Temporalité & Husserl
Recorded at MaMuPhi Seminar, ENS, Paris (2008), featuring Jean Petitot. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.
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0:00 Certaines analogies formelles que Husserl utilise et qui, selon moi, viennent de souviens avec les mathématiques. C'est pas un temps du mai que Husserl a été l'assistante d'Alain Sprach à Berlin en 1883, il a eu une baisse sur les toxiques des variations, il a eu d'extrêmement proche de Cantor et de Berthe, He was a disciple in phénoménology and mathématiques of Mannwein. He was a disciple in phénoménology and physics of Oscar Beter, in 2014, in general. He started his work in 1891. After, when we met Hirschkuhl, and the tradition brentanian is completely distraught, but in fact, his life is extremely close. He is very alerted to the whole development of the mathematics. So, we can do an hypothesis that, at a certain moment, he uses an analogy, a different expression, etc. He knows what he does. I have already talked about some of these in this seminar. I'm going to reprendre some of them in an accent on the problem of the temporality. These remarks are sincere, some of you know, in a research program that is quite ancient, which is a research program of actualization scientific of the phenomenology, which is called naturalization of the phenomenology, and who can quite easily explain it. Well, I could not enter into the technique of the phenomenology, but if I am too much superstitious, I will not be able to explain it. But I will start by, say, three great levels. what we call the natural attitude. The natural attitude, which is our attitude permanent to us all, we are installed in a world objective,
2:30 we believe that there is an external space, tridimensionnel, that there is a lot of energy that comes, there are objects tridimensionnels, often solides, which move in this space with the speed, acceleration, which we can measure the distance, that we have an objective, that we can measure this time with the horloges, etc. Well, we live, we live, we are installed in this world-là. And we We croyons très fermement, très, très fermement, c'est ce que l'on appelle l'eau comme ça, la croyance première à l'existence objective de ce monde, fait au fait de ce monde avec cette structure-là, existe indépendamment de nous, ainsi, avec cette structure-là, ça ne veut pas dire que quelque chose existe indépendamment de nous, mais nous croyons tous qu'un espace tridimensionnel, which is not easy to use, etc. etc. exist in different ways. Now, if we practice a minimum of reflection on our experience, our experience as a subject in first person, we immediately constate that it is totally false, that this nature is naturally and massively wrong. This is not at all a space tridimensionnel with objects tridimensionnels that we see, effectively, which we are given in the perception. Here we have an object, we look at an object, And I think that you all would say, well, okay, we have a spot visual, we have a victim, we have a male who goes, so there is the external world, there is the object, the flower and the appearance in this world, and we have a spot visual who is palpable, scan through the space externe, and then, now, we understand the structure of the eye, we understand what happens in the airs visuels, when we do all this, it can be complicated, it's the problem with the neurophysiology, but we are impressed with the sense of reality
5:00 by a world externe, the reality. So, we could say, in a language more contemporaneous, that the phénoménology says that we can think like that, but if we can create an experience, and create a theory of experience, this point of view is totally erogated, So what we do is exactly the inverse, that is to resolve, in our sense technique, a problem not inverse, that is to say that from the two dimensions of the two dimensions locales which are taken into a flow of water continue, which is the one of our visions, we constitute an space tridimensionnel with the properties of the matrix, with the objects tridimensionnels etc. How we construct the project, including this objective, is a problem not only inforceable but a horribly difficult problem. It's very easy to show, if you prenez a neurophysiology of actual vision , you would presume that I meanquetekin, what I told you will say it is in the first few sentences. La vision doit résoudre le problème inverse et impartir de données sensorielles, reconstruire la structure du monde externe et de toutes ces structures, etc., sans faire d'hypothèses que ce monde préexiste. So there is a second level. Here is what we see now. We have a kind of flux. In a very local field, we have a kind of flux where we don't know very well what. And you see very well that if you part of these data, The fact that there exists a number of experiments, etc., etc., there is no doubt at all. What there is there in the chamber, you can first segment it, you can do the detection of the work, you can see what the people like Morel, what the people like Morel, just simply the segmentation of the image is the problem variation of the image. a little bit, a little bit, a little bit, a little bit. Une fois qu'on a segmenté ces images, il faut pouvoir les interpréter comme des projections que j'ai plus fonctionnelles. Et pour ça, il faut pouvoir recoller ces morceaux.
7:30 Il faut être capable de faire une bonne traquille, c'est-à-dire savoir que ce qu'il y a ici, que ce point-là, c'est un tout petit peu French, it's the same for this point-là, and it's not at all in the same position. All those who have done the analysis of images and video know how to do a good tracking are atrocious, according to the movement. So, Tancserve said at the beginning of the 20th century that it was difficult, and that if we had adopted this point of view completely inverse of the nature of the nature. There was a whole range of new problems that were discovered, and it was fundamentally the result. So, the second level, which is the phenomenon in the sense quite banal, is the phenomenon of the appearance, how things are given, how things appear as phenomena, and observe the reality objective in which we believe that we don't have a phenomenon. It's constituted by our experience, but in a way complicated. So, in the case, I have a program, philosophiques et sociétiques, et assez simples, que d'essayer de comprendre comment les choses sont données phénoménaliques. Pour cela, c'est une grande philosophie, les deux grands puisiers de philosophie que je le sais, en fait, premièrement, cela a été débloqué la mise entre parenthèdes de la tête du monde, It is to say that you make, even in parenthesis, a little impasse on this reality which would be the first of my object. And you say, what do I see really? When I turn my hand, what do I see really? Well, I see the boards, the boards move, and then there are points of confidence that appear, and then, well, we don't see objects, but there are fluxes that we don't see. It's not a problem. It's not a problem. So, to reconstruct the objects, apart from the institution of our parents, it's not possible.
10:00 So, the first pillar of the methodological, it's this mis entre parenthesis, but okay, and then the second pillar of the methodological, the introspection. We have an access introspective, in first person, to our expertise. So, just with that, if you take a whole set of knowledge on the world of this way, you have already done an enormous work at this point. Because what I've said about the concept of the future, you can do it on all the other concepts, and then after the language, and then after, etc, etc. Ensuite, il y a un troisième niveau, beaucoup plus fondamental, et qui est celui de l'origine de la phénoménalité elle-même. C'est-à-dire comprendre comment cette phénoménalité qu'on se donne comme tasse de décrire correctement sans faire une hypothèse qu'un monde s'externe, comment cette phénoménalité est telle que c'est ? Alors là, il y a une difficulté évidente, c'est que l'incrospection ne suffit plus, et donc on est obligé d'adopiner une méthode, je vous le dis, transcendantale, c'est-à-dire de régression vers des conditions de possibilité. And we have to begin to remove the conditions of possibility of the phenomenon itself and to go above the phenomenon as an apparition and as a donation to a deeper level. And the more we go to the depth, the more we go to the original. So essentially, if we look at the temporality, there are three temporalities. So we have the attitude naturel. There, a first level of phenomena, which I call the phenomena of the appareil, which is an idea descriptive of the nation, and then phenomena more fundamental.
12:30 At the level of the temporality, we have the objective, which is the objective, which is where we are all. Then, the human being is the time that I call the esquices, It is a profile of objects that I see with it, that I see with it, and that I see with it, and that I see with it, and that I see with it, I place it a little bit like a film in the Swiss. So, there is a temporality that is not objective, but now, but in the same time, we see, by the same way, this is a temporality, which is not a film. profondes, plus enfouies, était une temporalité absolue, selon celle de la réalité absolue, et celle du flux de la conscience constituante. Puisque si on sert, la conscience constitue la phénoménologie. Alors mes hypothèses de travail sur la phénoménologie sont à la biologiques. On parle de pas mal d'interceptions, des collègues. Première hypothèse, la phénoménologie de l'appareil, j'ai appelé la phénoménologie de l'appareil, la phénoménologie de la classification, les esquisses, etc. Et les descriptions de l'Ousser sont essentiellement justes. D'ailleurs, elles sont essentiellement corroborées, by what do the sources cognitive actuelles. And the other thing we observe is absolutely sans-exivalent in this domain, so it's a real treasure of destruction and of problems linked to this destruction. We have a plateau. There is, according to me, an enormous program of research which consists just simply to reprendre the value of this destruction. very beautiful. You know, I'm not very admirable about how the third dimension is constituted by the third dimension. So this is a positive, a positive, a positive. The second hypothesis, a little less positive, a little less euthérienne, is that you serve for reasons that I haven't developed here, but they are extremely precise, extremely techniques.
15:00 They have, according to me, essentially, a rapport with the maddenatician, Dr. Robert Huber, which is certainly Huber, which is Huberciel axiomatique of the geometry, has always said that it was impossible to make a theory mathematical but vécu experiment. For example, these esquices, these esquices morphologicals, which constitute the object dimensionals, which is the geometry of this kind of thing, which is totally impossible. I have too commented this article, so I don't know what I'm talking about, but there is this fundamental thesis that we could try to imagine a mathematical phenomenon, but axiomatique de la géométrie, etc., c'est impossible. Alors c'est impossible essentiellement parce que les formes de changement phologiques sont vagues. Enfin, tu vois, il n'y a pas de géométrie de la perception possible sur une sphère. There is no geometry of the perceptive human. The consequence is fundamental because the X, which is called the identity of the perceptive, is that it will be conceptually and not the geometry. And so, the phenomenology becomes almost obligated to a certain type of theory of the signification, of the theory of the conceptuality, of the acceleration. So the consequences are immense. In the 1970s, you have developed the thesis that the travaux of l'art of Tom, was exactly what they were considered as impossible. Tom has always said that the path of morphology, which is the phenomenon of pure phenomena, I have a substrat, I have the qualities of the spatiality, I have the discontinuities, etc. And that is the phenomenon, that is what I mean. These are almost all the descriptions that we have. We are going to try to do a mathématic, a mathématic generative.
17:30 So, my hypothesis is that, So, this is the first step of the naturalization of the phénoménology. It's because of the phénoménology, there is a normal status of the scientific theory in France, which is the modernization of the phénoménology. etc, will stop there. So, we can, I think, naturalize the second level as easy. And it is already very interesting. But, in terms of the third level, which is the original, So there, there is an enormous problem. It is there that there is a difficult, I think that Jocelyn is aware of this, but what is the most difficult concept of the serbians of the temporality, this temporal concept that we are trying to construct. The description, it doesn't work. You can simply say, well, when I turn my hand, I don't know what it is. The introspection doesn't work. And as I said, we need to make a regression towards the conditions of possibility. And it becomes extremely difficult. And it's there where a much more metaphysic of the epidemiology becomes possible. at the Serb, which is more close to us, which is actually the originate of the Serb, which is clearly the originate of the Serb, which is extremely metaphysic and totally disoined. Par rapport à ça, ce fait qu'une espèce de retournement, c'est un peu comme Marx, par rapport à Hegel, c'est vraiment pas marxiste, un espèce de retournement matérialiste, l'idéaliste et le transcendant ne sert bien, qui dit qu'il faut remettre le niveau transcendant, non pas sur ses pieds mais sur ses neurones,
20:00 and I developed a test that it's in fact the neuroscience which is the key to the naturalization of this level. That is that, effectively, we have no access to experience to all the algorithms that are normally implemented. And that is there that is this third level. Evidemment, cette thèse est une thèse extrêmement violente que la plupart des phénoménologues refusent d'être totalement. Totalement. Alors, pour faire comprendre ce que j'ai en tête, je vais faire le parallèle avec la logique. Si on prend l'histoire de la logique, on a aussi historiquement trois niveaux de cette vie. We have the world of nature, there are plenty, plenty of capacities, there are many different things, etc., etc. And then at a certain moment, there are people who start to realize, especially in the 19th century, there are people who start to realize that there are structures formelles and a convergence of travaux according to the logique formelle, but as a logique of ideality. The idealistic logic. They are afraid of the idealistic logic. They are afraid of the idealistic logic radicals. And then, we know that at a certain moment, when we have regressed in the conditions of possibility, we have quit the idealistic, and we are now in the same time, we are completely past ailleurs and we have a possibility of the physical system with the capacity, or, in order to say, logics. It comes to the informatics. So, there is a kind of return to the logical idea, and there is a much deeper level of the computer, with the implementation of the scientific theory,
22:30 it's about to repenser the structure of the scientific theory, and it's become a banalité. I think that for the epidemiology, we are in the way of living with the neuroscience something of equivalence, It is to prove the implementation of the idealities that we serve to be able to write the theory of the human being. It is very different from the idealities. It is much more proche to the structure of the geometry, topological and dynamic. But all of that is still an ensemble of the algorithm that has become a neural network. There, there is a really a naturalization extremely brutal. And I repeat that most of these monologues refuse to do that. I will cite, for example, the book of Jean-Luc Petit, which is a remarkable, not only concern, but a certain inédit concern. It is written by Paul Perdo and he has written by Paul Perdo, he has written by Paul Perdo and he has written by Paul Perdo. And I think that, effectively, it is there that we have the response to a lot of difficulties that we encounter with. Well, if you admit that, this change from the point of view, you have immediately the three temporalities, the difficulty of the problem. The temporalities objective, that's what we know. The temporalities phénoménal, that's the dynamic of the flux of images, visuel dans un enchantment visuel et la temporalité interne sous-jacent plus profonde ça revient la temporalité des dynamiques neuronales et le fait que dans le cerveau vous n'avez que des signaux which is the end of the end of the end. So, you have the potential of action
25:00 which is the end of the end of the end, etc. And all of this we do is explained by the structural pure temporal of these grains of potential action in a system extremely complex. It's really a bit like all that there is in the informatics, it's the 0-1 that is in the balance of the networks. So, you can see immediately that this temporality is all of a different. This temporality is the most profound. I'm not saying that it's what the professor says, but that if you admit this kind of turnaround towards an internal nervous system, you can see perfectly how we have a level of temporality supplementary. It has absolutely nothing to do with the flu of the virus. It is consistent with flu of the virus. This was an introduction. Now I'm going to go to the first part, which concerns, which will be a bit more precise, the phénoménology of the appearance and the appearance of the visual. A text that I particularly appreciate, which I often commentate, I'm sorry for those who are not going to commentate, it's Choses and Espaces, Mirrogram, 1907. Alors, c'est un texte qui m'intéresse particulièrement parce que c'est un des grands textes qui me servent, comme il dit, qui veut clarifier la façon dont le monde de choses tridimensionnelles se constitue dans une manance de l'expérience nique. So, l'écoqué de la réduction transcendentale mis entre parenthèses, le temps et l'espace objectif se focalise sur la relation à l'objet. Cette relation à l'objet est intentionnelle, mais, comme je le disais, ce n'est pas une simple relation à l'objet, comme on le trouve encore chez Pantano, mais c'est une constitution de la géographie. to understand what it is, this constitution. Now, the constitution,
27:30 it is first the fact that the flux of the views perceptive is first the flux of the views perceptive and that this flux of the views perceptive is not aléatoire. So, there are rules of enchaînement that exist. There are rules of enchaînement extremely precise. When you turn an object, there are rules of enchaînement that are more apparent that are extremely precise. And if we believe to have these objects tridimensionnels, it's because we have learned this kind of grammar that we have learned from the universe. So it's the temporal, emanating from the universe, which is constituent of objectives. And there is a difficulty fundamental because, as I said, the difficulty of the Constitution is to understand how this constitutes is objective in the phenomenon and which is not It's not an even phénomène. It's a problem. How are possible the enunciations porting on it? It's an objectivity which is not given effectively to the phénomène. How do we understand the se constituent? What does the se constituent? The first thing that we need to understand is the spatiality immanent. There is a spatiality and a temporality immanent that is more perceptive. I don't want to insist on the spatiality immanent, but there are very very beautiful descriptions of Lucerne, which are very close to what Tom will do after.
30:00 he insiste sur le fait que les données premières dans la perception ce sont des morceaux d'expansion spatiale remplis par des qualités et que c'est la cohésion spatiale qui donne leur cohésion aux qualités. C'est parfaitement concerné the neurophysiology, which we call the retinotopie of the air visuel. There is a respect of the topography of the air visuel. So, we could say that the spatiality is a format for the senses organics. It already organizes in the form of a collision spatial with its proprieties extremely which organizes the sensations in terms of the air, in terms of the epiphany, not at all the format or the data. So there is a formatage, I don't know about the problem, of the data sensorials. Then there will appear objects in this flow temporel. How can objects appear in a flow temporel? These questions may seem evident because we do it all the time, spontaneously. I often do what I do to understand if the problem is difficult or not, is to try to imagine a machine. It's just to imagine that you can see the same thing, and in the face you have a vision of anything. How do you create an algorithm that will extract the objects there? You say, there's an object that passes on an other object, etc. In fact, you can do all of a different thing. So it is evident for us, it is evident for us, because we are extraordinary machines. It is not because we are making an extremely complicated machine which appears in the evidence that these sources are simple.
32:30 So, everything can be an identity of the object. There will be a logical identity, a logical identity, a permanent identity of the object. But compared to all of the philosophers contemporaries, who served for a lot of work on the logic, when we were talking about the research logic, which I would like to read a little bit of the problem at Africa, etc. A very long, enormously insisting on the fact that the identity of an object, which is an identity secondary, is an identity derivative, compared to an identity more profound, and of an object in a flux of esquisses, of profiles, of appearance, of an object. We have a flux of appearance, multidimensionnel, of an object. And it's the result of the identity of an object. Husserl construit une forme en disant que la synthèse logique de l'identité présuppose une autre synthèse qu'il appelle une synthèse signifique, une synthèse continuée de l'identité. So, the perception of objects has no sense to be isolated, they exist in a flux. And in this flux, if we can extract objects, it is because there is a symphony that allows us to do it. and this is the first in terms of the structure of the language, the reference logics, the notation, etc., which interviene to the superiors. This synthèse cinétique, which is an enseignement of the methodological, is to regulate these issues and it will intervene So we have to have, from one part, the movements of the object and the movements of the object. The movements of the eye, the movements of the body, the movements of the body.
35:00 And so we will have two types of movements which are intercertain and, in a way, sort contrôler le flux des vécu-carceptifs et permettre la synthèse seulement. Michelin avait été un des premiers, il y a aussi des gens comme Macaré, à voir expliquer que la perception visuelle est totalement impossible si on a seulement des impressions rétinelles et puis après ce qu'on appelle des synthèses noétiques, without having a rapport with a kinesthese corporelle. You know better this story than me, but I think at the time it was very rare, to insist on the fact that the perception of kinesthese is a perception clearly passive, clearly receptive, but not possible. The perception is too obligatoirement active and that it is triste in the book that, as we have said, the book that is censored not triste. The perception of the censored not triste. Alors, il faut rentrer un peu dans le jargon, c'est-à-dire ? Citation. the content of the visual, the content of the visual, are impuissants to assume to themselves the function of the content of the exposure for the spatiality visual and the causality in general. What does that mean? The content of the visual is not for the content of the visual that we can interpret as things in the world exterior. It is important in addition to the sensations of kinesthétique. Now, we start to enter here, in the things that we should try to formalize. They are not evident. Even today.
37:30 The visual content. It's a visual image. It's a two-dimensional image. So it's a two-dimensional image. It's a space, but it's a function of a space. It's an image, an image, a dimensionality. We have a kinesthese with a certain number of degrees of liberty. And like the Serbs, this is a kinesthese. The kinesthese constructs an espace multidimensionnel et hierarchisé. An espace multidimensionnel, a certain nombre de libertés des lieux de la tête du corps. Et il faut comprendre comment les kinesthenses peuvent agir sur les contenus du champ visuel. It's not quite a problem, but if it happens when Jesus turns on his head, the fact that he met the objects, the rest of the files, he's keeping an identity there-dedans. It's a problem fundamental of the vision, which is not yet all at all resolved. You have to look at Tom Berghoff on the saccades visuels, etc. So, the kinesthase intervient, fundamentally, dans le flux temporel des esquices perceptives à travers les chemins temporels, les chemins temporels, les chemins paramétrés temporellement. Alors, voilà comment on va nous faire s'exprimer. les sensations kinesthésiques, n'édifie d'unité continue que sous la forme de décours, ou une multiplicité linéaire qui extrait de la multiplicité globale des sensations kinesthésiques, se superpose à la manière d'un continuum remplissant à l'unité continue du décours temporel pré-enquête. In fact, it's very simple, it's complicated. Apparently, a multiplicity is not linear in the space vector.
40:00 It's linear in the sense unidimensionnel. So, we have a multiplicity, it's really the term multi-caxian, we have a variety unidimensionnel which is a path in the multidimensionality of the synesthetics, and this path is superposé by an evolution temporal of the content of the sound visual. We have an evolution temporaire of the content of the sound visual, and in the same time, we have an evolution temporaire in the space, which I call it the control kinesthesis, the space of control kinesthesis. So we have the space of images, the space of control kinesthesis, and we have two fluids temporaire which are coordonnées. So we can say that there are associations between the humanistic, the humanistic, and the humanistic, and the humanistic. So, we found the image, quite précise, of the space multidimensionnel, of the temporal space in these multidimensionals, and the correspondence between two in two different spaces. The space of images and the space of kinesthetics. And one of the things that I observe is that which is a problem, which is, is that, if we talk about a relationship, a correspondence initial, an etat initial, between an image I and a control kinesthesic K, in the course through the apprenticeship, we learn the correlations, which means that from a fluid image, we are able to rebuild a fluid inesthesia
42:30 and from a fluid inesthesia, we are able to rebuild a fluid image. And where it serves, and I think that's why it's important, it's an essential aspect of the possibility of building objects. Construire des objets, c'est en particulier de savoir que si j'ai un objet, c'est que, si je tourne comme ça, l'objet va changer d'une certaine manière. ses propriétés d'anticipation qui fait que si j'ai un chemin d'un certain type, je peux reconstruire le chemin d'un autre type, c'est comme une théorie de la relation fonctionnelle entre les deux chemins, est un aspect absolument crucial de la possibilité de constituer des deux. Alors voilà comment il s'exprime, citation, avec la représentation d'un mouvement d'image qui prie 10 secondes, j'ai tout de suite la représentation d'un écoulement d'inesthésie de 4 et 1,4 secondes comme d'un écoulement lui appartenant. So if I see a fluid image, I am able to reconstruct a movement that relever would be the same fluid image. But the control kinesthesic, I have a sensation interne. And so you can see that there, the experience in the interne is fundamentally corralled with the changement perceptive. I insist on the actuality of this problem. We know very well how they are in a world who moves, but in the ligotant on a little chair, and in moving, in the sense that it is not the operative who moves, but that the the kinesthese and the flux of its perception of the venerable, is incapable of constituting
45:00 its perceptive system if it is not taken constantly into the group sensorine. Another image, our intuition is almost formalized, which we see in the sense of the idea that to build the external world, it must absolutely be able to recollect the content of the which are the content locaux. You will be able to pass from local to global to the operations of the recollection. This is a... This is an intuition which is very, very clear. Well, he takes an example of a square, and he says, what is happening when we walk a square of the eye? He says, well, he does a chemin ABCD, right? We walk a square of the square of the eye, centred on ABCD on a square of the eye, with a square of the square. and in fact we have the superpositions partials between the content of the champs visual and the superpositions partials that allow us to recollect the I'm not at all at the level of the correspondence I observe, but it would be interesting to know if there is still a discussion about this concept of variété. textes, les champs visuels, enfin c'est pour qu'il y ait une variété, une dimension 2, etc. Ça me semble absolument évident qu'il a discuté avec la syntaghe de ce concept. La syntaghe qui est à propos des gens sur la critique, qui se connaissaient parfaitement,
47:30 puisqu'il y avait des assistants de la grâce, etc. Je pense qu'on peut faire une hypothèse qu'il avait ce genre de représentation So, he says that each position of the eye which is, for example, in the sommet will correspond to the range of the range of the range of the range. And he says that the figure, the range of the range of the range of the range partiellement au contenu du champ visuel sans préférer. On va dire «partiellement » c'est vraiment une intervention du recollement martiel et qui permet donc de passer du local au global. Et tout ça à l'intérieur même de la synthèse cinétique. In fact, these are the recollements, but they are the recollements symétiques, temporally organized. This is a series temporel. Alors, pour mieux expliciter ça, on sert à introduire un concept qui a beaucoup intrigué certains commentateurs, si je parle, c'est simple à comprendre, et qui est celui de rayon intentionnel. Excusez-moi, je voulais dire quelque chose avant de venir à un réunion intentionnel. Je voudrais souligner le fait qu'il y a une métaphore différentielle chez Moussa. Dans ce flux temporel des images, corrélée à un flux temporel de kinesthèse, intervient une image qui trajectoire des systèmes différenciés.
50:00 Alors, Nusserl exprime les choses de la façon suivante en introduisant les concepts de rétention et de prétention sur lesquels je vais revenir. Comme chaque contenu visuel qui était bien listé à un stand donné de l'enfer, pris dans le flux temporaire, il contient ce qu'il y a immédiatement avant, ça c'est ce que nous sert à la première rétention, une espèce de mémoire immédiate, And he pointe, he anticipe on what he will have immediately after. That's what we call a protention. So there is both a retention and a protention and which is fundamentally linked to the intentionality perceptive. so that this flow of two dimensions could be brought to an object that is fundamentally liable to this game pretentious and pretentious. Like he said, the intention of being, the possibility of having an organization intention of being an object, I cite, a part in D, and also a part in D in the continuality of D. So, the elements of visual content, of visual images, visuels connectés à des évolutions qu'il y a vu, sont pensées véritablement par nous faire comme des sortes de trajectoires de systèmes différentiels, mais dans un space, so he doesn't say anything. It's essentially the protention. It's a transformation in the image, an image of an zero to an image of a plane of a plane of a plane of a plane of a plane.
52:30 This is not an interpretation that I give. There is clearly an intuition of the vector tangent that we observe. We talk about the direction linéaire of changement, even for changements that correspond to very complicated, like rotation, for example. Rotation is something extremely complicated, image. He talks about the differentials. He says that from the same phase, from the same detail, from the same image, from the same remplacement initial, from the same continuity initial, I can pass to others in a very different direction. So I can pass from this point in different directions, which are tangents, and there is a situation that for me is very clear, a différentiel determine the direction of progression in the development actuellement quantitant and determine then the direction of the quantitant component. On a différentiel qui détermine la direction dans laquelle on va progresser, dans laquelle le flux temporel va progresser. Il parle d'un différentiel du mouvement qui fait que chaque esquisse pointe vers l'avant. There is a whole ensemble of images that make sure that it is clearly in mind, for the retentions and the potential infinitesimals, an image of the type of change vector, a system of different equations, but in a space of images with a control kinesthetically. I insist on the fact that there are a lot of work, actually, that they are trying to do that. On prend les combos de anesthésie, puis on essaie de voir comment les changements de les mouvements anesthésiques sans changer les images. Et puis ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va, ça va.
55:00 Bien. We serve an idea that has a lot of intrigue some commentators, which is what they call an intentionality transversal, or even a rayon intentionality. It has a lot of intrigue this idea of rayon intentionality. Alors, ces raisons intentionnelles sont absolument essentielles, c'est dit, car c'est ce qui permet, c'est le processus élémentaire qui permet de constituer de l'identité. It's what makes the different points in the flux are considered, in fact, as the same point which evolves temporarily. And it's true that if we don't think about this operation, that's what I mentioned earlier on the floor, this point is there, this point is there, this point is there, etc. It's the same point that if we don't think about this and even if you are a man, you can say a man, you can't have an identity. It's what we call the problem tracking. You can be able to follow a way in the future. So, Husserl says that what constitutes an identity has no origin in an image, but in the fact that there is an intentionality which traverse these images and define an identity. This is what he calls a rayon intentional. Alors, je cite, Les rayons attentionnels qui traversent les images actuellement données, rattachent en une conscience d'unité des points correspondants des images qui se transforment continuellement l'une en l'autre
57:30 and constitutes the same object moment which is continually in the apparition of the mind. So if we simply use the rayons intentionnels traverse the image and select the corresponding points correspondant, ajoute une conscience d'unité, c'est l'anime, c'est en fait le même, et du coup l'objectivité apparaît. J'aimerais vraiment insister là-dessus, parce que c'est avec faire un texte où on voit émerger le passage à l'objectivité. the same moment that we have. So, the points that we have made from the main lens of the VQ are not at all the same. They are not positioned in the same way or in the same way, etc. It is not at all the same point. We say that it is in fact the same lens. and then we create the objective. The points, that's amazing, it's really amazing, the points which are on the same rayon intentionnel expose in their content one and the same point of object. We have the same point d'objet dans une ligne temporelle au niveau du fluide du luge. Et vous voyez bien que là, il y a quand même une énigme. Il faut qu'il y ait quelque part une instance qui soit capable de projeter l'identité. that there is no one. In Bousser, I insist a lot, there-sus, a conscience posant l'unité traverse ici la continuité temporelle pré-empirique, le flux des contenus, et ce flux de contenus
1:00:00 pris en enfilade par le rayon intentionnel expose, pass by pass, le même point de chose, d'objet, d'objet externe. Alors là, j'allais faire un petit peu ça. Voilà. Là, on a une fenêtre. We have a fenêtre, which is the case. We have different points, positioned differently in the fenêtre. And then we have this kind of rayon from the same object. We do this for all the points, and we will show you an object. I don't think that the problem is still resolved. I don't know how much it is. I don't know how exactly it is. This is the idea that we join what I showed in the study. On a suit and point for the fluid of the essence. And then immediately we see what we call the constitution of the temporality of the subject. On peut passer la temporalité immanente depuis l'expérience, comme celle de l'expérience, à une temporalité objective. Et on va comprendre ce que c'est une synthèse synoptique. Je cite, The expansion temporaire is very empiric, so we don't know how to do it in a manner, in the ecoulement of the continuity of images, the flux of images, and the exposition of the expansion temporaire objective of the thing. So you can see what's happening. because you have a region intentionnel, an espèce de... l'espèce de... comment on appelle ça ? l'univers, on a une espèce de l'univers. Et puis on dit, c'est en fait le même point. Donc du coup, ça devient le même point qu'il y a une trajectoire temporelle, which is the same point, which is temporary. This temporary temporary is the objective.
1:02:30 I have an identity and I have simply the universe and I have the immanence. The theory is that these two possibilities are fundamentally different. That the objective is what becomes the immanence Identity. Evidemment, la thèse, c'est que cette identité via la conscience, on ne la trouve pas jamais dans le monde. Elle n'existe pas dans le monde. C'est nous qui l'a vu. Donc le temps objectif ne peut pas avoir de réalité indépendante de nous. C'est totalement possible. So, these trajectories d'identification s'interprètent comme des trajectories qui sont devenues objectivement temporelles de points objectifs individuels. Dans les balances, on n'a pas de points objectifs individuels, on a uniquement le flux, on rajoute des points objectifs individuels et ce flux, la temporalité du flux, devient une temporalité du flux. So we have a real conversion, a change of status, and we see how, by constitution, we pass to the plurality of the object. This is only an example. I will give you an example absolutely passionnant. For example, the 3rd dimension of the 7th and the 4th dimension. And these are the interpretations, these are very complicated. When you have an object that comes to the result of this 3rd dimension that does not exist, you can see that it is essentially an image of this. It is a dimension dimension. And the size of the expansion of the object, you can see it as the size of the 3rd dimension. That is a good calculation. For the rotations, it's exactly the same. If you take an object like an image and try to imagine its rotation in the space function of the images, it's a closed path of rotation, in an space which is infinite, which is complicated. There are very beautiful parts that serve
1:05:00 We can simplify the calculation, considerably, by making the hypothesis that we have a tridimensionality métric and a group of rotations. But the structure tridimensionality, the structure métric and the group of rotations are ways to simplify the calculations, which have no existence. because at the level of the great phenomenon, we have the lacets fermés in the space of the dimension of the universe. That's what we have. But as he said, it's exactly the same thing that if there was an space of the universe of the dimension of the universe. If you want to take another minute, that's fine, you don't know, it's too long. So, I'll pass to my second part. So, here you can see what's the nomenologies that are important. It's important. It's about the conception of Cernien's of the temporality, but a temporality more profound than that I've been talking about and what is the temporality interne of the conscience transgressive. Husserz has interested in this problem in relation to those of 1904-1905. It was the phenomenon of the 1568 times. It was a problem. Then there was an industry, particularly in 1917-1918. There are two volumes of the museum Yala, which is 1933, which are important. C'est particulièrement difficile comme problème. Moi, je l'exprime en disant que nous, c'est en base de la conception infinitimale de la rétention et de la protention, comme je viens de parler, à une conception plus locale, plus extensive, pas globale, mais à ça que l'infinitimale ou locale, de la rétention et de la protention. The thesis that a lot frappé the philosopher, and that we have a lot of glosses,
1:07:30 is that we don't understand the phenomenon of retention and retention, that one part of the past and one part of the past, which are constitutive present, It serves to introduce a bidimensional time. That's why it's not that the real time is a bidimensional time. And there are a certain number of diagrams. I'm going to propose a new model on the origin of these diagrams. These are not the original diagrams, these are not all the same. There are several diagrams that I have done in the same way. but it's still just. The first diagram that we found in the observatory analysis, for example, are the two sides. Here, you have the time banal, the time of the dimension dimension, and you have the phase process. 1, B2, C3, which are the phases abaissées, but indexées by a time T1, a time T2, a time T3. La dimension verticale, une espèce, c'est une dimension de récension, donc c'est une sorte de dimension de mémoire et la ligne diagonale exprime que lorsque nous avançons dans le présent ou dans l'unidimensionnel, Le passé passe sous le présent, mais reste en le présent. Une sorte de mémoire. Alors, c'est évident dans la perception, quand vous voyez un objet tourné, sa position à un certain instant est fondamentalement corrélée à la position qu'il avait à l'instant, à quelques instants avant, That's the chamber of the table. But it's even more important, in the example of Husserl, which is commanding to the chimics, and which is commanding to the chimics in the most part of the system, and the example of the music melody.
1:10:00 It's evident that when we hear the melody, So, there is a passage that s'enfonce. So, when we are in B2, the A81 is always present. When we are in 3, we have the face C, but we have the face D which is present. It's the B3, but the A also which is present. And being present means that the content of the experience is not the same as if there was no attention. It's evident for a melody. To listen to a note, it's not the same experience. It's not exactly the same note in an écoute of melody. this is not the same experience. So there is a modification vécue, so there is a an espèce d'épaisseur du 13A. Alors après, nous servons compliquant un petit peu les choses. En disant il y a un flux A autant T1, B autant T2, il y a une anticipation, donc là c'est une protention, une anticipation de B autant T2 vers un C autant T3, And in this protension is included the fact that the B, 2, will become retentional, which is the form of B on the 3 on the C on the 3. That is to say that in the anticipations that we make from a certain tranche of BQ, The retention of this tranche of vécu is part of the anticipation. So it begins to become a little bit difficult.
1:12:30 And then he says, he knows the situation, and he says that we can imagine, when we are in C3, we have D3 and D3 in C3, which is the retention of C3, but we can, in a way, remonter the time, remonter the C3, which is the C3-, which is not yet there, and in B2, to experience, the fact that B2 is already retentable compared to C3-, which is not yet there. So, in fact, we can complete and arrive at the idea of a multidimensional, retentions, retentions, retentions, retentions, and with the present, which comes out like that, in the plan, and déplacer the point of articulation, retentions, retentions. That's what I told you about my colleagues about the memory, the synopsis, the anticipation, the fact that all anticipation is already a memory. I think that it's really a problem of this genre that you have to do with your own mind. It's very difficult, because without experimentation, it's almost impossible. It's almost impossible. It's almost impossible. In other diagrams, there is an idea of the following, which is interesting. on a le temps, et le temps c'est comme un espèce de paramètre pour des contenus d'expérience. Donc là c'est après U, U1, U3, c'est un dessin qui fait. Donc on a des contenus d'expérience paramétrés par le temps,
1:15:00 et en plus on a un temps dans ces contenus d'expérience eux-mêmes. So we have the time, which is a kind of an external parameter, but we also have, which is what represents an indescendant, but also a kind of time interne for the content, the experience, and that is what makes the bidimensionality of the time. It is to say that when the horizontal, the base of the time, the interne change. So, I think, and I often say, I think that what it says is to pass a different concept of retention and retention, as a concept of a little bit more local. And that what it is just like, it's something like an equation of a micro-dissurement. I think that is the image that he had in his head, and that in the dimensio, it is that he has to be a variable temporal. On fait une convolution par un maillot, on a besoin d'un X' et ce qu'il se passe en X, c'est ce qu'il se passe en T, pré-subo ce qu'on est intégré sur un certain intervalle au niveau de l'autre variante. Et là, ce qui nous occupe tout simplement, c'est ça. On a dit ce qu'il a en tête comme schéma, c'est ça. so it's just a difference, complexified, and it allows to understand the thickness of the present as in containing one part of the dimension of the dimension and in addition one part of the dimension of the dimension. So this temporality is totally independent of the particular content. It is a very original temporality, which intervies everywhere, absolutely everywhere, in all activities. And it is called a long process, a process originaire. And it's this temporality-là which is constituent and which is located at the origin of this
1:17:30 other temporality that I talked about earlier. But there is a very good example of that. If you remove the images of the content, if you look at what happens during the time, Thank you very much. that we change our perspective, we don't know, we don't know, we don't know, we don't know, etc. That is something that we really want, that it's a level more fundamental, etc. But, in fact, when we don't see this question, it was because one thing I was wondering how it was, this coordination between the perspective and the perspective, which is the other question of saying that here we are on a something more fundamental, better, etc. And my question is, is that in this naturalization, which I don't want to justify and correct, is-it-is-it-is-qu'il-faut-garde vraiment this kind of technology that we serve? because if we, and I believe that we're in France, I believe that we're in New England, so we're in this problem sort of circularity, because, let's say, if we're doing a scientific, a neurologist, so we're doing a routine, etc., then it's very constituted, but after a little bit, It's an experiment, it's an experiment, etc. And all of that, it's still in the case of an objective, in the sense of the attitude and the nature of it. And to my opinion, all of that, I think that's the problem, how these two levels are... How are all the coordinates,
1:20:00 how all of that works together, How do we look at this idea that we have something like a reduction here? We have a reduction in the physical space. In this space... I don't know what it is. I don't know what it is. There is no reduction in the problem of the constitution you have to find exactly what happened between parenthesis. It has nothing to do with the parenthesis. It's a resolution of the problem index. It's very different. For example, if I understand, if I understand it, it's true that we're going to get on the same thing. But it has a few values, I don't know, I don't know, I don't know, in the sense that from something that is It's just the Constitution, the Constitution, the Constitution. But if we take this perspective naturalist, I don't think that we could... It's exactly... It's two different things. If you naturalize, you have exactly the same problem. that is to say that all the work that is actually done in the logic and vision, it consists also to understand how we constitute the space multidimensionnel, the object multidimensionnel, etc. For example, it is exactly accurate. It is also to solve the problem. Simplement, the method is different. Well, in regards to this method, you could say that we have no more than at all. Let's say that in the neurophysiology, I would like to say two things. One thing is a very pragmatic thing. It's that the tissues of the cereals are extremely fine, they are extremely easy to do. They are there, they are disponible, but we use them. if we can think about these things, it's a great thing. The second thing is that it is practically impossible to make a theory purely objectivist
1:22:30 and that even if you are totally naturalistic, you have to have a good description of the experience in the first person. So, the protocol is definitely not possible. A fellow of the Barrelac who said, that's a great question, he said, he said, he said, he said, he said, he said, he said, Au lieu d'avoir deux images superposées, tu ne vois qu'une image, tu vois un damier. Et puis tout d'un coup, au milieu du damier, il doit apparaître un bout du nez, et puis tu commences à ranger le damier, et puis il y a un petit deuil, et pouf, tu as une multiplication et tu vois un visage. Et quelques secondes après, sur le nez tu vois apparaître une casse-moi, et hop, tu re-obtiens un tel nom. It's very important to understand the neuro-gysiologist what happens, but you can't analyze the experience, for example, in the registrations of the subjects, if you don't have a good in the first person, in the first person, in the first person, and in the first person, we have to do absolutely reintroduce the descriptions. Now, I use the phenomenon, it's a phenomenon very element. It's a phenomenon scolaire, in the first year, but... But anyway, I think it's very important. So in terms of the fact, I've never said that it was true. I've said that what we see, what we see effectively, what we see effectively, but not at all what we believe to be. We are always installed in the result of the Constitution, in the product of our constitutions operations. And we have no conscience of our constitutions. So we are obligated to do a big job
1:25:00 to understand something. We are not in the result. It's all. First of all, we can summarize the concept that we have in saying that, at the point, the perception of the world that we have in creating a system of kinesthese which, as we call it, corriges the movement of the esquices observed, it is exactly like the constitution of the space by the group of the sense of the nature. It is simply that this correspondence is dynamic. The impression that we have an existence of an objectif is simply due to the fact that this performance is dynamic. Our system, to us, is obligated to simulate at the same speed that the phenomenon. And so we have the idea that it exists, we have the illusion that it exists in an extérieur to us-mêmes, which governs the phenomenon, but in fact it's simply the trace, the perception that we have. It's just a dynamic extension of what is used to be Bracaré. Absolutely, there is that. I don't know Jocelyn if there are tests on how to serve Bracaré. Because on certain points, they are exploratory. It's not just a work to do. So I think you're all right. But there is, in plus, for the fundamentalist of the esquices, which is, when you see, these objects are non-dimensional, but they are never given them. It's not only a question of dynamics, but it's fundamental to the dimensionality of the intellect, which is that we add a dimension. It's already what we do, but we don't want to see what we do. Yes, we can't do it. But in other words, I'm not very... I'm not very satisfied by... When you talk about the two dimensions, it's a different one. It's simply a system that has a memory. But in an space of configuration, instead of the effect of the change of the system and the way it is, the way it is, the way it is, the way it is, the way it is. Well, that would be, especially if the white is infinite.
1:27:30 But there are chances that the retention, it would be a melody. Yes, you're right. So it's in this sense-là that it's not clear. That's why I was saying that it's a bit of a proposition. I don't know what it is, but it's a bit of a future. But the idea is that we have to do the two variables. Because what happens in T will depend on the integration of a way or a way or another on T prime. There's a certain interval of time. So you have to do the two variables. You don't have to say the T prime. Yes, I have the impression. I like your analogy. The reduction of the tourism. And behind it, there is the force of the ego and the tourism. There is the utilization of it. Yes, it is. It is. It is. And just from there, there is to be a part of it. And I think there is a lot of attention. You mentioned only the spikes. I know that you think, like me, that there is a lot of more. But really, the spikes can be easily interpreted in terms of zero. But no, these are the transitions of phase. For example, there are some things that are formed. And there are some things that are formed. And there are some things that are formed. I don't know about that. Absolutely, that's what we share with regard to the cellulose. And this brings us to the kinesthase, why? Because we have to see that we have a lot of different forms, but this cellulose vivant, all these cellulose vivant, we have no need to be able to be able to go through an analysis convention. The neurose is a cellulose very long, very gross, which is like a cellulose, which has the change in the electrostatic with the transition. But there, it's very important because it participates as well as the metabolites and the non-activated metabolites for the level of the structure of the cellulose. And this participates by the integration of the core which is that. So, I think that you are not as well on a concept that is, for you,
1:30:00 is very important. The transplants Well, personally, I think one of the ways to approach the notion of Gestalt is to see that there is an action, very basic, the action begins by the action of the body, the core, and it is the action as one of the forms of transformation that gives it an invariant. So it's an element, and the constitution of the invariant is, in my opinion, I think this transition critique irréversible. It's suite à une variety de transformations qui sont celles de l'action, qu'il y a suffisamment d'invariance par rapport à suffisamment de transformation, une transition critique qui te donne cette invariance qui est d'abord un invariant de l'action, qui sera un invariant conceptuel, quand on arrive par un langage. Et c'est ça un des éléments d'invariance et d'avorel, des idées de l'activité qu'on utilise. Des transitions critiques, et autrement It's for the time, I think it's an element important. Identity is the object. There also, I think the identity, it's not a word that's not a word, but an identity aristophilicienne. It's an identity that we have only on the alphabet. It's not an alphabet, it's an identity. Then the A, then the A, then the A, then the A. It's an identity. We have a culture alphabet, and it's aristotle, we have no idea. structure, which is something different, which is compatible with the variability. It's about all the phenomena you want, just the phenomena you need. It's to say there is a stability structure which is really not an entity. It's an environment that is relatively stable. Look at what you're talking about. What you're talking about is that you're talking about the stability structure. But I think that the interpretation is made in a structure global. In fact, it's not a bad idea, it's a stability of the global structure that allows us to identify the problem. And it's a stability of the structure, an invariance, which is not a bad idea. Like always in the world, because there is a rage. But not really. The other question is on the retention of the potential. How do we go to the end? It's not a symmetry, it's an asymmetry that is interesting. It's a phenomenon that is also in physics, such as the base, for example, or even those of whom we have talked about, Bernard, Shevin, and Tom.
1:32:30 These are the phenomenon of a memory, a physical memory. But it's a dimension of the potential. Like there is a potential potential, but there is no potential potential. in retention. What he told us, he also told us, that he has no effect on the potential of the potential, that is an asymmetry, which is another component of the reflexivity in terms of biologically. These are these transitions that are reflexive, the constitution of biologically, these asymmetry of the domain of the potential of the potential, which are at the core of the reflexivity, and which are at the reflexivity, and that is dynamic, and that is dynamic, and that is dynamic. And in plus, I don't know, there is this phenomenon. There is a lot of duality compared to the CERN, which is the respect to the CERN. Yes, I would like to add to the discussion. So, I think that this duality of the CERN is very interesting. It's not a different form, but it's the same thing. And what is important is the duality potential. And this is what I think is absolutely pertinent with this asymmetry, which is constitutive of the time biologic and the time of the flexibility biologic activity. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. to create an internal reality more profound. But it's not that what we are trying to live, it's that for all the problems, a big part of the problem with the social, it's a source of the memory. And that's why there is at the same time that is a very exciting thing in terms of the social media, and that's why we are trying to live in existence. Thank you.
1:35:00 Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Oh, mais je pense que c'est vraiment une activité de la distribution, c'est vraiment génial. Mais on peut être tellement loin que c'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure. C'est tout à l'heure.
1:37:30 Thank you. There are several questions. We'll go. We'll go. We'll go. We'll go. We'll go. We'll go. We'll go. Thank you. That's very kind of thing. Thank you. Thank you.
1:40:00 Pardon, sorry, I guess I'm going to go to the same thing, thank you. Sorry, thanks for this. Oh, okay. Excusez-moi. Restez pour votre patience. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
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