Mathematical understanding (contd.)
Recorded at Mathematical Understanding, Univ. Paris 7 (2008), featuring Ivahn Smadja, Michael Wright, Others. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.
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mw0000396-cc-a_e_p- Format
- Audio recording
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- Michael Wright Collection
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- Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy
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- Made available for personal scholarly use. Rights in recordings are generally held by the speakers or their estates. If you believe this recording infringes your rights, please contact [email protected].
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0:00 There's another way to formulate one thing. That's what I thought. He explained that. He explained it to me. I couldn't figure it out. I was too quick. It's very useful because of this symmetrical motor system of function, warranting that there's a mechanism. The very important thing is the duality argument. It's the duality of which you spoke, exactly.
2:30 But he adds something more to frame it, to adjust it, meaning in framing the parallelogram, to get a parallelogram in an area. This is a connection to the model. When you see what he does here, it's pure able. That has more power than the others. Yeah, metaphor. Forget about the metaphor. The metaphor, it was an unparalleled metaphor of human. Actually, what I meant with this metaphor was exactly what you mean, because what I meant is that you could have different levels. I use this language of different systems plus simple goals. The levels of mathematics, historically, they are all rooted in mathematics.
5:00 This is a kind of math question, and it's going to be a little bit of a quiz, and I have to answer that, because there are two jobs, the conceptual one and the historical one, and I would like to connect these things to the programming of this one. No, no, this is good. Concerning this one, I'm puzzled. I mean, if Kemp says Riemann, Riemann should be more on the substance, Baalashah on the comfort. I'm not sure what to say. There are too many people to know.
7:30 Ah, concerning this problem, that's a way to connect the answer to Jean-Jacques. Why should we think that Kemp's diagram has one cheating? Is there only one way to make mathematical pieces or different pieces of mathematics could be equally conservative in such, but in very different ways, because the conventional is not given, and it's very difficult to feel the gap between them. My own idea would be to look at some of your platforms and some statements of... No, no, yeah, yeah, okay, I understand. You mean different, different ways of looking at it. If you, if you, how to, how to distribute, in a way, the landscape of it. Don't you think that there are different ways of connecting that to what you said about forming? I, I, I kept in mind what you said about unification, no matter, connecting.
10:00 There is a way of looking at formulas, and especially the chronicle one. Which is inspired by a claim, a very deep claim, distinct, okay, not blurring the borders. And there are other terms where, on the contrary, one should take advantage of blurring the borders, in a way. What do you think? What would you place in the imaginary shop?
12:30 Chronicles are not opposing them as, not that chronicles are dealing with formulas. Actually, I don't understand how to, but you have a second question. Are both ways equivalent with regard to logic? That is, are they obtainable by institutionist logic or certain logic or are there differences? I'm asking if both ways of obtaining ellipses are obtainable by some, not psychological, but intuitionists, for example, or are there differences regarding that? Yes, pardon me. And not intuitionists? In the second part, not. The first part, purely, because it's purely polynomial. There are many points that you began with in the first few quotations of Walker's intimidation, but this comes, I thought, it comes as a way of to say that behind the logic, so I would like to know if there is this thing which is compared to that behind logic.
15:00 You absolutely know that logic cannot tell us. Logic is a way of the importance of logic. And then you give the logic of physics. The logic of physics is the representation, the formula, the element, the theory. And behind that is something else. I think that, of course, also, but there are at least two different ways to see what is something else.
17:30 There is a very nice observation, a very nice observation of a world that is the way to, that is the only world in which we can grasp behind a logical general sense. It is not important, I think that there is a point of view with respect to which you can say that. There is also a gap, and the gap is the fact. What you lose, in a sense, is what you have lost in some time, and the fact is that you... Ivan, I wrote a book on the origin of analysis, so I'm not speaking against the understanding. I think that understanding is true.
20:00 And that is the level of...
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