Henry More / Newton, absolute space (contd.)

0:00 I'm still not sure why the community is thinking, given the things that are going to determine the number of parts, why do we have to take the parts that should be the most important? This is what he says. Immunity motion is simply the emotive matter which is removed, but nevertheless it's happening at a certain, determinate quantity. In this, we easily understand that the contents of the universe is a whole without varying in any given part. So in order to give an account of this, we need to have a determinate quantity of motion There's a mass from, if I want to see why this, what it is that's conserved in the universe, then I need to give an account of how this conserved quantity is really amassed from various quantities that are in the parts, otherwise I can't go to the parts of the universe. So, there's a jump in argument from quantity of motion being conserved in the universe and then quantity of motion being conserved in particular. But I think that in his mind, the conservation of quantum motion in a particular body, in a particular system, is justified by the general picture that he has about quantum motion in the whole universe. But could he have that view at home? Could he have the view that it's conservative in the whole universe, and I'm talking about parts, those would be the individual bodies. Could he just say, I'm not concerned with the parts of the bodies? It's the bodies that are parts of the universe, and as long as the total speed times y is a concerned quantity of q, I can pretend that there are no parts, I can ignore parts. If the bodies don't have parts, then you're right. But of course, according to Newton, the bodies do have parts. No, I'm saying to be a part. If there's an indefinite number, that's just to ignore the parts, then the whole... If this loses some motion, this hole, something else is going to get a gain for it. If we say that the quantity of motion in the part is s times speed, size times speed, the way to justify this is, why does it have this amount of quantity of motion? It has this amount of quantity of motion because you look at the different parts of the body and all of them have the same speed, so the composite has s times speed.

2:30 So it's just a vacation. Why do we say, why is this quantity the determinant one? Why is it volume times speed? It's that part of the population. Otherwise, why that number? Why is the volume times speed? It's because the motion of the composite is coming, is sort of arising from the motion. And this is why it derives this definition. Like that's one part of a matter moves twice as fast as another. That's the definition of quantity of function. I granted that he moves from a very cosmological picture to individual processes and that one is not justified at all, but it's a move that he takes. I like the paper and I like the way it was used. Part of it is because it has to be understood through conceptual argument. I also like how he picked up on the notion of place and freedom from oppressing that and I think it's a good way to re-read. There is a sort of line that goes absolute and relative space are the same species. I'm wondering if, on your reading, you could actually now say something about what that amounts to. One of the payoffs, I think, of a fresh approach is that the stuff that's puzzling that everybody skips over may now give up as a lower second look. I'm wondering, do you have anything to say about that? Again, what's the same magnitude but not the same? Absolutes and relative space are the same in species and in magnitude, but they do not always remain the same numerically, and so what I'm wondering is if you now have a way to cash out what he means here by species and magnitude, and I can sort of figure out why he doesn't think they're the same numerically, but just sort of, just a general guess, I haven't thought about it, but look at the motion of the body relative to a semantic space, that seems to be the same.

5:00 So it's the same species, it's the whole motion of the value relative to the outer space between them, the one that's unmoveable, and it's also the same magnitude because these are, you know, the motion of the position of the part of space relative to the composite thing, the whole space. It's not the same numerical value because the outer space is unmoveable. Did I understand that correctly, that actually there is kind of, there is this refutation of Cartesian Cartesian theory, right? A refutation in the sense that it really, it does comply with quantity of motion. But then, or I just missed the argument, or probably just Newton does provide it, that how still you make this move from refutation of this rather specific Cartesian. Theory 2, Epson space, right? First we have to realize that there are no alternatives, or at least there are no workable alternatives to the definition of two. By destroying the existing paradigm, it's a pretty safe bet to introduce another one. That's one claim that I made. Another one is more general, because if you take the definition of the space body occupied by the developers and the surroundings, So why the surrounding place cannot be movable all the way out, right? You need to find some unmovable reference point unless you want to really define the quantity of motion of this body, right?

7:30 This is the argument. That doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' definition of true motion. It just has to do with the definition of place. Yeah, right. Okay? From this to say that all definitions of place... You know, to think of this kind of Leibniz view. Or probably I could put differently the question. Could you easily say, imagine some, you know, other relational view which would counter all the other... But a relational view, so this is a new standard by which relational views are going to come. Do relational views by Leibniz, do they provide a specific way that Leibniz knew exactly saying whether... Whether that's part of it or not. So the question is not can they give us the good dynamics, but the question is can they give us an account of the response to the emotion itself. Workable definitions. And think about this, another wrinkle in the whole story is that for Leibniz, of course, quantity of motion is not significant. He has quantity of force, and then we have to think about whether he has to compare the quantity of force that's conserved given his relational definition of motion. So that's even further away removed from Newton's project, where you can see things behind the illusion. Now that we have this account of the argument, it would be interesting to see, okay, let's look at specific proposals. Do they have a chance of giving us a good account of conservation laws? And that is really what's going on here. There are four notes that we're looking at, but if Boykens actually picks out that, one of the issues has to be about the emotion of that, within the historical case. We discussed it, but I must admit that up to today I did not realize that I could take it from this point of view. But I'm almost certain that we will do it. I think what's significant here is that look at how

10:00 All of the commentators completely skip over, not all of them, but almost all of them, completely skip over the argument from property and they jump directly from the argument from the effect. Where what is going on is that in the argument from the effect there is the same amount of argument going on all over again only for now we have a visual demonstration and now we have an actual application of quantum emotion. In rotating bodies that doesn't, that doesn't, that conflicts Descartes' definition of true motion, but the same line of argument only done with observed phenomena. You're not planning, well maybe you are planning, but you're not planning, so the one element of the Stein-Salvi, which picks up on the last few lines of the Scobian, it says, listen, I'm giving you a kind of provisional account of What I pick up, the clauses of the three motions are, and I'm not going to explain it further, you're not playing with only a conceptual argument, are you? No, but I'm claiming that people think that the empirical argument is the only argument. No, it's what you're saying that really is shared. I mean, there's an element that's strictly conceptual, and there's an element there that's come with X or Y. And I think we understand these as... ...several different kinds of papers and similar kind of articles. No, this is a friend of mine. Can you maybe describe what I would mean by conceptual? So suppose someone says, well, in a way, it's not, you know, this can be a different thing at different times. It's not purely conceptual in the sense that we might have a kind of ordinary idea that we all have had moves and... You can't exactly ignore this sort of ordinary idea which is based on perception and so on, but once you allow us to bring in this sort of ordinary idea, I think with the pocket too, but anyway, once you have that, then it's conceptual in the sense that it's got these links among these various endings.

12:30 So you have two different properties. The property of motion, which is trying to capture quantum motion. You have proper motion, which is defined according to the way that Descartes defined it. There's a conceptual conflict between the two. They don't work together. Then the question is, if you go back to this picture, and you say, if I look at this picture, And I need to be committed to both definitions, both properties of motion together in surgery. So one way to avoid the problem is let's give up one in motion. The result of the conceptual argument is we have to give up one property, one or the other. Both of them don't work together. The only problem is that I think you can still commit to this property of motion. And I think he doesn't think he has a chance of describing the science of motion without taking on board this commitment. Why? Well, there are all the interiors, especially if we take the time to have an analysis of the convolution. So we have both ontological near the end. Nevertheless, the case is not totally hopeless. Apart from the forces, there are the causes and effects of the three motions, and by holding on to the causes and emotions, he's in a position to give the right definitions to do both. Again, I'm taking the argument for why he's in a position to ignore that, but I'll work with that definition in the future.

15:00 I think it's time for one more question. It's a common question. I was a bit puzzled by this brick that you used. Because I think what Lenghardt makes is a distinction of course between solid and fluid bodies, and fluid bodies are the ones in which particles are free to move with respect to time. So the quality of show is important, the quantity of motion is important for fluid bodies in which you have particles unable to move with respect to the other one. ...which is able to transfer speeds to another particle using its feet, in such a body, for Descartes, it would be impossible for one part to move with respect to the other, or for a quantity of motion to be exchanged between the parts, so it is one body, and for Descartes, it would not be right not to say, okay, the inner part does move because the body is whole, and the particles do not need to move. If you look at these rules for collision, if you take this body and another body, the way that we understand how collision occurs, and I don't like collisions, is to say this rigid body has a certain quantity of motion, this other rigid body has a certain quantity of motion, then I'm going to write it out and see what the collision is like. To say for a single rigid body that it has quantity of motion, you have to transfer it to a new body. Our size is quantum motion, because it depends on the motion of the planet. I'm completely confused about this now. It's actually cool. You might also have to do something with some kind of imaginary divisibility. I mean, a bit of something you're saying, like for Descartes, would be one solid body. And so what you're saying, well, you might mention that it's divided, that it's divided in parts, and that this idea of, then again, diviability, what I'm saying is imaginary, that this might be an issue for the faculty. I don't know if I'm correct, but I would like to say, why do solid bodies have quality in motion? Whether it's justified in the sense that...

17:30 We can find many mathematicians divided into the various parts, and that's why it has the quantity of motion in half. But he doesn't say this. He doesn't say this, but he does conclude from the general conservation principle that quantity of motion is something that's a determinant property of each part of the universe. Part of the universe doesn't mean part of solid bodies. But again, if each part has a quantity of motion, the question is why does it have a quantity of motion that's size times velocity? It's the size of the whole solid body of the ball and its velocity. So if two solid bodies meet, the one needs some speed and the other one loses its speed, and the last of the solid is the size of the one ball you bring in to save. I understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point, but I don't understand the point. Thus, if one part of matter moves twice as fast as another, which is twice as large, we must consider that there is the same quantity of motion in each part, but why is quantity of motion dependent on the size of the body? How does he conclude that? So you have space, which is matter, and a part of matter is a part of the space, which is a body. So this body occupying a bigger part of matter than this one is a bigger part of matter than this one. But I don't think it's thinking of the part composing the body. These are two parts of matter which can collide, and one can transfer velocity on the other. So in other words, the relation between the whole universe and its part, i.e. bodies. But how do you compare? Why is it that the size is the thing that you compare?

20:00 So let's say I take a body that has one cubic centimeter and another body that has two cubic centimeters. And then we say that this, and they move at the same speed, why does the bigger body have twice as much quantity of motion as the smaller body? Why is it proportional to the size? How do we, what's the justification for that? Part of the analogy is what happens on a balance. It is really transposing the scheme of a horizontal balance to the scale of collision. And if you have a body on a balance, then you take part of it. You see why it's adding up in this kind of proportion. But that doesn't mean it has an indefinite number of parts. It's not like you can break it up. Even if it has an indefinite number of parts, it doesn't mean that the volume is not proportional. How many parts in a sense, how much volume it takes, how many parts this could have if you divide it into distinct parts. I mean, I don't see how you derive the quantum of motion that is in each part if you don't say how it's related to its size. I feel some sympathy toward what Gervais is saying with respect to Descartes, as Descartes probably would have conceived himself, but what you give, in any case, is why Newton thinks Descartes makes this error and the result of that argument stands, given that Newton leads Descartes making this error, the argument why Newton developed this whole situation is correct, but I was convinced by what you say, but now I'm sorry, I attempt to… Indeed, the conception of the relationship between space and math is so viscous that we cannot just simply take the relationship between parts and whole that Newton has decolonized as one of the characters. I think this is an excellent remark to stop, but I would like to point out that Ori is right. It's time to go for coffee, and we'll be starting at 15 to 4 sharp, so it's like 15 minutes before we go out. So first of all, I'm going to read a paper to you, and I would never do that on the last job. Mark will assist me with some slides that sort of provide some background entertainment.

22:30 What I say and what's on the slides hopefully connects, but it's not the same. The second thing is this is not a paper on space, although I mentioned space rapidly and broadly. But this is a good audience because reflecting on Morse paper made you realize there was something wrong with Stein's field notions. The other accountant who was looking at me like, you know, he's sort of like intimidating all the comments and he's sort of like blowing everybody out of the water. Along the way I'm noticing there's an undertone, the Sal especially. So I'm getting everyone more irritated. So I figure, okay, I'll sneak it back. I'm going to not push it. And I say, okay, the view that you're presenting kind of accounts for. You've been positive as far as the tree is. And much to my shock, Friedman doesn't say, oh, you're wrong or I have to think about that, but he points at Andrew and he says, my student, Andy, will answer that question for me. Now, much to my shock, Andrew rolled off an answer that was in direct contradiction with me. I grabbed the microphone back. And, you know, we started to do this little shindig before people stopped us. And then afterwards, I said to Andrew, you really can't believe what you just said.

25:00 You're just defending your advisor. He said, no, no, no, I don't really believe it. My focus is really based on it. And I was like, oh my god, I'm really so wrong. So then we started, we pulled out a statement. So we started corresponding about this. And I think we had like a intense quarry of about three months of three times a day, three times a day, letters going back and forth. We included Friedman on a few occasions. You get some background support, Rob Stein, who told me I was completely wrong. We're also completely wrong. It wasn't help. Then, Yannick and I were joking that I was blind. But then, about six months later, I got this big manuscript for this paper. Basically, I edited out all of Atiyah's paper based on my comments, but then really started to think more seriously again about Belkin's observations on it. However, in thinking about Orr's paper and in developing the details of my term, I end up disagreeing both with science claims that produce a single-body congenerated graph in the force field, as well as on the kind of speculations Newton's speculations permit. All of this involves taking interpretative stances on Newton's definition 8, the third law of motion, and the third little reasoning.

27:30 Newton said he suppressed them in order to prevent disputes with other prejudices. I believe the prejudices he has in mind are not really vulgar, but rather philosophical, that is, those in circulation among the world, for the treatise is more speculatively metaphysical than the published version of book three. Nevertheless, because of the timing of its writing and the fact that Newton thoroughly did not disown them, this rather surprising has been largely neglected in Newton's scholarship. While many later much-studied additions to Principia can be explained by Newton's responses to new empirical evidence or corrections to obvious problems, these should be viewed as Newton's evolving responses to the concerns expressed by some of his religiously motivated interlocutors and the evolving polemics with life and its followers. The Leibniz plot corresponds and say the letter could definitely have received a lot more attention than the treatise among those who claim to be interested in Newton's metaphysics. Surely uncovering Newton's substantive commitments, we should not focus primarily on the duty expressed for reasons associated with a holosocratic problem, that is, the independent authority of philosophy in the face of social, political, and legislative constraints. With Newton's general secrecy and purgations as routers from heterodoxy, there's no denying his awareness of such constraints. Recall how, for example, in Desgraves, he calls attention to how Descartes feared positions that might be called as offering a path to atheism. He's aware of this issue. In my much larger book, I actually spell out very different kinds of notions of Socratic. Really not relevant today. Next slide. Second, because the treatise was published so shortly after Newton's death, it is invaluable in making us understand the reception of Newton in the 18th century. While that reception was shaped by the optics, the likeness of far-carved comments, and various meconian popularizers, the treatise influences much the collective.

30:00 This is unfortunate. For example, David Geinplank, that, and I quote now, was never the meaning of Sir Isaac Newton, to rock second causes of old force or energy, though some of his followers have endeavored to establish that theory upon his authority. Among Newton scholars, it has become unfashionable to read Newton as an instrumentalist or a positivist. And again, Yanket is a very important hero. But many probably still read 18th century British empiricism as reading Newton in this mistaken way, and thus uninformative on matters of Newton interpreting. Moreover, scholars are thus also blind to the fact that the British empiricists are often very ambivalent about the new role of Newton's authority. So while today I do not hope to rehabilitate 18th century British thought as a guide to interpreting Newton, that was true of... It is useful to realize that we do not need to focus exclusively on mathematics, likeness, and con, but can offer a philosophical insight into Newton's law. For over a month's reading on the next slide, I understood Newton as a kind of a sort they were not. We can also see that part of the great 18th century debate in philosophy is not between empiricism and rationalism, but between those philosophers that believe in creating a complete system from the method of expecting ideas and those that believe in a more piecemeal mathematical experimental approach than tradition initiated by Galileo and Agnes. The Newton of de Graaf, which is now the focus of so much scholarly attention, who unabashedly offers an analysis of the exceptionally clear idea of extension, belongs to the first tradition. The Newton of the Principia and the Treatise is the champion of the second tradition. If I write about this, we should date de Graaf before the Treatise and claim that I think it's possible. On my reading, Newton knows that the view I attribute to him Haydn is itself a kind of speculative metaphysics or hypothesis that he deplores as increasing vehemence in others, as he anticipates against the broadened debates with the mechanical philosophers and later the perturbed and politicized dialectics with Leibniz.

32:30 Given that his followers become ever more insistent on the empirical and experimental nature of his method, he thus deprives himself from developing or articulating fully perspective of the view that guided his early development of his view. I provide five methodological and historiographic reasons to remain agnostic, though somehow this issue could be spared as other potentially complete proposals of Newton's entertainment offer a stable, consistent, high status, but I believe I am spared of discerning and comprehensive view of Newton's speculative metaphysics even at that time. Someday this may be possible. If you want to complicate the religious context, you can't always take Newton at face value in speculative matters, especially because there are instances when Newton hints at his knowledge of an extra pair against an extra pair. Of course, despite two notable isolated exceptions, we do know how to comprehensively view how Newton's views evolve across and among many issues. And this is really a character that's a lot to reflect. It is dangerous to treat a painting of Newton's speculative views in isolation, but it's not always clear how to take these to a larger, evaluative package. Finally, Newton is an extraordinary first writer, as sometimes lesser mortals like us could use further clarification. In fact, these considerations are never too inclined to restrict my scholarship to the reception of Newton's views, so despite the term language and what follows, my views are very provisional. In this paper, I proceed as follows.

35:00 First, I present the view as I find in Newton's posthumously published treatise. I explain how Newton offers a relational kind of graph. In this third section, I disagree with Howard Stein's account of how the gravity field is generated by a particle. I argue that a lone particle is not enough to generate a force field. In offering arguments against Stein's view, I take strong interpretations of his third rule of reasoning and his third law of motion with its paragraphs. In section 4, I reinterpret the Coates sign objection and help explain why it's based on a false dichotomy that Coates, at following in Kant, mistakenly attributed to Newton, namely that the view that gravity is an essential property of the planet. I should say, in the last section, I do love half-landing, pointing at a virus that the donors have done. Okay, next slide. From the meter body to the gutter. Here, the distinction does not deny the reality of the view, but affirms it. In the next paragraph, Hinton explains the natural perspective more fully, specifically in terms of the attraction features. The first one reads, there is a double role insofar as the action is considered on two bodies, but between two bodies but one sole, single one. The second one reads, we are to conceive the single action to be exerted between two planets arising from the conspiring nature of both. The cause of the action. This is the disposition of each body. And two, the action or effect itself. The action is itself two-fold, A. It's two-fold as in upon two bodies, but it's single, let's say this is B, as between two bodies. Thus we see that the cause of the action is the conspiring nature of both bodies. And for the conspiring to occur, the bodies must share a nature.

37:30 To sum up, the cause consists in the nature or disposition of two bodies, who are twofold caused because involved in two bodies, but it is one interaction, or somewhat confusingly, one nature. What are caused are one interaction of two actions upon bodies, and these are, of course, two oppressed forces. As Haberslein explains while using somewhat anachronistic language , As Adam and Yanni have noted to me in correspondence, part of Newton's point here is to say that the third law holds for attractions, just as it holds for other interactions, and to note that the attraction between the bonds and questions, of course, includes the bonds. And read about this one. Newton is offering us a radical new idea, one that he feared would encounter a lot of prejudice. Here we have, on all firsts, necklaces and typosices about the nature of matter. First, Newton emphasizes a single action between two bodies, and he uses the repeated axiomatic. This looks like a very clear description of action at a distance. Second, Newton says one cannot only treat the third law of motion as a merely mathematical statement, but also that the action at a distance really takes place in nature. And I think Yann Yann would agree with me that this reflects Newton's detection in the General's Boneyard of gravity. In his treatise, Newton explains that this is due to a shared property of two bits of matter. That is, Newton is hypothesizing the underlying physical cause. Here, Newton is silent, however, if this attraction is mediated through the medium. So we should distinguish between, number one, the reality of the force of gravity. Number two, it's only because a matter is not a single bit of matter.

40:00 For when the accidents of bodies have been rejected, it remains not extension alone, as Descartes supposed, but also capacities in which they can stimulate perceptions in the mind. Alone, particle mutants will not stimulate a perception until there is a mind present. Of course, in Descartes, the official argument goes in the other direction. Second, because of this, we can grasp why gravity is not essential to matter, for we can't conceive of matter without gravity. Now, John Henry has argued that this is due to Newton's commitment to God superadding gravity to matter. My view cannot rule out this possibility, and I think Newton was eager to encourage it among his theologians. However, I read Newton as claiming, and I should say, to quote from the optics, I'll put it in the extra slide at the very end, is the multiple universes that God could create, I think actually decisively suggests against the super. Newton as claiming that gravity is non-american. Sources for attitude matter, but rather generated by, for lack of a better term, interactivity expressed when the universe contains these two bodies. More on this in the next section. So we're dealing here with an accidental relational quality of matter. And we'll look at this paragraph now at the end. This reading has five nice features associated with it. First, long as the species of speculative metaphysics that Newton increasingly changes the floor, it provides a cause of gravity in an ontologically sparse way in accordance with Newton's first, maybe second, rule of reasoning.

42:30 No new entities are introduced. Related to this is an additional nice feature, his theologically flexible. I think this is very important. That is, Newton leaves room for a possible role for God, for example, as the medium or the super addition part. But he's not required to commit to it. As he writes in it, so I'm going to say this is actually a strategy of Newton more generally, just theological flexibility. And I think you're a really big polemical against a lot of reasons. As he writes in a different context in Optics 331, it only seems probable, that is to Newton, that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, dependable, movable particles of such size and figures for such other properties and in such proportions of space. This probabilistic and empirical approach to matters related to our knowledge of God's after-groups, which are Trudas quoted from the General Scopia, from Phenomena, fits the overall character of the Trudas, where God only and very briefly shows up when he has the seed of a conditional statement about the placement of the planetary orbits. Only mention of God in the Trudas. It also fits a ground for Newton's treatment of the idea of space. All three versions are compatible as a theistic and atheistic interpretation. Regardless of Newton's views, he is always careful not to overstep the evidence. The third rule of reasoning avoids claiming that gravity is essential to matter will not have been an attractive position, as we want to conceive or imagine matter without gravity, and the empirical evidence does not license the inference. Adopted in the editor's preface to Frank Hinton. Fourth, it avoids adapting the absurd and career position in which passive matter can act at a distance rejected in the letters of envy.

45:00 For Hinton's position, it permits us to understand that in the right circumstances, matter can be viewed as active. By itself, matter is passive, but it has latent active dispositions. He passed the principle by which the bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they resist it, and he contrasts this with active principles such as the cause of gravity, by which planets and comets keep their motions in their orbits, and bodies acquire great motion in falling, and the cause of fermentation of the body, and so on. Shortly thereafter, he lists gravity and that which causes fermentation and the cohesion of bodies among the active principles. This allows that, as he says in the letter to Fedley, that the attractive agents be material, not the insignificant. Incidentally, because the laws in motion are also said to be passive, I reject this Hamiltonian patia of late speculation that gravity is an immediate effect of the will of God and one of the first rules leverage to control the universe. If God is involved in accounting for action at a distance, it will either be in the way he created matter or super-antigraphic to matter after creation or is active at all occasions. But not the laws of nature. The possibility allows Newton to move beyond merely noting the fact that the gravitational interactions of two bodies are proportional to their masses. It allows one to distinguish between investigating the cause of gravity and the medium that facilitates the interaction. And I think this is a really important point. For as both Howard Stein and John Henry have pointed out, even if one posits an ether, it would consist of particles based on partners or pulsing forces operating across the distance between them. Or even if the bodies are particulars, they require an active principle to keep them together. This provides, so in other words, ether doesn't solve the attraction at a distance problem. This provides further reason to avoid conflating news and speculation about the medium that might be facilitated attraction and the cause of it. This is not to deny that it may have been attractive in exploring the idea that the action of some kind of subtle matter between ordinary bodies can cause the attraction. The attraction might then be an emergent property in virtue of the local action of the medium on the individual bits of matter.

47:30 So, I'm not saying that Newton's way of thinking about the problem, thinking about the meaning of it. So, section three. Now, my position, first, he writes a note, so to speak, into the text, which are a fitting tribute to Carnap's volunteerism. Investigation on Newton's mathematical speculations can be illuminating, a political reserve, and perhaps morally inspiring. Read it as it may, there is a serious debate about the metaphysical... An open picture I'm describing to a Gagnac called Newton's Mundane Metaphysics is an attractive one. Second, Stein's particular... next slide. Stein's particular field interpretation of gravity was initially and incoherently offered as an interpretation of Newton's example, the treatment of definition A, where Newton writes that accelerative force may be referred to the place of the body as a certain efficacy that keeps from the center for each of the surrounding places in order to move the bodies that are in those places, and the absolute force may be referred to the center as having some cause without which the motive forces are not propagated through the body. Where there is cause of some central body, such as the low sun in the center of an independent force, or the earth in the center of a force that produces gravity, or where there is some other cause which is not apparent. Note, by the way, that Newton distinguishes the cause of the force and it, in turn, from gravity, offering independent support for my claim above not to conflate such matter. But this is the injustice to the fact that it is the shared nature that generates a square quart scale. So in my view, there's only a pair of bodies that generate a few.

50:00 Our dispute turns on how to interpret Newton's empirical approach, especially in terms of, number one, the exact wording of the explanation of definition A, number two, as formulated in the circle of reasoning, and three, perhaps as... On one sense of Newton's aesthetics, when we explain these three differences and offer responses to Stein argues. Stein argues against my view as follows, and I close now. If the properties of all the bodies we observe are to be ascribed to all bodies whatsoever, and you accept on the basis of Newton's argument that the possession of the power of gravity, and therefore the existence of an excellent measure of gravitational force that points to the surrounding region, is the property of all the bodies we observe, then rule 3 may be read as saying that we are to ascribe such a property to all bodies, whether they are other bodies or not. I should say something about terminology. In our correspondence, Stein and I talk about properties, whereas in the paper and in the title, I only talk about qualities. And there might be some. So, against Stein, I argue that first, in definition A, Newton does not claim there would be an accelerative force or an accelerative measure of a gravitational force in the absence of a second body. Rather, the definition of accelerative force is given in terms of the disposition of a central body to move the bodies that are in the surrounding places. Thus, the example following definition A is quite clear that we're dealing with an interaction or a shared action between two bodies. However, the whole example of definition A is about weight. That is, humans giving a treatment of forces not in terms of their impact on empty places, but on places filled with matter. Luckily, my terminology follows, or is careful. Second, on my reading of the third rule of reasoning, this means that we can infer universally that pairs of bodies with shared actions generate force fields where bodies are, but no more. We have no empirical evidence whatsoever on how to think about a lung particle. In fact, rule 3, and Newton's explication of it, is articulated in terms of the pleural bodies and their parts. Recall, those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted, and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made, should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. The only lung body mentioned in a long discussion accompanying rule 3 is the hypothetical disconfirming divisible body.

52:30 But this is thus evidence for my approach. Stein has a final aesthetic argument. It goes as follows. If there's only the particle p and one other particle, p prime, then obviously you, the Schleser, want to say that the fields about p and about p prime, which of course almost completely overlap, are jointly generated by the pair. But then you want to say that the field about p in the actual world is jointly generated by all the pairs p, q, whose first member is p. It seems to me, this is Stein still, that this leads to scholastic monstrosity. Newton says nothing about this matter, and since the speculation beats me as a sterile monster, I don't want to poise anything on it. End quote, Stein. I call this an aesthetic argument. It is unpersuasive, because after all, many of Newton's earliest and most able readers did find even the times-yield in Franckitia unabashedly occult and in its own way scholastic. A reading of Newton that makes them out to appear plausibly as a certain kind of innovative scholastic, she does have something to be said for, especially because we're also trying to explain why she was impressive in light of expected prejudices. It is to be admitted that on my view of Newton, the infinite universe is populated by infinite numbers of pairs of interactions within and among bodies generated in infinite number of fields around bodies. But that is no stranger than the mere fact of universal attraction. Furthermore, it is this scope's elastic monstrosity that Newton is leading us to, and slide. When he writes in his account of the third rule, if it is universally established by experiments and astronomical observations that all bodies on or near Earth are heavy towards Earth, and do so in proportion to the quantity of matter in its body, and that the moon is heavy towards the Earth in proportion to its body, And then our sea, in turn, is heading towards the moon, and if all planets are heading toward one another, and if there's a similar heading, it's a common source of sun, will have to be concluded by this third rule that all bodies gravitate toward one another. I think this is the scholastic monstrosity that Newton is making us sort of see. So, on balance, my position should be favored over Stein's, because it avoids this as anachronism, not glory, and does justice to the text of Newton and the expected reaction to it. It does saddle Newton with a potentially unbalanced mixture of speculative hypothesis and strict verificationism.

55:00 In a partial sense, in law three, one version of which is articulated as, and I quote, the action of two bodies upon each other are always equal, always opposite in direction. Note this is Newton's way of offering the third law in other words. It's his own, as it were, explanation. It is inherent to the third law that we're eating as at least pairs of bodies, and this, of course, might be used in dissection. Also, Newton articulates and applies the third law differently to cases that involve contiguity among bodies than to cases that do not. This is, in fact, the main point in his response to Koch's version of the famous Koch final definition. Newton reminds Koch that the third law itself is entirely agnostic about contiguity. In fact, in the last sentence in the justification of the third law, Newton goes on in his way to make clear that the law is valid also for attractions, and so on. And he refers to the proof in the following scolion. In that scolion, Newton offers conceptual and clear cards for the first claim that the third law could be applied to attracting bodies. Now, what's about to follow is a lot of handwritings that he compels characters to do. But in my view, the evidence turns on the Galilean conservation principle within a closed system. The whole reasoning at the end of the Scully was very Galilean. There's an irony here. Because Adams uses the same kind of reasoning in some of his most celebrated passages on relativity. If I'm correct about this, then Newton might have hoped that in the absence of empirical disagreement, Hawking would have no major conceptual problems with his theory. Newton's response to Coase alludes and refers to the Scullion, and echoes its reasoning. So third, Coase's question ought to have been directed at the third law itself. This, I hope, is one of the main insights that my approach can show. If there's a problem, it's not in the application of the third law, but the third law itself. Furthermore, the way Newton formulates and explains the third law tells us silently against an over-reliance on the letter to Bentley of the sort that Andriy Adyak implies to do.

57:30 Newton certainly states that attractive bodies are very conceivable. Nevertheless, the successful application of the third law is uninformative regarding the cause and mechanisms of attraction at a distance. The third law applies to interacting masses connected by and in figures of bodies, as it does when they are attracted at a distance. Moreover, my argument does not deny that both Stein and others are right to say that there is something fishy about the validity of the third law, especially the treatment of parallel reform. The issue can be put succinctly. This is, I think, the way that Andrew likes to put it. How do we know that Bernini was a closed system which potentially included pairs of bodies to be said to have changed momentum? I blame him. We do not know, so let me rephrase this, the issue comes in succinctly. How do we know that we're dealing with a closed system in which potentially infinite pairs of bodies can be set to exchange momentum? We do not know this, but as Newton explains, this has come to Newton to cut our unsent draft, it follows from both the first and third of those laws, and these are founded upon phenomena by induction. The argument holds good till some phenomena can be produced against it. And I think for a very nice reconstruction of this, and Belkin's other papers... While McKenna denies that Newton is offering a potentially troubling, abductive argument from success, my reading emphasizes that Newton's conceptual apparatus should be understood as insisting that forces are measured and inferred from pairs of bodies. Moreover, given the general empirical promise of Newton's program, if forces are measured or inferred for which no bodies are apparently present, this results in a hunt for new bodies, and I think this is one way to understand it. These are the successful discoveries of Neptune and Pluto and other planets. So while any pair of bodies can be treated as a closed system in Newton, or for all kinds of practical cases they are, the weight of Newton's program is to keep opening up the nature of the system all the way to the so-called base star. This is an implication for how to think about Newton's views on algebraic space, but this is not the place for studies. So it looks like the projection really is ignoring Newton's boldness. Of all people, Newton first favorably appreciated this feature of Newton. I quote that from the history of England, Newton is cautioned in admitting no principles such as those which were founded on experiment, but resolute to adopt such principles, however new or unusual.

1:00:00 I deliberately discuss the code Stein objection after explaining how I understand Newton's conception of the shared action of the resulting force field. For Coates, the following account also attributes to Newton the view that gravity is a primary quality, that is, Coates' language, in just the sense that extension or infinitum really is. And our separate work on Newton's optics, I should say my work on Newton's optics and Newton's... Howard Stein and I have expressed some doubts about the appropriateness for Newton of the language of primary and secondary qualities, but here we can leave that aside, because I hope I've made matters of this, that accepting Newton's third law of motion for attractions, I'm quoting from the Scoping through the Six Colors, is an entirely separate matter from claiming that gravity is a primary quality, for the third law is merely being applied in terms of pairs of bodies. On my interpretation, if an acceptance on a conceivable matter without gravity, there is in addition no empirical evidence or conceptual reason to suppose that gravity is a primary quality of matter. In the latest is a Paulson's dilemma. We can hold that gravity is a relational Inessential quality of matter. Perhaps if Coates had also pressed Newton on this in the correspondence, we would have more evidence for Newton's evolving views on relationship in matter gravity. So the weird way I want to say, Coates had the right first question and not the right follow up question. So in conclusion, let me end with two disconnected observations. In my treatment, I said nothing about a very important and much-neglected passage from Book I, Section I of the Scoping. Finally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the physical species, physical causes, and physical proportions of these forces. By talking about the conspiring nature of mathematics,