Representation of structure / conversations incl. S French

0:00 In this practice, obviously, we need to assume that we can be really about the domain that we use to argue in the context of the realist. Then we need to give an account of the relationship between this specific domain and the rest of science. At least if we want the thesis to be a general thesis, and it seems to me that realism should be a general thesis about the whole of science. And then, of course, we need an argument for structuralism, for specific domain. There seems to me that there are a few things to say about each one of these points, especially the last one of course, but I think it's interesting to focus on each step of the reasoning. So the first element is realism about quantum mechanics, and obviously we can see that we need to be realistic about quantum mechanics in the first place if we want to draw a basic But then we have a problem here because we haven't hiked before on this structural realism yet, so the sort of realism that we assume has to be a different sort. And obviously here the obvious choice is a systemic structural realism. So it seems to me that Steven and James and the others need to assume a systemic structural realism anyway, and then show us that we have a reason to destructuate our quantum mechanics and these reasons are enough to make this addition to the initial field, which is not obvious to me. Anyway, we'll talk about this later, the first point that I want to make is that if this It doesn't necessarily mean that we hold back on to the first understanding of that human condition, but it is still possible that we have a direct argument for the ontic understanding. But at least we need to make sure that epistemic structural realism makes sense in the first place. So it seems to me that ontic structural realism shouldn't be tempted to show that we have specific problems for epistemic structural realism. The French that seems to be dented and mentioned approvingly Angelo Chey's work on the prediction of the Zeman effect, basically Angelo claims that epistemic structures really have a problem

2:30 in explaining this particular historical case, because in predicting the Zeman effect, a specific non-structural property was attributed to the electron, namely that it is a rigid Even that we don't have an epistemic structural realism explanation of this particular case, then this could be a problem for the epistemic position. Now, if I'm right, if we don't really have a reason to be epistemic structural realism, then this could be a problem for this. The most important problem, it seems to me, that epistemic structural realism be realist about what is preserved in this third time. So a very interesting question arises as to whether this means that we can be realist about quantum mechanics as a whole. Because obviously quantum mechanics is a new theory, is our new structure. So if we really want to resist the pessimistic meta-induction, we need to take the point of presentation seriously. So it's not So we can be reading about quantum mechanics in a strong sense and then derive the metaphysical conclusion that we want from quantum mechanics. Okay, so the second point that's been already discussed is the problem of explaining what is that structure about quantum mechanics, if and how the position extends to other domains. And obviously, we have these two options here. But it seems to me that the reductionist option, according to which, if we can destructure a little about quantum mechanics, we can destructure it about everything, because quantum mechanics is the fundamental theory, is bit problematic. I mean, this sort of reductionist is regarded as problematic in the theoretical community. But I see that Stephen is sympathetic, so we have to discuss it later on. The only alternative seems to be, but this is my understanding, what Lediman and others have in mind when they talk about something a bit more vague, when they claim that there is an objective model structure to the world, which is not reducible to the morality properties of objects. This seems to mean that, okay, we can be on structural reality about quantum

5:00 mechanics and also about all the rest without reducing the other levels of reality to quantum mechanics. But obviously this is very interesting, but it seems to me that we need to be given a lot of details, especially on the relation of the specific structure that we have in quantum mechanics with the rest of the world. I mean, this talk of objective monostructural than now. Moreover, it seems to me that the very dog of an objective model structure, which is not reducible to the problem of the object, is actually derivative on the idea that we can be on this structure in the above quantum mechanics in the first place. But of course, this is something that we are still trying to establish. Obviously, the alternative is to simply accept that the onto the structure of position is not about the whole side, and just focus on the quantum mechanics. And I take it that this is not what Stephen wants to do, because it would just mean that as realists, we should see a discriminatory structure of realists. And then, when it comes to interpreting quantum mechanics, we may have arguments to be structurally in that particular domain. But this doesn't make structuralism a realist position in the sense of other stuff. It seems to me that either way we go, we still need to provide a serious reason to be structurally in the case of quantum mechanics, and then reasons to extend this to other domains. But now, of course, this is the crucial point that we need to do better than this more quickly. This is my reconstruction of the item before, structuralism about quantum mechanics, right? Because something like this, okay, we know that we have an established metaphysics, right? We do believe in objects, you know, in everyday life. And we require compelling reasons to give up on these particular metaphysical tasks, right? Now it just so happens that when we look at quantum mechanics, we have this sort of underdetermination that we have described, but also we realize that objects don't play any role in quantum mechanics and that we can reconstruct our own domain in terms of structures, and these allow us to overcome this problem, so we do have competent reasons to give up on the entrenched

7:30 metaphysics, and we should conclude that we need to be structured in the metaphysical sense. I think to me that this may look compelling at first, but there are a few problems. In fact, the first two premises are uncontroversial, right? I mean, that we do have an object-based metaphysics to the fact, and this function is explicitly effective for a trend we discussed infrastructure on January 2003, Critics of Structuralism. And I said at the beginning that I take the structuralist reconstruction to be possible, so I will not talk about this. Stephen told us that we can focus on groups and there are ways to move from kinds of particles to specific particles by using and this is convincing enough, at least as I say. But we do have problems with the other premises, starting from the brief claim that there is ontological underdetermination in quantum mechanics. Now, Stephen told us about this, so I don't need to read it. The basic claim is that if we believe in objects, then we look at quantum mechanics and we need to say, are individuals or non-individuals. And in each case, we sacrifice something and we make a better sense for something else. We cannot decide, so we have to accept that there is a problem here, because we have two options and we don't know how to choose either one. Now, I agree that if we look at the theory, we don't really have a reason to actually choose one of the two. But it seems to me that there is a potential problem here because when talking about objecthood and visuality, we need to begin problem with it, in a serious sense. Obviously the physics must be taken to the testing grounds, but if we ask the very question of whether objects are individuals or non-individuals, the first answer cannot If we just look at a physical theory that works, Metaphysics will tend to be under-determined. So we need to start from metaphysics,

10:00 and then see whether the physics makes better sense of one of these options. But if we do this, it seems to me, the very claim of under-determination is solved. We know that metaphysicians do have a lot of alternative accounts of what grounds the individuality of things. And in particular, we have different ways of understanding the dynamics through which things come to be individuals or non-individed. But what metaphysicians do is just give arguments for one of those and then apply them to real papers. And I think this is what we should do in quantum mechanics. We need to have prior arguments in favor of this or that of individuation in general and then see whether we can in some way or another make sense of the physical theory by applying this principle. And it seems to me that this is perfectly possible because if I have a random reason to believe, for example, in these, that it is discernible to say that we have these principles only if we have different properties, then okay, I can look at quantum mechanics and conclude that at least some particles are indisturbible, so this principle doesn't make them individual. But then I don't have under-determination because I can simply re-describe these objects as non-individual. Then of course I have a problem in explaining the equality of tables and chairs, but this can be done. Similarly, I can assume, for independent reasons, that the principle doesn't count if not a compelling principle. And incidentally, metaphysics is what people think. I mean, a commitment to the principle of identity in this cycle is considered as a problem for any metaphysics. So, obviously, I'm sympathetic to this option, but this has no bearing for the main argument. The point here is that if we insist that the individuality is an event, we may have fair particularity or primitive business, whatever. If we don't believe in the principles, then we can conclude that even if one of the particles are indiscernible. They can still be regarded as individuals. In this case, of course, we have a problem of explaining statistics, but as Stephen said, there are ways of getting

12:30 sense of the evidence. It seems to me that the basic point is that the very view that quantum particles are non-individuals was too quick in the first place. It seems to me that in the 20s we had that they had these sort of identification or individuality with the property of being classical right and obviously we learned from quantum mechanics that things are not as we described them in classical mechanics but this doesn't mean does not imply that things are not revealed it just implies that they are not classical individuals right so for example we We can say that in the classical domain, the identity of discernible works only because things are impenetrable in the classical domain. So we know that a very weak version of the principle always holds, because two things are at least different in terms of their location, right? But then we know that this is simply false in quantum mechanics. So I don't see why we should insist on non-individuality based on the principle. the principle is just both and again, even in the case of statistics we can just drop the assumption that the whole structure of reality is classical stick with the idea that particles are individuals and describe in a different way other things, in particular we can change our understanding of property which is on an octoberdenial creation because obviously from classical statistics, so if we exchange particles, we don't get a new state. But this doesn't necessarily mean that the reason for this is that particles are not in vehicles. It might just be that the properties that we are describing are not possessed by individual particles. In some sense, they are additional to particles, so if we exchange the particles, the very property remains unchanged. So, in some sense, we are still making sense of the statistics. In a classical perspective, we just need to drop the idea that all properties are monadic, which I would be ready to drop anyway. But the important point here is that, okay, this is my preference, but I'm just saying that if you start from the metaphysics, then you will have a reason to choose between one

15:00 the whole of the dilemma while in the case of ontic structure really it thinks to me that they choose to be neutral as to the ligaments of individual they just say okay i don't want to say anything in certain goals um that particular business is they are the same to me i just don't know how to choose but then this seems to be in potential conflict with a very strong claim that I need to be structurally in the metaphysical realm. And the contradiction seems to be that they want to be neutral about individuality, and then they want to be radical about things on the basis of an argument from individuality, or lack thereof. So, I mean, I haven't been thinking about this very long, but it seems to me that there is a potential for contradiction, maybe a misunderstanding of the position, right? There is always this ambiguity between what comes first between science and the physics. And in some cases, this helps. In other cases, it may be confusing, right? It seems to me that, in this particular case, if we want to answer the question whether particles are individuals or not, we need to question the metaphysics. Obviously, we don't need to ignore the metaphysics. I mean, our position must make sense of empirical evidence. But then, it seems to me that if we take the metaphysics seriously, then we are committed to the idea that there is one right here. objects are there, we just need to know, and maybe provide new arguments and evidence, for one thing of them in conclusion. I don't see structured ideas that Montelli gets. So moving on to the last premise, I can see the claim that, okay, we have this problem of under-determination, and one way of overcoming it is to just forget about objects and about the question whether they are individuals or not, focus on the structure of the, of our best theory, in the state, the physical counterpart of this, as an ability to be. Now, this is perfectly fine, but then at some point they

17:30 say, objects are not absolutely animated, they are the real, they are known in structure. But then, the main question maybe is that, if objects emerges known in structure, I feel I mean, the stronger claim that everything with structure and objects don't exist via disappearances would be more convincing. In that case, I would just avoid questions. I mean, it would be a question about a fictional object. If I agree that I have physical structure and objects emerge from a physical structure, then the question would be simple. But then, if this is the case, then the explanation is not from the first place, and then it's wrong. But it may be the case that we can say even something more. For example, in mathematical structures, we wish I agreed to, so I start to proclaim a scientific structure. Anyway, the claim is that... Well, this is, even though, there is no more to the individual counterparts in themselves than the relations they write to each other. But it seems to me that this may be understood literally, right? If individuality consists of things having well-defined identity conditions, well, it doesn't matter if these identity conditions are established in a structural way. Because if they are established structurally, and they are defined, well, definite, at all times, then I still have an individual. I may want to reconstruct individuals in a structural system, which makes perfect sense, but I still have an individual. Right. Okay, this is even more problematic, maybe, but if something like this is even remotely convincing. Maybe, not only the premise is wrong, as under the dimension is not avoided, but the very structuralist claim breaks them by showing that objects, even though they are derivative of structure, are in view, right? But the main point is that the claim that objects The derivative is not itself a claim that allows us to say that the very problem of

20:00 argument determination is avoided, or is not avoided but does not receive a specific answer. I'm getting into the... There are a lot of friends I want to discuss. I'm also a bit skeptical about displaying that objects don't play any role because we only have properties and relations, right? Obviously, if we take objects to be something over and above properties and relations, this may be the case, right? For example, I may want to understand objects as per particulars to which properties and in some way. Right? Now, apart from the fact that this could be something that metapositions want to exist on for different reasons, I will accept that this could be a problem in the fact that, okay, if we look at the theory, we do have to talk about some of these relations all the time, and something additional doesn't really play any role. But then, it seems to me that the immediate reaction is that, okay, objects simply are to be identified with properties and relations. And this is the claim of old bundle theories, according to me. Every object is a set of non-presenting properties. And it seems to me interesting that something like this seems to be, what Saunders wants to use when in case that structures can weakly individuate. So I'm not sure that Saunders' position is really structurally to extend that, go in the same direction as Stephen. Even in pure metaphysics, we have fundamental theories which focus specifically on relations. So the simple fact that we have properties and relations all the time Obviously we have to trust them, right? Because obviously we need to show that all monadic properties are derivative in relation, organized in a specific way. So the interrelatedness must be shown to be there. I mean, I agree that some metaphysical elements could be really weird if we look at them from the perspective of I am typically informed metaphysics. But then, I'm very sympathetic with this.

22:30 Obviously, they are just the properties they exhibit. And obviously, it seems to me that we cannot use premise 5 to argue for premise 4, because the possibility of structuralism needs to be established independently. If we know that we don't really use the notion of entree, then we can use this premise to argue for the conclusion. But if the two premises are equally dependent, this may be a problem. Because on the one hand I claim that objects don't play any role because they can reconstruct them structurally. And then I have to claim that I shouldn't reconstruct them structurally because they don't play any role. So this sort of circularity may be for the magic. Then, obviously, we have something more than a claim of possibility coming from a given side. He claims that every property, even one of the properties, needs to be dissolved into a way or a way of knowledge of relations because this is just the way in which they manifest themselves. But again, in this case, I'm not sure I can see anything more than a claim of possibility can know things and their properties only when they interact with each other, with myself as an observer. But it is far from establishing a metaphysical problem. It does make systemic problems, right? So again, it is possible to think that the property is solved metaphysically in a web of dimensions, but the more modest claim that this is the way in which I describe thing seems more rosy as things are now. So my conclusion with respect to the third point, namely structuralism of vast quantum mechanics, is that the argument is clear, it seems to be convincing, but then it doesn't clearly, at least not logically, establish that there is a compelling reason to give up on the linear idea of logic. Right? So given that I also I had doubts about the other two points, it seems to me that all the elements that are involved in a direct classification of the optic plane need at least some addition of this structure. I think this is basically, I will just summarize it quickly, as I said, I'm assuming that we

25:00 can be optic structural realists, and I think the very interesting question is to ask whether even this we should be of structure really and obviously if we just obtain the object position by adding something that basically structure is preserved in the eastern style then we have a logically weaker position so this cannot be and so it seems to me obvious that what they want to do is to look at the physics and extract compelling reasons to be structured about the field but then First of all, some sort of realism is pretty bold, rather than argued bold. And obviously it cannot be object-structural realism, so it is likely to be a spin-structural realism. So we see that this form of realism still has some priorities, at least in the conceptual process of arguing for the other position. and then obviously we need to be given arguments to be realist about quantum mechanics I mean it's logically possible to be realist about everything up to quantum mechanics, excluding quantum mechanics maybe on the basis of the fact that quantum mechanics is probably they have so many different interpretations of the domain I don't know, I mean it's logically possible but then even if we are realist about quantum mechanics and we understand it structurally, we need to be given I mean, the only position should be regarded as a general real-explain about the whole of time. And here a discussion of reductionism needs to be given. And then I had a specific problem with the metaphysical argument, right? It seems to me that there is a problem in choosing to be neutral about individuation in general, and then decide to be structuralist about entities because we don't want to choose with respect to the initial problem of individuals. Then I'm not sure that this is a compelling point, anyway. I don't really see our thoughts from structuralism that the very question of whether objects are individuals or not is the source. one potential problem is that the very claim that objects are playing a role and the claim that

27:30 structuralism is possible or compelling seem to rely on each other in a potentially problematic way and then i also mentioned that it seems to be that an object-oriented realism which insists on objects as individuals makes perfect sense of the historical evidence of which shouldn't father so seriously, they just didn't know, well, they didn't think about the possibility of abandoning something from the classical perspective, speaking with the very idea of individuality, which is exactly what object of the Korean sphere is, as well, nowadays. So I want to conclude that even though the position can be developed in a consistent way, I still don't see sufficient obligations. Thanks a lot. Well, I want to take a moment to just make one comment and then a quick question. The comment is, I take your point, of course, when you're always breaking your determination by appealing to some form metaphysics. But I think that the worry there that it kind of ignores or downplays where structural realism sits in the realism debate. And as I indicated, it's not only got to, as it were, distinguish itself from object-oriented realism, but also from constructive empiricism. And I think it would be notable that Van Prazen also presents this kind of determination. And so any appeal to further metaphysics, go for one more and larger than the other, is just going to be dismissed out of hand by Van Brassen, for precisely a lot of similar sorts of reasons that he dismisses those kinds of factors in general undetermination. You just don't see how that's going to lead us to know one form to be true, or what is So I think in fairness to structural realism, you know, although I find it attractive to appeal to some kind of rationalist meta-physics,

30:00 it's not going to help in terms of defending that position in the beginning early, early early, where there's a manual. So that's really the comment. The question is, I don't quite see why, you know, supposedly ignores pessimistic meta-inductions, or supposedly discovers the kinds of structures that we want to hold as true for that are not the kind of structures we want to hold as true given the color of physics to come apart. Or supposedly say forget pessimism, I'm going and follow the historical cacera and these other guys and look at a structure as an appropriate motive i don't quite see why it's still presupposes esr i don't quite see why it's parasitic on esr and therefore we can't because because the motive the first motivation there would be i know you put it that's got to be weaker you can present it as a conjunction of course it is But some might say, well, look, the problem with ESR is precisely because it insists on there being something beyond what we have access to. And there's a line, I think it's from Casero, where he says the conditions of accessibility are the conditions of ontology or something like that. So, in a sense, I mean, that's, you know, you can see that kind of understanding of feeding off the positive as well. Why insist there's something beyond what you're given in the physics? But don't quite see why OSR, even if you forget the perspective of it, why it's parasitic on the ESR? Well, there are a number of issues here. I mean, the first point is that it seems obvious that if you want to draw conclusions of a physical form from a physical theory, it needs to be real, right? Of course, they may have reason to be structurally about the theory without being the real. This is actually a sort of contrast and style approach. So in our case, we need to assume, really, what seems to be your problem is that you're still arguing for your sort of . So you cannot assume that your haunting structure is . Because you're assuming that you will look at the theory and derive structure .

32:30 So you see the thing, I mean... I don't quite see how that amounts, because ESR says all that we know is structure, and the point of the paper with Angelo is really to say that, he tries to point out that ESR really goes beyond that by insisting there are these unknowable content, and that's problematic. Of course, OSR has to assume realism, and then it says, what are we going to be realistic about? I don't quite see how that comes to parasitic relations. Well, the second part of the argument is that if we want to read that you... Well, you don't have arguments for all these structures. It's exactly what you set out by looking at the theory, right? So you say, I will be realist about theory x, and by looking at x, I will establish on different realisms, right? So it seems to me obvious that if you want to be realist about that, to establish a specific type of realism, you cannot assume that very type of realism. So it must be something weaker than what you want to establish. It may seem to be... I take that point. Sometimes you can kind of say, I'm going to be realist. Yeah. Now, nothing about ESI. Yeah, exactly. My point was that you only have two options there. Either the standard form of realism or the distinct. But just being realism is not real. Because you're just keeping the... I just don't know why people are talking across photos, and I take your point, I take your point, but, you know, it's come like this, we kind of, to put it in Van Frassen's terms, right, and make him happy even though he's not here, so we, we have to adopt the stance, right, so Van Frassen said, you can't really give argument for adopting a particular stance, because the very argument will presuppose elements of the stance, so he adopts the constructive empiricist stance, you and I adopt the realist stance, and we both adopt that stance, Adopt the realist style, Michel adopted a different style, he adopted a transcendental idealist style. Then, having adopted that, I said, right, I know Dr. Realist's attitude towards this theory, couldn't I then say, right, I'm now going to go further and cash that attitude out in terms of OSR? That's that, he says, no, no, no, no, no, I'm going to cash it out in terms of object-oriented realist,

35:00 And, you know, you might do the same. I still don't see why OSR... I don't need ESR first. I'm not sure we can do that. Exactly because we are not talking to a person. And we are assuming that it is. The question of what kind of realism we want to assume is serious. I mean, our disagreement is exactly about whether we should be honest. So I take it that you will not assume anti-structuralism to take quantum mechanics seriously and then show me that I should be anti-structuralist too. Right? And feel like it'd be not completely fine, but generic talk of reality. Because you know that I'm completely, that the community has worked. I mean, if you were talking to an anti-realist, then you would have another problem. namely to make sense of what there is use that we made on all the time to that explanation, right? And now I'm assuming that the first level in terms of that explanation, namely, from historical preservation to realism of structure, is the minimal thing that we didn't agree on, right? And you don't want to be an object for realism, while my argument is basically that that even if you don't give me a compelling argument to be on this structure, I mean, given the theory on which we agreed that we should be real, then I can be conservative and speak to the instruction about physics, and ask for other projects of theory. I mean, the whole argument is about forms of realism. So it seems to me that it must be taken seriously. At least if we agree that we assume realism in the first place, and that the logical structure that is forcing people to argue for object structure is really on the basis of a weaker form of real, which cannot be just real. Whatever, we can talk some more about it. Maybe I can speak from the outside perspective between really. so I think that suddenly when Stephen spoke about the sense of I thought that after all it could be a very good argument in favor of sexualism in general because it's very easy to translate say the sexualism of consciousness and

37:30 the sexualism of idealism and the ontological sexual realism of children. Whereas, it's very difficult to first place, in first place, for instance, an object-oriented realism as the one you are defending, such as an idealist, to be sure, and sometimes we compress it. So, at least, it's a sort of common language. I agree with that, but I have a problem with that in the sense that Mark Rassen simply doesn't get the first step. I mean, the interest of that explanation is rubbish. So, I don't get it. I mean, structure may be preserved in different science, but I'm not really. The proportion of structure are in a different sense. I mean, it just looks at theories and models and tries to provide a way of understanding theories, which are just influenced to make sense of reality. Right? So, I'm not convinced. I mean, this may be sufficient to block the right. They are not taking structuralism in the same sense as a core thesis about reality, and then one prefers to be a realist, the other one prefers to be a Kantian. The realist has the problem of defining the very thing that is meant. I mean, our process can say, okay, structure is preserved. I prefer not to commit myself to truth, and therefore I will not say that theory is the first thing right. And this is consistent, because if you want to be neutral about metaphysics, you should go to a constant style in effect that I just assume that in duality, well, I can establish only because of the physics, and the physics doesn't even ground to be an individualist The problem that I see there is that Steven follows my trust in claiming that the theory doesn't give you any reason to be this sort of metaphysician rather than the other. But then, all of a sudden, he becomes a metaphysician himself and claims love. The theory gives me a reason to be a metaphysical structure.

40:00 But if I were from Prassen, I would say, well, I cannot find the same analogy. about arguments that don't come from physics to the effect that particles are indivisible or non-indivisible. And I'm also skeptical about the very inference that we're using from preservation of structure to realism of our structure. Of course, there is structure inside of our design, but not even the object of reality here. But then it seems to me that at this convention, if it is true that we all accept that there is is a compelling, an infringement of the business based on objects, then the word of proof is not only that it is possible to be structurally, but it is a compelling position. I don't really have any other option. Then, of course, I mean, an argument from the existence of structure in different positions may be developed, but is it not? It's very easy to give an argument of necessity, because the whole line structure you impose onto phenomena is the condition of structurity, of objectivity, and ends of object. So how could you be more deceptive? But that's sort of a privilege of you. If you're a Kantian, obviously, you will have relatively easy answers to everything, but the problem was... I'm sympathetic to Kant himself, but I'm saying that if we are talking about whether it's a realist or an anti-realist, And so, idealism or internal realism of Kant is not really incompletible. Then we need to delete the relationship between science and metaphysics seriously. In a way, Kant is all very ancient, but this is why I don't think it's fair to... Okay, it's fair if you have other reasons because if you just look at the problems of the theory itself, and the problem of realism in general, then you need to take two options, and there are just two, either you are anti-realist or a real and serious thing. And it seems to me that the anti-realist option just rests in a crucial way on the sort of neutrality about metaphysical issues, that there is an ambiguous role in the old tradition.

42:30 And I'm not saying that it's obvious that we should be off of the preemptive realism. In this talk I'm just saying that it is true that we have an established metaphysical perspective. And I think even I agree with Anzheimer on the need to have compelling reason to give up on this established metaphysical, which is not constant, just realism a lot of the problems. Then I don't really see a lot of things compared, of course, to something that I don't think about. I mean, there is another response to say, why should I have to give up to your content of the reason? Some structures are concerned about the entrenchment. It's almost as if you have this method that's been in place a couple of thousand years, and it's not clear that it actually works that well, and that's what we might disagree But somehow the structurist now has to find the own issues on the structurist to overcome 2,000 years of entrainment. And there is a view that, well, we need to forget, in a way, where the owner is, and actually just look at the two views in some kind of rational way. And in that respect, I think, in terms of what you said about the Bundle theory, of course, as I said before, it's not always clear that when, say, the old structure is give up on something. They're not just going over to some form of bundle theory. And I think that kind of, you know, bundle theory kind of structuralism, if you think of the bundle as involving not, and of course, as you know, there are different forms of bundle theories. If you take it very hard by admitting one so that every other is a bundle of monadic But if you have it included in the bundle relations, and in particular, if you have the kind of view that you think you like, kind of tropes there at this view, it's not clear to me that that's incompatible with a non-eliminative kind of structuralism. I think you're right, that might be the kind of thing that Simon Thornton is, in a sense, heading towards, although he would say it's not clear, you know, what it's, where, you know, it's still a form of structure in that, in a period of non-humanity, or, uh, time.

45:00 And I think that's where the, you might want to... about the precise definition of structuralism. I take it to be the first option, meaning that you only have relations, structure, in a way, in which they, and you have interrelatedness. Sure. I mean, no, in fairness, I am an advocate of the first option. I mean, the way that James is, look, I think, again, it comes back to the delineation of a position. What we always find is that there tends to be a spectrum. I mean, James' view is structuralism is any view that shifts, and this is very vague state that shifts the focus to the relation rather than the object, right? And he takes that to embrace both illimitivist and non-illimitivist. And what I'm saying is one can see a spectrum of non-illimitivist structures going over into the kind of sudden theory that you advocate. And Jan and I have argued about this over the years, and there are times when it just seems to be very different between the views. I think on the illimitivist view, and this answers one of your points, on the limited view, I don't have to give an account of the individuality or non-individuality of these nodes, because they're not the kind of thing for which one needs to give identity conditions, because they're not objects. On the non-limited view, they take these to be the kinds of things, and their identity conditions are cashed out in terms of structure, that's what the station is all you're trying to do. to do what you want me to do, because I don't see these nodes as objects, and therefore in that particular metaphysical character, a category to begin with. Well, as I said, I mean, that's a remark, a short suggestion, but I'm pretty sure that in some stages, you do think that objects are not completely dispensable, they're just shown to be delivered. But if you just claim that all there is a structure and nothing I think it's not there, then I agree with you that the question of whether they are individuals or not doesn't make sense. But if you say that objects live, although as derivative, from structure, then it seems to me that what Shapiro, for example, said is a different thing. Because he claims to say, I do have, by my dog, I do have individual numbers. I just want to say that everything that there is to say about the identity condition of this object is even in relation of them.

47:30 I think Shapiro's confused, and I think I'm unclear, but I have been unclear, and I think that's fair enough. But I always took the claim that the object, with the quote marks, the derivative, amounts to an unlimited explain. It's quite strange. I can't give an easy example of a moment, but... Well, this is very interesting, right? I think it would make a really...