Frege, Russell & F.o.M (contd.)

0:00 He often categorizes Frege's project as showing that arithmetic is analytic. That's how Frege categorizes it in the Gould argument. Interestingly, it hasn't always been recognized, but it does. After the Gould argument, Frege never talks about arithmetic being analytic. He never describes the project as one of showing that arithmetic is analytic. The Gould concepts result that the term doesn't appear. And so on and so forth. So what is the idea? In the good logic, you see, the other important thing, to bear in mind, you don't understand the framework, in the good logic, you don't distinguish between Z, the deuterium, you use the pretty much synonymous, he distinguishes Z in the deuterium. He wasn't using it in our comparison. He simply distinguishes Z in the deuterium. But at the time he introduced the counter-futures, he doesn't. So his thought on mathematics, it kind of trades on. But the idea is this. We're trying to give an account of number terms. So we want to be concerned with identity states, qualities, or a glass shell. So we want to give an account of that. Can we give an account of that? For Frege, we define that through that. We define numbers. It's one in which the epistemological of numbers and the sense of number terms.

2:30 And we understand the sense of number terms. There are sentences in which numbers don't appear through an abstraction, so we understand that, since that's equivalent, we thereby understand that, and so we thereby understand that it's an interesting combination of the compositional perception and the interpretive perception kind of coming together. We interpret that as that. So if we understand that, then he says, this is the key, we must, if we understand that, if we understand that, we must also understand the number of x as being a singular term and as having a pedeutical. So basically what he's saying in the Ruhl diagram is that in understanding the sense of this, we understand the pedeutical parts. If he doesn't make that distinction, he's a good luck. So he thinks he's got it all, it's all better to make law. But of course it isn't, because the possibility of a contextual definition, which you see with Russell Stead's description, suggests that you can give an account of the sense of sentences without supposing that the logic is that even parts of the sentences themselves have other properties. So that possibility, the Russell Stead description... If you like, made explicitly the first time, there's a problem in this repository, just one paper I've written, and it's a failure to run exactly what I think you'd say, which is to count it as a problem. The concept of the crisis is more than just a concept, it's a glycemic system. Yeah, that's just a kind of informal new stage of shit like, there is a one, yeah, you can take it with a circle, an idea of one.

5:00 Define that for me. At some level, in compositional maths, there really are elements. So it has an action role. You deny it, because abstraction is a whole idea. You start from objects in one domain, you find a group of suppression, and then you abstract them into a whole. That idea just isn't there anymore. He recognises that Russell talks about mathematics, which he talks about, and he doesn't use the word himself. But there is an important group where he discusses and then kind of rejects it. Exactly. He rejects the idea of abstraction. Why couldn't one look for his method of method of abstraction? Absolutely. In fact, interestingly, the other statement point is Russell, who said it actually isn't the method of abstraction, really, it's the method of dispensing with abstraction.

7:30 Differently phrased across them all mean the idea of alternative analysis. The crucial myth is something I've argued and people recognise. A whole range of these ideas come from his use of function arguments. If anyone's interested, I've got a paper I can leave a copy of, or a paper I've written. But the key idea of the analysis, the idea that comes from a function argument, is that two different functions can yield the same values over different arguments. You know, just a simple example of that is so helpful. Yeah, you threw out there in the tens list. You can take 7 and add 3, or you can take weight. So you can represent one and the same thing, on the same value, using a bunch of different parameters. Applied to the case of concepts, of propositions then, you have the idea that one and the same proposition, like impulse, can be analysed in different ways. This was absolutely crucial to Frege. Throughout his life he had this idea... The same proposition of, not the most appropriate word to use in the framework, but the in-house observing work or the thought in its later work, the sense of sense, can be multiply analysed and provided there is no such thing as an ultimate analysis. Whereas for Russell there is. Here is the example of the framework in section 9 of the book. The person is lighted and carved up. He says you can analyse that. The object is lighted and carved up. You obtain carved art. It's the same in-house. And to my degree, there's something that these two states have in common. They have the same concept. You analyze a hydrogen response, okay, but doesn't that presuppose a more optimal analysis? Something like Michael Dunlap has suggested there are, there's a notion of decomposition, there's a notion of a version of analysis.

10:00 There's an ultimate analysis into hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and the relationship. So on that basis, then you can talk about a concept that's lighter than hydrogen. You can analyze that into either the relation of converse is lighter than or is heavier than or is lighter than So even in this supposedly fundamental element, there are two possibilities. So, precisely on this issue, when they represent the same proposition, two different analyses of one and the same, Russell's term for it. If A is greater than B, and B is less than A, are the same propositions, you have to maintain that both the greats enter into each of these propositions, which seems obviously false. I don't get it. A proposition is literally composed of its constituents. So if you're considering the proposition, the constituents are the higher is lighter than. If you take the proposition, the carbon dioxide is heavier than iron. There are two different relationships, they can't both meet in the same position, the same is identical from the logical, from the syntaxical point of view. It's so important. I don't agree with you. The proposition is itself a complex of entities. In this case, two objects and a relation.

12:30 And this is part of it, to go back to the idea that relations were real. If they're real, in which case you can't have both relations. But the obvious way out, just to say that if you just cut that way, right, that, say, A less B, that there's just linguistic, kind of linguistic surface, right, and we should talk about prepositions, kind of more abstract sense. Absolutely, absolutely. But what I want to do here is just... Despite lots of similarities between Frege and Rasmus, they have quite different conceptions of analysis. For Frege, his views sit aptly with the claim that everything can be mathematically analysed. One and the same content can be wrote differently. Unique optical analysis. What strives him is the idea that there is some unique optical analysis which he has to find, which was never in Frege. One often curbs Frege's sayings. It doesn't sit comfortably with you, Fred, at all. It's not with you. Why? Because it's one of the functionalities of analysis. That's really what we're trying to say. In other words, analysis, when you think of analysis as mechanistically neutral, you have, let's say, a simple decomposition, you just take something, you just break it into bits. And nonsense if you like. We interpret it in some way into a framework that disconstrains the process of analysis and what we count as legitimate as will result in the analysis of the humanity of it. It's a complicated story.

15:00 As I said, what's interesting in this period is that in 1900, he was early Mario Eberhardt, influenced by Bohr, he has this kind of decompositional concept, he then had his famous book, he takes on Bohr and the use of project logic, gradually as he uses the unknown logic, he starts to reflect on, as he writes a couple of pieces, on what is a function. He distinguishes actually two conceptions of analysis. One, his conception, composition analysis, where you like, you know, in Russell's terms, you decompose a composition, sorry, into like an object, a compositional function. You have a sentence, you take out the name, and you have a compositional function. So you have Socrates as a man, you take out Socrates, and you have him as a man. That's a compositional function. He says that's a different form of analysis, that compositional functions are not literally parts of a composition. So what you're doing in gaining the functionality of mathematics is just indicating the time of propositions. This can be seen as an instance of the time system. And, you know, after that, he doesn't need to make that, but it's easy to see how taking a conflict gives you the carbon.

17:30 So we take the hydrogen as a carbide, and instead we take the hydrogen as a carbide, and it's like... But I think what happens is that that idea is generalized. If you think back to the counter-Hughes principle abstraction, The same idea there, although it's not strictly speaking to alternative and functional algorithms as one and the same content, the idea that the content can be analysed in a different way remains, and I think there's a certain suggestion there, and it's like what's happening is that not just that we get concept formation, if you think of abstraction for instance, we also get a kind of object formation. To be more exact, we get object recognitions and straight things that the objects and the concepts are already there. There's a certain avenue in which concept words, their sense, and their reference. What he calls a concept is actually a deuteronomy. So he doesn't talk about concept formation in his later work, because there's no such thing. Concepts are just given, like objects. All you can do is recognize them. Or the sense of the concept. Sense formation. So Strictly speaking, what he says is object recognition. So abstraction, for instance, will be seen by what we call abstraction. We see Bifredo as principles that give us object recognition, so in an abstraction from one object to another, through an abstraction, we start with understanding the sense of the sentence, we've got referring to objects in equivalence relation, through the abstraction principle, we get objects of some other kind, but in that recognising object, as I said, I'm going to go over the Russian tables, where we have the Russian state of the phrase, the state of the sentence in five, the function f has the same value as the function g. If you like, since concepts are functions, the truth of that is, an instance of that is the corresponding case of concepts. If two concepts apply to the same object, then they're extensions, let's say.

20:00 Okay, then you could run out. Then, if extensions are objects in the original domain, then they're not, for which there is the need not to recognize that this is indeed an abstraction principle. That's a paradox. You said that the scenario in your car is a paradox. It's not the same thing you said with me. In fact, no, the problem is that the extensions are seen as objects in the domain. But isn't the case that actually you always think about kind of universal domain like all objects? Exactly. Yeah, yes. So that is solution for you. No, I don't think there is nothing wrong with that. There need be nothing wrong with that. No, I think it is wrong. There are a lot of good abstractions, but I think the problem with Frank is that he just treats them as being universal. And any object that you introduce by an abstraction principle is already there in the original. But I mean, in my opinion, yeah, in my term, it's expensive. Intersection is written by a good father. It's not the same thing that says that it is useful. For example, I think there are other problems. Yeah, the issue for Frege then is that, and this is something that he, that in a sense also reflects the kind of tension that I've identified between the status of such a principle, which we've got, he says, when he introduces it, in the good life, he made the good with that, he's actually very cagey about whether it actually has to say, he wants to say it has to say in the doctrine, and vice versa, vice versa.

22:30 If you say, depending on the order of the criteria and the sense, then the best criteria one can offer is that they come out with having different senses, which one can, if you like, grasp the sense of one without necessarily grasping the other. It has the same ontological commitments as that of movements, and you actually introduce them. But if they actually are introducing objects of some different kind, then really this has different ontological, it has different sense, in which case you can't really see the least difference. This issue about if the form raises issues. I couldn't give you lots of other things to say about that in the street. Could you tell me what you mean by the number zero? They're not going to say, they've read some framework.

25:00 So you kind of say they can't. The sense of the number zero is used by them. It's not the same as the sense of the exception context. So the other question is this notion of explication as used by Kahn at Bridge 5. Quasi-analysis is really getting to what's really there, and quasi-analysis is the whole story of the problem. But just briefly, as a matter of fact. Where is the inquiry? Oh, the notion of explication. On what there is, as an example, in Woollock Object, where he was talking about explication, he takes that notion of explication from Karnak. Karnak uses the logistic definition. We can come to a conclusion. We recognise this now. When Michael Dover wrote his first book on Frager's philosophy of language, it had nothing to do with it.

27:30 Looking back, the great man Michael Dover is, I might say the greatest living philosopher, the great man Michael Dover is, is just extraordinary. I find him extraordinary in the Frager's world. Of course, he thought he was going to write a book very soon that gave the other side of the book. But to separate a book like that, no one would do that. These are the ones that we've been driving. Let me end with a mildly hearty piece. I think Marco may be the only one who knows this. My main interest is the history of Amethyst Cross. What's happened over the last ten years is that Amethyst Cross has been conceptualized as a historical period. The history of Amethyst Cross is now seen as a bona fide historical period, just like early modern or ancient. And this, in fact, I'm editing the Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytics and Philosophy, which I think is a sign that even though you pity Oxford now recognising this is where people are working, it's now in the status of one of their research areas, where people say, I'm interested in learning more, people will now say, this has only happened in the past 10 years, I'm interested in the history of analytics and philosophy, so I'm interested in that. And it's interesting because analytics and philosophy arose when Canada was strong, so there's lots of interesting issues about that. And here's just a wonderful, which I would say is the most ironic misprint in the history of philosophy. It's a challenge to see if you could ever come up with a better misprint in the history of philosophy than this. You know, there's the front page of Frege's main work, Kugels et Zerbe, which he said, Begrüsch ist nicht abgeleitet, right? Derived by means of his begrüsch. Those are the basic rules of arithmetic derived by the ancient logic of logic. That's the original. In 1998 there was a reprint of this and with a new front page. And this is what it says. Google said to me, I think, Begriff geschicht. Begriff geschicht. Begriff geschicht is history of concept.

30:00 So this will be derived by a use of the history of concepts. This is absolutely wonderful because in Frank's life, particularly in the Introduction to the Good Life, Frank denies that there's any such thing as perverse geschichte, having to be a history of concepts just given, that could be no such thing as a derivation of his life back into conceptual history. Oh, can one imagine what happened? There was this German copy editor, his Begrüßtrichter. Let me know such a word. It must be Begrüßtrichter. That's a proper German word. It's only been said for this week. Begrüßtrichter. It's just wonderful. It's a wonderful term for this week. There is something in the idea of Begrüßtrichter. There is something. In that sense, what I'm doing is a kind of Begrüßtrichter. I actually like it. I like it. See if you can come up with something better. Okay. I think you are just perfectly right just tracing this issue of paraphrasing and interpretation, but I actually have two very general questions about that. It is a thing I am interested in myself. And one thing, how much, say, historically can we find something in Frege or Russell thematizing that somehow, stressing, or just these people just take it for granted, this idea? You already mentioned hard enough with explication. Yeah. But what we can, and the second even problem, more general question, what, I mean, what follows? If we really take seriously this, say, need of interpretation, what you call interpretive analysis, would it mean that, say, some theory of interpretation should, say, accompany or probably even precede this kind of logical analysis, what normally is referred to as logical analysis, or should it be accomplished with... By the way, I know about one publication, probably, you know, a book where Nabokov and Klein published under the same cover, for example, and it was a book published in 50s in New York on translation. Yeah, yeah, and there, I think, there were some...

32:30 Some discussions about that, but probably you could mention something in earlier history. Oh yes, one thing I did mention actually is that, let me find some quotes. Actually, if you're interested in different quotes, I mean, there's lots I've established, but in the revised version of the Instruction on Psycho-Theoretical Analysis, I've added a whole section, lots and lots of different quotes from different people about analysis. It's about seven pages long itself. Why recently? Yes, in 1975, so I'm trying to drop it at the end of it. Quite himself knows a connection, I don't think I mentioned this, knows a connection with Jeremy Bentham's idea of paraphrase. Jeremy Bentham in the 19th century introduced this notion of paraphrasing. He designated that sort of exposition to be afforded by transmuting into a proposition. Having for its subject some weird education which is not for its subject any other than the fictitious. Benton used this as an analysing way. You know, we might attempt to divide the world for the day on which we're obligated that there are these things here. But he wouldn't say no. You can analyse the way you talk about it in such a way that you don't have to do it.

35:00 So what I want to do is precisely see the connection between Benton's original notion of power phrases and Russell's theory of descriptions. In the 1930s, he was reflecting on this process of what's going on in interpretation, or interpretation and analysis in the history, yeah, interpretation and analysis. Here, there's a possible final turning point. You know, we're talking about very good turning points. One is the shift in terms of sentences. And he said, many people have notions in macro-mathematics. Well, a phrase from one of his other ones. But it's a contemporary job known to talk. The applied contextual definition of the term can be applied even to some genuine terms, such as the grammatical ones, such as conjugation. If you find some terms inconvenient or ontologically embarrassing, the contextual definition enables you, in some cases, to continue to enjoy the services of the term while disclaiming its denomination. Again, this is the key idea. It is a quaint, reputable, inventive and genuine idea. The analytic process starts with the general analysis, precisely because such a distinction was explicitly distinguished by people right in the 90s. They distinguished between broadly logical analysis, as they called it, or same-level analysis. You should be offering a pathway on same-level analysis. And reductive or mental, or new-level analysis.

37:30 So that's important. The reductive elements are criticized. It's a straightforward set of concepts, both logical and mathematical. He thinks there's a real logical form, which is the Tau-Tau, but he then rejects that idea. But he's still at the logical analysis. There's been, in a large extent, a rejection of reductive metaphysical conceptual analysis. So the obvious question is, well, then, are we at the most analytic age? And of course we're not, because the analytical process still seems to be thriving and flourishing. The question is, well, why are humans really rejected? The answer, as before, is that it's far more subtle. There's lots of concepts. And the reductive concept of this problem, at least not of the modern type, you know, in a certain case, but the logical one is to lie as well, so it's to simply paraphrase away. We have one user's language in a certain misleading way. The right way to show this is to offer a different one. So, I think this has never had sense. No, no, absolutely not. Oh, I know! In that sense, yes. John Bartlett was a very tame Asian, which he quoted him, where you would see problems. So, if you dismiss the arithmetic theory, what is the argument? Well, if one's following all the law, and some of them are all being anguished, one would say, really, logical analysis doesn't quite mean... Well, there are various forms of one which have different purposes.

40:00 So it's not what you're giving out is the claim that there is one single logic that will give you the underlying logical form. What do you refer to as the main task for logical analysis and uncoupled from that physical one? Well, the example that I used at the beginning, we might get into confusions about the sense, meaning of number statements, existential statements. We offer a paraphrase that shows that we're not committed to what might come to surface. So, in my opinion, when one uses language, there's an apparent ontological commitment that the logical analysis that it shows isn't necessary. So one diffuses and analyzes away those ontological commitments to push the question of what are they. Yes, that can be done. So here's the interesting part, I think, is he recognises that analysis is something different to chaos. This is because of the investigation. An investigator is therefore, such an investigator shares his life with other people by clearing his understanding of them. His understanding of them is the same as the use of words, something by certain analogies. Some of them can be removed by substituting one more of them. This may be more than enough. It's like you recognize it, but also you still have it, you still don't want to rephrase it by saying it's now something different.

42:30 So now, again, you don't say there's something like it. So a single belief you don't want to rephrase, you say there's something in it. Very short question. One thing is that our state of the world is very similar to that of India. We come back to the regular mathematics itself, and something very similar to the composition, because the idea of analytical analysis is exactly the same as the use of the product development. And here we use one object over another object. The regular algorithm is the kind of analysis that would have a role in looking at the analysis.

45:00 The story that I tell is a story in which you have two fundamental forms of mathematics, physics, and quantum mechanics being told in all sorts of bizarre ways throughout history, and you have the method of diaries, which also goes back to the Socratic definition, which we want to say is that what we've got is a set of problems, but they happen to come together anyway. I actually see two groups. We're talking about what we mean by analysis. Two basic groups. One is, just to crack a definition, discourse. The Greek level of analysis isn't used for that, but gradually over time it is, and you have any Greek job in there, the Greek level of analysis is used, but gradually it kind of drops out of the concept of analysis, so there's actually a very complicated story to be told about that. I mean, for example, in Plato, the word analysis was singular class. Thank you for your attention.