relationship between the concept of maître and the talons normalement entre un concept et des individus auxquels les concepts s'appliquent parce que évidemment dans le cas de l'aïe russer le dit très souvent si vous imaginez un concept et les individus auxquels les concepts s'appliquent et bien on peut dire que l'essence l'essence le sens of the concept, but it has nothing to do with the effective existence of individuals who

52:30 fall under the concept. So here, obviously, this is not the case. So, the talent, when I say the maître, but also, in theory, the judgment in which I use de détermination quantitative. Il n'existe pas non aucun sens si l'on considère aussi au moins un individu particulier. Si le pas théorique et pratique de l'établissement d'une unité de mesure comporte une idéalisation, il ne permet pas pour autant de s'enfranchir complètement du of the reality. Because the measure and all the particular determinations which depend on, may survive by the disappearance of all the etalons. We are therefore confronted with a type of concept of a statue of a batard which, unlike the idea abstracts in the classical sense, can not inhabit the realms of pure ideality. The objective of the judgment of the measure is rooted in the real world. The introduction of the equivalence It does not permit a complete franchising of the original character indexical of the context context. Because the dependence of the real existence of at least one etalons lies in facticity which it does not allow to reduce to pure determinations conceptuelles. Why does it have a indexical character? Because, finally, as we can't describe an etalons, you have to show it, you have to show it, you have to show it. When you say the mètre, there is no definition abstract. You have to say that a mètre is the unit of measure which explains the length of this thing. And you will show it. It's clear that it's not this thing in particular, because it could be any member of the class of equivalence. You have to say, it's this thing. There is no other way. It's true that there is a need for a material tradition for the reactivation of the quantitative determination. We know that, of course, there were, for example, units of measures that were used in Israel,

55:00 before Alexandre Lebrun, before the Romans, etc. Well, we lost them. And so, we don't know what it is. It's clear that we can conjecture, but we can't get rid of it, but we can't get rid of it, but we can't get rid of it. So we can't get rid of the judgment that we can't reactivate. And so, in the sense of Husserlien, Husserlien was interested in the problem of the ideas, because he talked a lot about the difference between... Well, not a lot, but in the experience of the judgment, he talked about the ideas that are free, the ideas that are enchaînées. Alors, les réalités libres sont des réalités qui n'ont aucune référence à la réalité, donc l'état de la géométrie, par exemple, alors qu'une idéalité enchaînée est une idéalité qui est en référence à la réalité, c'est-à-dire la constitution allemande, par exemple. Alors, elle aussi est une idéalité, mais qui, dans son sens, est en référence à la réalité. Alors, ici, il faut vraiment s'interroger, parce qu'après, Husserre dit, au fond, When we talk about science theory, we always talk about free idealism, at least like Telos, and I think there is perhaps a problem. There is perhaps a problem, because in the case of the application of mathematics in the world, the role of instruments, in general, on verra, est telle qu'au fond, il y a une référence à la réalité dans ces idéalités. Il y a une référence à la réalité, à la réalité. Et bon... Alors, j'ai juste une petite parenthèse, 5 minutes encore. Alors, au fond, voyons. Oui, je pense que je peux le faire. Alors, une petite parenthèse. La mesure, on pourrait dire, c'est un passage de la perception à travers le comté, on arrive à la mesurer et finalement, au lire. Eh bien, si vous lisez Marx, connaissance et erreur, on trouve déjà le fondement du comptage dans la perception. Pourquoi compterions-nous si notre milieu était absolument inconstant, si tout changeait à chaque instinct comme dans un rêve ? Il n'y aurait pas d'unité séparable, on ne pourrait pas compter. Il n'y aurait pas d'unité séparable et constante de deux choses. Alors, d'abord, on a besoin d'un élément de la vie, il n'est pas, il est subjectif

57:30 réglatif, mais au fond, dans le monde de la vie, ces unités discrètes qui sont plus ou moins constantes existent. Alors, bon ça, je n'ai pas le temps d'en parler, si vous prenez Carnap, il vous dit qu'il parle du thermomètre, par exemple, alors d'abord il parle de la sensation de He said things that are not too different, not too. He said that there is a lack of intersubjectivity, of reproductivity, of judgments that are based on the sensation. But at a moment, he said that if I have a thermomètre, two people will not be sure, in the lecture of the thermomètre. Now, I express it in saying that we find in the world of life, the resources to objectify the world of life, the objects objectivant that can be used as a way to be judged. Repetons, si, le monde de la vie n'est pas mathématisé, mais si on arrive à le mathématiser, ce n'est pas évidemment parce qu'on arrive à percer le monde de la vie, pour aller au-delà et au-delà. C'est que dans le monde de la vie, il y a les ressources pour objectiver le monde de la vie. Et au fond, dans le monde de la vie, on pourrait dire qu'il y a des points forts et des points faibles. Les points forts, ce sont les objets et aussi les signes qui sont au fond presque, on pourrait presque dire des objets représentés, ou en tout cas, ils sont aussi évidents, aussi saisissables que les objets. Et d'un côté, il y a tout ce qui est flou qui n'est plus du côté de qualité. Alors l'instrument des mesures est vraiment quelque chose, c'est évident, because we can have a disagreement with the heat, but I've never seen two scientists who don't agree with the fact that there is a thermometer in this moment. What is the moment of the life? It's not a chaos. There are elements that are more objective. These are exactly the things, we could say. And again, the measurements are made in the way that we can read them.

1:00:00 They are also based on the principle that we should all translate into what is more objective. It's within the world of life that this game is happening. L'objectivation du monde intuitif et la tradition matérielle. Maintenant, ces analyses se rattachent à celles de Husserl. La géométrisation de l'art de la mesure constitue, après les quatre niveaux que nous avons introduits, une cinquième étape dans l'objectivation du monde de la vie. L'étape finale, la sixième, est le développement d'une science de la nature qui mathématise les qualités spécifiquement sensibles et recherche des lois causales exactes. Alors, voyons quelques conséquences pour la physique mathématique. La mathématisation de la nature joint la dimension théorique de la géométrie avec la dimension pratique de l'art de la mesure. L'opération des mesures en tant qu'élément médiateur nécessaire entre les idéalités mathématiques et les mondes intuitifs, If you imagine, it's an element mediator between the world and the ideality. It's an activity both intellectual and practical. It implies, at the most primitive level, the movements of the body, and at the most sophisticated level, the construction and use of instruments of measure which the function is based on the principles proso. In general, the subject of the measure is an active subject, doué des mains qui interviennent dans le monde. Cela rend nécessaire qu'une physique mathématisée s'accompagne d'une tradition technique. La mathématisation de la nature a donc commandé la technicisation au sens étroit et non pas au sens de la crise usherlienne, pas la technicisation dans le sens que la science est vidée de son sens, la technicisation dans le sens que les scientists who must be helped by engineers. The measure is a tentative to give objectivity to the world and to life based on the relationship between the world and the objects. We enrich our capacity to formulate judgments on the world through the adoption of classes of objects objectives. The instrument of measure allows the determination of the object of the world,

1:02:30 de sa présentification au-delà du champ perceptif actuel et sa mise en commun au-delà de la co-présence factuelle des différents sujets. La désubjectivation du monde de la vie exige par conséquent une sorte d'épaississement collectif de la subjectivité qui, à partir de l'introduction des premières règles, voit progressivement accrue son enracinement dans la sphère matérielle et pratique. Alors, certes, la dépendance vis-à-vis de la sphère matérielle change de nature lors du passage de l'art de la mesure à la physique. Par exemple, les physiciens définissent les unités de mesure sous la base des concepts fournis par la théorie physique elle-même. Alors, on pourrait penser, bon, au fond, toute l'histoire de l'étalon, on la perd dans le cas de la physique mathématique. C'est une chose qui ne concerne qu'à l'art de la mesure. But it's not as simple as that. First of all, we can say that it does not eliminate the physical dependence on the technical tradition. Because every function function of physics and mathematics, and every concept belonging to the fundamental theory, presuppose the existence of techniques and procedures for their employment. It is not because you use the light of the light as unit of measure that you can determine the world directly with the light of the light. It is a tradition of the same. They are calibrated in a certain way to do it. And it is a tradition technique. So, according to Sert, the geometry as a tradition is possible in order to use the language and writing. The science mathématiques of nature, for its part, also exige the sédimentation collective of the knowledge of the practical, which is liable to the tradition of production and employment methodics of artifacts, the tradition of the practical. It is to say that, well, we should say a lot more about it, but it is to say that when we understood that the application of the ideas of the mathematical ideas of the world this practical activity of the subject. Well, science as a tradition, we see why, unlike the geometry, the tradition of physics, in particular, and the empiric in general, is not just a tradition of language. So if you take the origin of the geometry, the Husserl and all of that, in the case of physics, there is still something to change.

1:05:00 This idea that the possibilities of tradition, we find it in the language, but in the case of the physics, it does not work. In the sense that, obviously, there is a language, it is necessary, but there is also this tradition practical and a tradition of savoir-faire, which, again once, in conclusion, I have my limit, simply to say that from that, we could also try to see how the concept of the history of science, which is always fondated by the continuality, here, finds well some difficulties. Because it's clear that a technical tradition and a tradition of practical knowledge is obviously more transparent, and even more transparent, than a language tradition. And this is again the fact that I just mentioned, that the mathematical ideologies applied to the world have this character of arrangement in the physical world. Thank you. I have a question. I have a question for you. En fait, la conclusion a répondu en partie de votre question. Ce que je voulais faire, c'est que le progrès... Non, c'est pour écrire, ce n'est pas pour être plus... Le progrès récent de la physique, c'était justement la dématérialisation des états. Et sur l'histoire, par exemple, des conventions internationales du système des idées, on va de plus en plus vers la dématérialisation. You said the same, but the same thing is more, of course. Yes, exactly. That's what I said to the end. Yes, of course. You said just at the end. It's a trend that goes towards the dematerialization of the talons. The talons are no more. And you know that one of the practical problems is that for the mass, we are still at this level of demonstration. It's to say that for the mass, the only definition objective of a unit of mass is that a certain core has for mass 1 kg.

1:07:30 Well, that the mètre has been materialized for a long time. And there are projects, the meteorologists have been materialized for a kilogram of mass. Well, what I want to say is that it could be... Yes, it's that. In fact, in the measure of the determination of the talons, there is always a reference to the reality. For example, if we take the temperature, which is one of the most difficult objects to measure, that is not... I mean, we don't describe what is the temperature, but we don't have a procedure. We don't have a procedure that allows, from there, to find an objectivation of the temperature. Well, after, we can incarnate in objects, in thermometers, the thermometers are naturally digitized, or simply there is a complex phenomenon to the reality. And this is extremely different. You have responded to your conclusion, but I would like to explain that one measure is what, in fact, On peut dire que quand on a un objet conduit à telle mesure de la température, de la longueur, etc., c'est-à-dire que la quantité que l'on assigne à telle grandeur, dans telle circonstance, est celle qui respecte la loi. C'est-à-dire que c'est... En fait, la mesure même est dépendante de la loi physique. Mais vous l'avez dit dans votre conclusion, mais je pense qu'il faut le souligner. It's that there is a displacement, the program has made a displacement of an etanon, of an object matériel, which can be shown, and which should be shown. And there are things that can not be other than that. For example, the orientation to the left, which is the transmission, if you want to transmit someone very far away, this is my left and this is my right, it's extremely difficult. There are ways to make it. It's a science fiction.

1:10:00 It's true that this is the last refuge of the monstration pure. But in fact, the measure of more and more becomes not an object isoler, an act isoler, but there is an ensemble of different measures that must be coherent with the memory on a possible. And that change, it's always a relationship with reality, but it's a relationship with an ideality, like the maître, with an object like this, but in fact, the coherence of a system of ideality, all the structures, all the structures, all the structures of theory, with an ensemble of facts. It's much more difficult. No, no, no, no, but in fact, it's interesting, you have to say three things. First, this materialization that you mentioned is also motivated by the existence of objectivity. So, this attempt to also idealize the talent. But just what I want to say, if we go to the direction of using the constant Planck, the speed of the light, etc., as a fundamental unit of measure, fundamental, on peut le faire parce qu'il y a toute une série de pratiques expérimentales qui sont sedimentées, c'est ça ? La dématérialisation de la définition de la grandeur n'est pas un détachement de la sphère matérielle, en fait je pense que vous êtes d'accord. Et en plus, vous dites justement une procédure, c'est bien une procédure parce qu'effectivement l'instrument de la mesure en tant qu'objet objectif doit être utilisé, donc c'est pour And in conclusion, this is very important, the problem of the laws that we treat to the definition of an operation of measures. What is interesting is that when we decide to determine the world from an object that is an intermédiaire, on determine the world from a morceau of the world, and that's what is the base of this problem, let's say, of the theoretical charge of the experience in physics, and it's because I use something to determine something else, I have to prejudge, at the end, the object that I use, and at the end of the talons of Maître, which I said simply that he is rigid, if you want,

1:12:30 A partir de ça, justement, tous les objets objectivants que l'on a introduit dans l'histoire de la science sont de plus en plus chargés de théories. Et c'est ça, c'est ça. Oui, ah oui, c'est ça. Bon, une dernière remarque, c'est que sur l'historique de la mesure, il serait intéressant de faire un tableau historique et de voir justement comment au fur et à mesure des époques, on a gagné le contrôle des mesures. Very, very, schématiquement, the length, it's hard to chiffre, and every civilization has a maitrise of the length of the length. Well, the notion of the duration is much more difficult. It is the 17th century that the horloges start. The horloges really précised, the horloges, and the griffes, but the horloges really don't appear in the 17th century. Bon, les sons, c'est Euler, vers 1740, avec son théorie de la musique, a quantifié pour la première fois, de manière rigoureuse, les intervalles musicaux. C'est d'Alembert et Lèvres qui ont fait des travaux de musicologues qui ont établi de manière rigoureuse ce que c'est qu'un intervain musical, avec une mesure extrêmement indirecte, les chances. Bon, la température, ça n'est qu'au 19ème siècle. Les températures, ça n'est qu'au 19ème siècle, qu'on a vraiment, avec le standardisé, on a vraiment un contrôle. Jusque-là, la température est très approximative. Les premiers thermomètres un peu fiables, ce sont ceux du Camillet, par exemple, mais qui est encore... puis il y avait le mur à la fin. Avec les boules de verre. Les boules de verre. Il y a Réomur, il y a Réomur, c'est plus à la fin du 18e siècle. Et quant aux couleurs, je veux dire, c'est avant la théorie ondulatoire de la lumière qu'il n'y a pas d'objectivation. Je veux dire, il y a un moment où on associe. The same thing that Humer or d'Alembert had associated the idea of sound with the idea of frequency, which is an enormous part of scientific and an impact conceptually, that is only in the 19th century that we have associated with the theory of the pendulum, the notion of an angle of frequency, which is lumineux, which is an excellent color. So, I think that history shows something about the difficulty.

1:15:00 Today, we are surrounded by different things, and they are all digital. We don't even know what's behind it. We don't even know what's behind it. But it's been extremely long. Thank you. Thank you. Yes, I've been working on these reflections, I think they are essentially just, very deep, and in the same time, there is a kind of error. Well, they are just, I have relevé the three examples you have cited in your exposé, which are fascinating and monumentally, the difference between idealization and abstraction. It's true that we serve the philosophy of philosophy, which is the most thématized, this idea that the idealization as a process limit port to the exactitude, while the abstraction port to the genericity and that the exactitude has nothing to do with the generalization of the concept. That's exactly the fundamental. All the way in which he reprend the concept of Kant, on the fragmentation of space, on the fact that space is not just a concept, the problem of the pure space of intuition, after opposition to the extensive, the intensive, etc. And then the third example, that Cartier just said, from Galilée, this extraordinary idea that we can do on the physics, what we have done on the geometry. The geometry is the first one, and the physics is the second qualities. And so in fact, we serve, but also one of those who have the best mathematical, which is becoming a banality in the contemporary physics, but which is not a banality, it's the geometry. Because to geometry, we need to be able to describe the second qualities like structures that can also be able to fill the space-temps. That's the problem of the remplacement. So, there are shapes, there are shapes, there are shapes, etc.

1:17:30 So, it's an enormous part of the physics, this physical operation. But, indeed, there is still an error. And an error, I can't say that it's false, but there is still a limitation of reasoning which is spectacular. You have said, as I said, that there is a gap between perception and determination mathématiques with an edification graded of determination quantitative. All right, there is a gap between perception and science-physique. They are physical. Well, Husserl, it's the hypothesis, apparently evident, which is an evolutionist, almost an evolution culture, that, as well as the evolution culture and the apprenticeship, that we start by the world of life, and we start by the math physics. So, we need to be able to understand how the math physics is built from the world of life. And that's what you have exposed, very brilliant. But we could go further and say that in a way too evident that the physical nature precedes the biological nature and the mental nature. And so we could completely reverse the problem. The first point is that this inversion has been made by some of the most great phenomena. Prenons l'exemple des rapports entre Merleau-Ponty et la nature philosophie, c'est une complète aversion de Husserl par rapport à ça. Mais celui dont on ne parle jamais et qui pour moi est le plus grand phénomène français avec Merleau-Ponty qui est Chambon. Chambon dans son livre Perception de réalité, je ne sais pas si tu l'as lu, a extraordinairement bien posé le problème en disant qu'il faut partir du concept de nature. This concept of nature, at first, is the physical nature. But what does the concept of nature for that can emerge these concepts that resemble the world of life? So you can completely reverse it, and say, you have to understand, you have to complete the gap, but in understanding how the macroscopic can emerge the microscopy, how the qualitatif can emerge the quantitatif, how, etc. How do you perceive can emerge from the physics?

1:20:00 And I tried to do this because, there 20 years ago, I worked hard on the links between Tom and Husserl. For me, Tom was a version mathématique of the program of Husserl. And as it was very high math and very high physics, mathématiques, là, il y avait un problème. Quand j'ai travaillé à fond ces textes-là, enfin, les textes des idéals, là, les paradigms 72, 74, sur la géométrie exacte, qui ne pourra jamais être une théorie morphologique, il ne peut pas y avoir de théorie mathématique des formes, c'est bien qu'il y en a. Alors, ce qui est fascinant, C'est que si on reformule les problèmes phénoménologiques dont vous avez parlé, mais en inversant complètement l'argument révolutionnaire, et bien en fait on obtient une description d'une énorme partie des sciences contemporaines qui elles-mêmes se pensent comme des sciences post-physiques fondamentales. All this is about the emergence of morphology macroscopic in the natural world, the emergence of forms, it's not only that, there are many people who have worked on it. We have now the amazing theories mathematiques, physico-mathematicals, of the emergence of biology, the coquillages, the feuilles, etc. All this is about the macroscopic All this is on the qualities sensitive. These are like Eugène and all this, who explain why the coll coll. Well, they recover the qualitatif and macroscopic and the second qualities, from the physics fundamental, in explaining the interface, the fractal structure of the interface and what they do. And I don't talk about the science cognitive, cognitive, de neurosciences cognitive, qui explique justement l'émergence du perçu à partir de processus fondamentaux qui sont tout à fait de type physique. Donc vous pouvez complètement traverser la problématique. Alors ce qui est intéressant, c'est que Husserl lui-même avait envisagé ça, il

1:22:30 appelle ça une contrepartie scientifique de la phénoménologie, dans des sciences that could not exist yet, but could eventually exist one day. And I think that these sciences exist now. And that the opposition between scientificity and phénoménology, in our scientific field, is for me absolutely caduque. This is the remark. Yes, I have a response, in the sense that I believe, I would know what you would say, Yes, you have right, and maybe you have right when you say that today the real insertion of the subject in the world is object of scientific studies, but that this will arrive after, in the transcendental démarche. It is to say that for Husser, there is no contrast in the sense that Husser, first of all, does not make an explanation. There is someone who is concerned about the theory of knowledge. His problem is a problem of the principles, of the rights. So, if you want to change that, it is true that the project of Husser can be reversed, but it is true that Husser always says that the subject also constitutes, also, and he s'aperçoit, he s'aperçoit, he s'aperçoit as one choice of the world, it's a bit it, I agree with you, finally Husserp never went against the science, he never did that, he wanted simply explicitly explicitly the possibilities of science which, they, are explicative. And so... I'm sure you're d'accord. I mean, if we creuse... And then I'll have to... It's not to forget that Searle has been a remarkable mathematician, a real mathematician. That's what I said. Well, that's what I said. And I think that Un des problèmes fondamentaux chez Husserl, c'est qu'il a pensé la question fondationale des mathématiques de façon Hilbertienne.

1:25:00 Hilbert était un très grand ami. Donc c'est vraiment la conception axiomatique Hilbertienne qui, pour lui, était la clé de cette idéalisation qui porte les concepts à l'exaptitude, etc. And several times he said that we can't imagine an axiomatic of nature. It's totally impossible. There are some axiomatic that we would derive all the forms, the profusion of the forms, for example biologically, like that. Apparemment, he's right, but in the same time, I think we can say that this affirmation is totally false. So there is something very formalistic in Husserl, which we do not find at the people like Poincaré, for example, and which is the fact that the theory that there cannot be a physicality and a geometry qualitative, radicalizes its alternative. And the alternative is the phénoménology. But I think that the position of the phénoménology is linked to a kind of limit intrinsic that he saw in the science of his time, and that there he was still a little bit because it was linked to a formalistic position. You said that he was not mistaken. Well, yes, because Poincaré was a contemporane, and Poincaré was completely in one direction. He said that the geometry is liable to the perception. But there is not necessarily this kind of genese phenomenon. No, no, no, but it's evident that, well, we can object to observe that these philosophical analysis are a little dated from the point of view of the development of science. and he also was not too aware of what happened at his time, in some cases.

1:27:30 That's what we always say, of course, maybe it's not right. Look at the Japanese crisis of the quantum mechanics. Well, yes. Well, he doesn't look like someone who really understands what's going on. Well, for a philosopher, he doesn't understand what's going on. what happened. He made remarks very general. But the big problem, it is that what first interest Serles is the order of the Constitution. It is this hierarchy. And so, when you say that we can reverse Serles, in the end, we have to decide, we have to is that we are in the cadre of a transcendental philosophy or not? If we are in the cadre of a transcendental philosophy, then everything changes. I am completely agree with you. At this moment, everything changes. But if we are in the cadre of a transcendental philosophy and a philosophy which is first interrogated on what is pregated, on what is first done, then this itinerary of the perception towards the ideality me semble tout à fait justifié, et me semble... Bon, je ne pense pas qu'il puisse être renversé. Peut-être que je me trompe. Une autre question, une autre comment ? Merci. Ce n'est pas vraiment une question de naïf, un peu éliminant, comme monsieur parlait des unités qui sont les choses régimes, issue of life also, maybe you talked about it at the beginning, but I wasn't there, but I read it in a way, it's rather a form of question, if I ask myself, I'm not there. Longueur, mass, and sand. Longueur, the mètre. Well, we define it as the middle part of the universe, where the length is between the two trains, etc. But it seems that after my lectures, which are not as pushed as the others, that in the history of the universe,

1:30:00 the maître is at about a length of my arms, or my arms, or my arms, and then the size of the men, a little, I think it's 1,75 m, so it's of the size of the size of a little bit. Because of the size of the size of the size of the size, or it's a size of the size of the size of the size. mathématiques, on prend le logarithme, etc. Bon, passons. La seconde, j'ai une fois lu, je l'ai lu, c'est pas moi qui l'ai inventé, mais c'était à peu près le temps d'un battement de cœur humain, à peu près. Alors la masse, c'est peut-être un peu plus difficile, but when the Egyptians had to coordinate some water, or I don't know what, or a bowl, or a urn, not a urn, but a jar, the Greeks, etc., it was perhaps not 1 l, 1 kg, but it was about to this order. I say about it, it's between and between the order of grandeur. So, there are three things. is it totally idiot to say that it is still more or less attached to something of our life, that is to say the length of my heart, the length of my arm, or the size of my arm, etc. And what does it do every day, even the mass, for a man it does between 50 and 100 kilos, I don't know what we can say about it. Yes, I think yes. I agree with you, in the sense that, at the end, what I wanted to show you is that we are because we need to determine everything in the same way. Everyone wants to determine everything in the same way. That's one of the reasons. It's one of the elements that we treat our objectivity. And so, it's why, first of all, we chose those who were there, which was more close, which was accessible to everyone. That's the idea. I agree with you. There is a march towards a dematuralization of things like Pierre Cartier.

1:32:30 I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. But it's in the sense of the objectification. the more and more precise, it's clear, it's clear, these definitions, if we materialize the etalons, it's because, due to the precision of the measures that we do today, the erosion of the etalons, the part that we have is not stable at the level that we want to acquire today for the measures. It's clear, the part that we have to be the structure of the millionth, you know, the structure of the millionth, it is very insufficient to define the human being universe. So it is necessary to define the human being. It is more stable, but less liable to the aléas matérial, so in the sense of the occupation. It is not a bit in the prolongation of the occupation of the human being. But, I would like to say, if you have a big problem, that what we do, what we do, what we do, what we do, what we do, what we do, that we improve, and if we think in a physician, there will always be a small error, maybe it will be zero, but it will never be null. Is this a nonsense or is it a little bit?