Theorie quantique de l’objet (contd.)

0:00 I'm completely against the idea that quantum mechanics can be reduced to a trascendental constitution in the subjective sense of the term. When I talk about trascendental constitution, I'm talking about the experimental condition of the scientific path for humanity as we know it. I don't believe in the approach of trascendental without touching it. It's like coffee with caffeine. I would like to start by saying that we are talking about something very important, because we are talking about the popularity of science. And the whole point of this lecture has been to describe this popularity of science, so that we will be able to find it, in fact, through this conversation. I'm sorry to interrupt you. Yes, yes. But simply, I think that at the end, it's not more than that, What does singularity mean? If it is, I will call it an object, which is the object of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, of gravity, A certain number of universal operations. If you want, it's a way of speaking. When I say that this object is revolving around the axis in a certain way, I can translate this sentence by saying that this object is part of a certain way of the universal operation revolving around the axis.

2:30 And that, formally speaking, is really the way in which we do it. We have a... There is, there is, there is, as soon as we get to the standard, to the US, the standard, I mean, in the countries in which we are living, in the countries in which we are living, there is something more that is a certain distance between them. Well, here, I didn't talk about that, I don't know if I want to answer you, but there are several dimensions of mathematics that are completely mixed, right? First of all, there is an algebraic dimension. I talked about that. That is, the dose of the object must satisfy a certain algebraic constraint, which is that each property must be invariant with respect to the superimposition generated by the other. Then, there is the shift dimension. Why? Because this constraint imposes very strong shift constraints. In fact, what we infer as the shift of all this is a shift called the Pondy shift, which is only locally a classical or modern shift. That is to say, the logical structure that we can draw from this algebraic constraint is different from the classical one. So we have an algebraic dimension, we have a logical dimension, and finally I would say that we have a purely geometrical dimension. Because when I say an object is made like this, it has these properties here and not these properties there, I am trying to localize it in an impossible space. And this is not a metaphor. In mechanics, there is space. In classical mechanics, it is called space-space. In quantum mechanics, I can see it in space-space, I can see it in space-space, but there is always a spatial dimension in which I can quantify my object. I can say that this object is the object that occupies this place in this set of possibilities. And all the geometry that runs in quantum postulates is a very, very particular geometry. It is not a matter of localization.

5:00 I don't know if it's clear. There are several mathematical dimensions that intersect, no matter which branch of physics or mathematics it is. It's not only the sound, no. We have an algebraic dimension, we have a geometry dimension, which is very, very rich, and there is a logic dimension, which is... The strategy of the expedition was to focus on the direct connection between operations and objects, so it's really a logical level. Why do you choose to skim over, in the first place, even though it resurfaces afterwards, the dimension of the space propellant? The operations, in the end, each example goes back to that, it's the space transformations, the operations. And why don't you deploy, from the start, precisely... Geometric dimension of this thing, to then find the object. I have the impression that you want to start with a theory of the object. Why a logical theory of the object? Why does geometry come afterwards? Well, first of all, from the beginning I was talking about rotation, I was giving geometric images in that sense. But without thematizing space directly. But then there is another geometric dimension which is not the same, which is the dimension ... The geometric dimension in the sense that this object, as it is this object and not such and such, occupies a space in its possible space. This is an abstract space, which is not, unfortunately, the three-dimensional or multidimensional physical space. So there are two different geometric dimensions, right? One is the object as it moves in the three-dimensional space, in a way determined by its objective properties, So, the geometry that I didn't talk about is the last one. I didn't talk about the geometry of space-time. So, it's the first one that you don't know. We have the impression that the classical mechanics have a problem because you say that there is no theory of the object. Or that it is not consistent with the theory of the object. Yes. I think it's a theory of the object in every sense. And it's the quantum mechanics that actualizes, that solves the problems in relation to the classical mechanics.

7:30 No, but I had the impression that in the historical order of things, it was rather by deploying a new type of space-time, or rather the articulation of space and time, that this object theory was deployed. I believe that I am, I try to be very faithful to the idea that mechanics is a formalistic trait that does not support objects. And when we talk about space and time, we are already looking for objects, because in physics, space and time are objects. These are objects that are written by a particular type of library, and it's not something that comes... That's why I introduced time at the end, because it's not necessarily necessary when we talk about mechanics, we talk about space and time. We're talking about a system that can live in a space that doesn't have all the spatial and temporal connotations. Maybe for the operations, the operations of the physics, they are opened by... Yes, yes, here I suppose... ...the space allows... Yes, exactly. In fact, this concerns general relativity. In general relativity, space-time is an object and there is a position in a space after the position and in space-time there can be a quantity of moment in a space after the quantity of moment. But space and time do not come with the theory of the object. For example, I can try to apply the mechanics, I imagine that we do, to economic problems, where the variables that define objects are not variables with a temporal space realization. They are abstract entities that allow me to characterize them in a certain economic configuration. I don't know if we actually apply quantum mechanics to economics, but if we do, the variables that write the object in question are not variables with a temporal space signification. Jean-Claude, is there enough time to make the presentation accessible and that there would be a sort of language-based principle?

10:00 Of course, there are two impossibilities. One is the possibility of the translation. The impossibility of the translation. You could say that a work is being localized in a language, and so, as long as it is localized, it does not move. I would like to say the same thing. Yes, you can go to the campus. That would be excellent. In fact, I don't know. I imagine that we have reached this point in the sense that we have applied mathematical formalism to the problem of physics. I would like to continue with... because I... and it's really because of the need... I don't know if it's possible to calculate the specificity of the... And I also want to learn... I also want to learn from the small pieces... I heard you say that it is necessary to discover the unit of the object in an experimental protocol. That is, we cannot assume from the beginning that we have an object in front of us. That is, we cannot only talk about an object after we have made the protocol, after we have determined which properties of the object are compatible with each other. This is not necessarily the case. It depends on the experimental situation. There are experimental situations where we produce objects to study, and there are experimental situations where we have an effect with what we receive. For example, in the case of physics, astronomy, we receive things and we cannot produce the experimental conditions that we know. So it is not necessarily the case that we always produce what we observe.

12:30 Then, to determine what are the objectives of the objectives, because I insist, if that's the case, I can't ask a question, but if we can take a real data and say that there are things in this data that are non-objective, because they are products, or even they are things, I would say that, to know if there are things in a real data that are not products, because they are not products in... Transformation is performed by a universal idea. It means that there is a touch. Of course, it is necessary that there is something that we do not believe in. So, we have a touch. It is necessary that there is something that we do not believe in. A universal idea. I say, do we have a touch? I don't know. In the past, we didn't have a touch. But do we have a touch of a touch of my brain? That is to say, I would say that we move through our brain. No matter what I can say to our boss, It's either a product of objectives, or a product, or something between the two. So it's at these moments, when it's interrelated, that we talk about Unsharp Properties. Properties that are not quite definite, that are not quite objective. They are partially objective and partially non-objective. Unsharp. Unsharp means that it is not sharp. It is not well defined. So, indeed, we have seen less possibilities. This is an incredible wealth of knowledge, which forces us to generalize, of course, all this description in which I spoke only about the real objects and many things that are related to the complete understanding of this language, and which is quite consistent in this language. There is a retroaction between each type of variable. It is the matrix. It is quite at the beginning that it appears, and then we assume that it is inscribed.

15:00 Yes, of course, this is a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, a piece of paper, It's good to talk about the principles of traditional ancient epistemology and so on and so forth. So that was a problem, but to answer that question, he talked about generalization. I can't answer that. Indeed, I think I'm doing what I'm doing here. It doesn't come out of the physical room. That is to say, to understand what is the rational necessity of the ancient mechanism. It is a task specific to physics. So we can talk about natural philosophy, but it is a way of speaking. For me, there is nothing philosophical in everything I have just said. Nothing. It is really strictly, as a physicist, that I speak. Or I am, as a physicist, trying to understand a physical theory. And if a physicist does not understand what he is doing, that is to say, the task of understanding what a physicist is doing is a task specific and immanent to physics itself. Yes, I understand. Yes, that's why I prefer to talk about speculative physics or mathematical physics. That's exactly what I was talking about, that is, the place where we are going to discuss, in the sense that there are two points of view, if you will, it is not at all easy to manage to accept the opposite of the same gesture. A little bit of that is constituted, essentially, in a case that is not an academic one. It fits well, relatively well, when we would just ... There, movements can constitute complete transformations in the world of games, and therefore in the world of games, and therefore in the world of games, and therefore in the world of games,

17:30 I don't know if you agree with that or not, but what I'm trying to say is that the physical objects, as they appear in the experimental conditions of physics, as we know them in Schopenhauer, are subject to this kind of purely conceptual interpretation. But at least from that point of view, I don't agree that they are not the same thing. It's a very bad local work. We can provide a conceptual explanation of quantum mechanics that makes it natural from a conceptual point of view. And that, in my opinion, if we get to the text, it will not be very effective. Because in general, we have this idea that quantum mechanics, we understand it very well, and quantum mechanics, we understand it very well, and quantum mechanics is a bit mysterious, incomprehensible. In fact, my view is that it is exactly the opposite. Quantum mechanics is very clear, because we can say a well-defined theory of the object. However, when we move on to classical mechanics, the problem begins, the chronicle begins to work. I do not understand classical mechanics, I do not know how to interpret it, but I do not know of generalisms in that sense. And I only know physics. Thank you for watching this video, I hope you enjoyed it. All of these terms are used in daily life. But I started with a description that I adopted from Foucault. It's a completely phenomenological description. I only see the properties. There are always things that you don't see. But which I can access from certain operations. There are only properties, but there is always something that is missing in the properties. The series of properties. That's all? Yes. And all the terminology that Foucault developed in his life is not what it is.

20:00 And what is the absence, in the sense of terminology? What is missing? The one that lasts a little longer. But that, I am a bit in my reflection. Because, as I said, when I see an object, I see only its profile. So there are things that I do not see, but which I can have access to from certain operations. And that's what makes it so. There are always operations that allow you to advance in this projected horizon as much as possible. Yes, there is a place for that. There is a place that has changed. But it's not that, it's just history. No, it's not the people of the world, it's always history. Yes, that's the question. It's just that the cube of the face is not the cube of the face. It's not the cube of the face. It's not always the cube of the face. It's always the cube of the face. But it's the same thing. It's the same thing. It's the same thing. What is the definition of a complete object? Yes, because there is a definite number of profiles. But if there is a definite number of profiles... Let's say that there is never a complete definition of an object. I would not like that. There is something that, for a complete definition... An object perceived. Yes, precisely. It is all perceived in mathematics. And the fact that we cannot have a complete definition of an object. In the sense that... This is a completely phenomenological lecture, it's an object, it's too much, what doesn't move doesn't change, it's radical. Yes, but what allows us to teach an object over time is that there are things that make us believe. That's what allows us to determine and identify and recognize an object. This object is always there. That's why I said at the beginning that identity is a category of objectivity.

22:30 There would be no objectivity if there was no identity. No entity without identity. That's a scientific point of view. You called that a test that can't be manipulated, that has changed. Well, obviously, I don't know. But we could totally... I'm trying to be rational here. Do you think it's important to have a chain of theories, not just a chain but a fabric, not just a base? In my opinion, with modern physics, from the beginning with the idea of a book and all that, I don't think we can make a difference between classical Newtonian physics and quantum and relativist physics. It's a completely different question. I think there is an essence of modern physics, which is the origin of modernity, but then I think it is not legitimate to say that there are two paradigms as measurable, the classical physics on one side and the quantum mechanics on the other, and that I think it is a really... I would say that quantum and relativistic physics is only an accomplishment of physics as it has been created by Copernicus, Newton, and Hegel. But precisely the physics that makes us realize that there is an answer. Of course. All that I am trying to say is retrospective. Yes, that's it.

25:00 Yes, exactly. But it's not the basis of the stories you are talking about. The classical mechanics is an over-determined theory. It over-determines these objects. Yes, we say too much, but that doesn't mean that it's not correct. Yes, but that's what happens in quantum mechanics, right? In classical mechanics, we have the quantity of moments and the position. In quantum mechanics, we have to stay either with one or with the other. We have to reduce things. And I'm trying to explain to humanity that this translation is quite consistent from a rational point of view. It's necessary. It's not that we discovered that the world is quantum, but it could have been very classical. It's really, it's not very quantum. Well, in fact, there is a whole other chapter that I will go through completely, because there is also this question which is, what is the relationship, once we have the quantum mechanics, what is the relationship, what is the consistency of the fact that the macroscopic objects, macroscopics, with the hedonist-archivist, are classic objects, right? So that, there is all that is called the classic limit of the quantum mechanics, which is, well, how can we understand that the macroscopic physics is classic, even if the fundamental physics is quantum? That's a big problem. This is the canonical way to understand the relationship between quantum and classical. We have the quantum, so we must explain how it is possible in a classical object. What I was trying to do was to follow the same path. We will start with the classical mechanics and we will try to understand why the world could never be really classical. Why is it inconsistent with the classes? From a mathematical point of view, not from a mathematical point of view, but from the point of view of a kind of purely conceptual rationality. The theory of equivalence is a theory of the electricity and the electricity of the earth.

27:30 And the fact that, let's say, in Lyon, the different processes of electricity, of course, do not have the same properties, All of these terms produce objective effects. They are effects of interference. Yes, absolutely. So it is clear that our concepts are also simply the whole of the system. Yes, but that is the idea with these two. These two, with a position in each phase, are an object in the form of a superposition of different positions. Then, there is the phenomenon of the poles of this superposition, which is the phenomenon of interference. We can say all that I said using the terminology of superposition. In English, in English a novel here is a superposition of the past, in the superposition. You have to use this metaphor here to understand what I'm saying. No, not at all, no, not at all, I never said that. It's always, when I analyze a theory, it's always a differential analysis that serves a neutral theory. I'm trying to say that I think we can understand why quantum mechanics is a more satisfying theory from the point of view of rationality vis-à-vis of classical mechanics. Of course, it's... It's possible that it's... Yes, but I think that in quantum mechanics, as well as in classical mechanics, there is something of the order of a mythic truth. There is really... there is... we don't have a part. There is a differentiated relationship between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. It's a problem, yes. It's a much more successful transformation. And that, of course, does not mean that there are no people in the quantum mechanics who will not be united to a transformation soon. But it's still... No, no, no, it's still... It's really a local work. It's a modest work, right? The differences between theories. We can do the same thing with general relativity. The point of view of the pure rationality. It does not have anything to do with general relativity, which I have already explained. But we can understand the differential relationship with the gravitation of the two. Sir, for example, one of the points of view is that there are no effects. It is a matter of jouissance.

30:00 In mathematics, yes. There is a jouissance anyway. So I just wanted to talk about the traces. Certainly, because that was a bit... I think that what Lacan calls the logic of the phantom, where there is this sort of object that is face to face with a small object A, which in a certain way supports the consistency of the object, because it produces separations that are useless. These are some of the things that I've just mentioned. It's really, in a certain way, what I've just said. An object is something whose consistency depends on a nucleus that we call a dose, and generates a transformation that is useless. Because it's a phantasmatic transformation, it doesn't change the object. So that's why I used Moulet, it's the same thing, but it's too subjective. The subject of the subject of the subject, because it seems to me, you make an impression, you say, well, in fact, the object is only a way of being determined, or a way of determination by the subject of the subject. And then you say, but in fact, this way is determined by the object. But it is an object that is only determined by that. And so, there you miss, in fact, you presuppose it, this kind of object's irreductibility. I think that the object is determined only by its relation, the way in which universal operations enter the object. You assume that there is something in the object as singularity that determines this ingression, but in fact the object is not determined by the ingression. And so I feel that you assume the object as a function of singularities that are below the object determined by the new operation,

32:30 but in fact I see that it is exactly the same operation that denounces Deleuze in the introduction. In the first chapter, we will introduce a little bit more of the great singularities. And so the problem is that, although you arrive at a singularity that is determined only by the participation in universal associations, so the singularity is not determined. And so if you ever find an object that has the same determination as ours, you have the problem of jumbo objects. There is no singularity of objects that can be determined in this way, because it is a conceptual and categorical way. The two are at the other end of the chain, and the chain has the problems of the mode of being of the universal operations, because they are not objects. And that's what the two denounce, they are not experts. The categories are not... in any case, they are just... Will you talk about the problem of differentiation of the operations? How do you manage to differentiate the operations of a thread? What are the objects in the thread, but which ones are in the head? In the end, we may have to go back to the technique. In the end, the objects are two of the other. The entities that play the role of those who have the ideas are two of the other. So anthropology is ultimately the country of the sensors? But precisely, one of the problems is that if the object is determined in advance by the universal operations, you cannot suppose the object before its determination. You cannot say then that the operations are determined by a kind of sense of the object, because the object is also determined by the universe. Yes, precisely. At a certain moment, I say that there are two ways of characterizing an object. There is a way, which is by its owner. It's the singularity in French, not the object, I think. And then there is another way of saying that this object is not another because it is part of a certain sort of universal relation. But in fact, I proposed in Portuguese that it is precisely a mix of two things. It is said that it is one and the same thing. Yes, but that's exactly what I was asking about. There is no such thing as an object that is only a subjective property, which is not a property. There is no singularity of objects. All that determines the object is a certain relationship between objective properties and profiles.

35:00 So it's the difference that determines the object. But this difference is a conceptual difference between two groups that don't work in a continuous way. They are two discrete categories. And so the five dualities of the object can only determine them conceptually. The singularity is missed because it is taken in the generality of the concept. And here I only make you take the analyst and the gambler. Yes, maybe what is true is that there is a relationship between the singularity of the object and the universality which is often interlocked. An object is a singular object because it realizes in a singular way. But you can't define this singularity, you can't define what this singularity is according to which it determines or actualizes the universal. I can't define it without referring to the possibility of universal operations. That's the problem with classical mechanics. In classical mechanics, we talk about properties but we don't define what a property is. But in any case, the question is whether an object is a universal object or not. Well, in the case of mechanics... In the case of quantum mechanics, it's like that, yes. So the singularity of the object is presupposed, in fact. And what you find behind, I don't know anything about quantum mechanics, but in the sense of Penrose, you find atoms, absolutely identical objects, but which differ only by numbers. But the principle is the same. In fact, this is another problem, because the part of the differentiation of the numerical objects is the space, and as I understand the question of Elodie, there is something ontological in the space in this planet that is missing, but not only methodological, because what supports the difference between objects that participate in the same way and perhaps in the same universal operations, Or they are all the same objects, they are two objects that are not different, they do not differ because the properties are the same object, and that is the initialism, the initial popularity. Or they are different, but the practice of differentiation is spatial, and they are just numerically different, they are two.

37:30 But there is a practice of differentiation of differences that is not understood. So, here, differentiation is not a numerical difference, it's a differentiation that comes from properties. Yes, but if you have two subjects... The subjects are different because they are different properties, not because they are two. So, two subjects that have the same properties and the same percentage of participants in the properties are the same subject? Yes. That's why, in order to introduce a purely numerical difference in this sense, we have to introduce... But then, I come back to the problem. Yes, exactly, that's what I came back to, yes, exactly, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came back to, that's what I came But the properties are general properties, that's what I mean, that is, it is the only point of intersection of properties, that's it, but as it is only defined by general properties, then there is no singularity of the object. And here I answer the question of the student who asked himself where is the singularity of the object? I feel that there is something that is unbearable, and then there are the problems of the mode of being and the properties of the universe. I would like to translate your question by saying that we can reduce physics to mechanics, as I have just described it. And indeed, there is a branch of physics that I do not know about. What we call linear dynamics, which is precisely a part of physics that studies the processes of temporal evolution of physical systems that cannot be accessed by the mechanical apparatus. In terms of technical terms, it is said that there is no Hamiltonian evolution of these systems. There is no evolution in terms of a generator of an evolution. So, the object is not general if it is not a toic and the object is physical in general. Is it just an object that thinks? No, it's the mechanical object, if you will. Okay. It's the mechanical object. Indeed, there is a whole range of physics that exceeds the mechanical in this sense.

40:00 And maybe even he was inspired by this. I have a question, I don't know if it will interest you, but a word on what is an object in the linguistics. We can think of it as a language, a term, it's a subject... There are several definitions of the system, but there are also paradoxes. For example, if two are totally different, they never appear in the mathematical theory, it is precisely because, on the one hand, they never appear in the same place, but on the other hand, the fact that they are totally different aspects of quantum physics does not mean that it is the same object that we trust. It's just that, in fact, it's a way of defining the object based on the generality, the idea, the concept of defining the object. It's a way of... I mean, that's what Dijon knows. I would say that this theory satisfies the principles of St. Bernard de Lémy. If there are objects that are different, it's probably because the localization of a property is different. There are no differences that do not come from properties. Okay. In fact, let's say... This is what denounces the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual. It's a way of saying what you say, I understand. And any difference between conceptual and non-conceptual, in the field of mathematics, if you wish, does not have to do with physics. There are differences that are precisely for the interpretation of the singularity of the object. Thank you for your attention.

42:30 I would like to ask you if you have any thoughts on this topic. Yes, of course. I insist that I do not make any declarations. It is still a very localized work. We will try to understand what is the internal logic, and how it appears from here, what is happening from here, and how it arrives in the second year. Of course, it is a question that has nothing to do with science. What I want to say is that, by looking, we are not in a state of inertia. Non-contextual information, as well as non-contextual information, can be found in the French alphabet, which is the same as in the Chinese alphabet. And yes, the French alphabet is precisely the same as the mathematical alphabet. It has nothing to do with the French alphabet. You can't find it in the French alphabet. In fact, if you find it in the French alphabet, you can also find it in the French alphabet. But when you think of the French alphabet as the first alphabet, the French alphabet is the first alphabet to be derived from the mathematical alphabet. For a determination of what is missing in this conceptual vision of determinism. So, it's just an inverse mask. It's maybe the same. There, it's a mixture of the two. It's the mecanicality that manages to give what is missing there.