Michael Friedman Philosophical & Formal Foundations of Physics, Les Treilles 2007
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Recorded at Philosophical & Formal Foundations of Physics, Les Treilles (2007), featuring Michael Friedman. From the Michael Wright Collection, held by the Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy.

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mw0000166-cc-b
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Michael Wright Collection
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Archive Trust for Research in Mathematical Sciences & Philosophy
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0:00 There just is no other way to do gravity at the time that's anywhere near as good. For example, I mean, there were other attempts to deal with gravity, of course, at the time. Yeah, but the thing behind is... Yeah, okay. Well, we'll continue. We'll continue. The last question, and go to the short story. Yes, I completely agree with your perspective. And I have a question concerning the role of mathematics in general life. So in parallel, there is a double aspect of your cognitive one associated to the specific structure of our faculties and the constitutive one. So, we have generalized the constitutive aspect of theory. But we have disjoint it from the cognitive aspect, the exception itself. But in that case, we lose any cognitive root of Hanselman's calisthenics into spatial intuition, through spatial intuition, in which self-sense point. So, we have to do something. There is a key point. Because we need Hanselman. Yes, my opinion is that it is mathematics and sophisticated mathematical which substitutes for intuition in the general idea of the second time. And with this hypothesis, we have shown, and you have shown, I have shown, and others have shown, that you can be a very convincing formulation, transcendental formulation of the general relativity, conduct theory, etc., etc. So, for me, the point is the following. You know the celebrated note of the paragraph 26 of the critique of Buddhism? Yes, where Kant explains that in physics and science, forms of intuition or pure intuition become form of mind intuitions, which are geometrically undermined.

2:30 And my hypothesis is that in a generalized transcendentalism, this remains. Formal intuitions remain. But the pure intuitions, the forciation, the pure peer, we have only formal intuitions. John, I'm surprised to hear you say that, because I took the thrust of the first part of your remark to be, in order to be genuinely transcendental, we also have to have this connection to our experience and our perception. We do have to have this connection. Is it impossible? No, I don't think so. I don't think so. So, it was a clash. Yes, but, Madame. Yes, it seems that way. It seems that way, and for a long time I've crossed that too. However, partly through talking to my colleague Tom Reichman I had to become a servant. Exactly. Exactly. So I had I had to become a moral servant. Perhaps not enough. Perhaps Tom would think not enough yet. But I think it is important still. Of course, in that paragraph 26 26 Kant is precisely connecting perception, what he calls the synthesis of apprehension with, as you rightly said, formal intuition which is, as he says, at least as an example, what we actually need in geometry. Is there a way in what way? I don't remember. So, for Kant it's relatively easy. Again, back to your question, Paul, because the exact scientific experience is not very distant, it's just but a little bit more precise than the ordinary perception. Now, this is why it looks so bad. You get to general relativity and you say, look, this thing is completely unintuitive, right? This just has nothing to do with our perception. But that can't be right. It can't be right that it has nothing to do with our perception because, after all, we do have perceptions and experience that we take to test general relativity. So general relativity has to be related to the Lebensmelds.

5:00 much as it is otherwise there's no such thing as as observably testing it so what i think what i think you have to do is you have to look at the at the frames of reference that as it were defined the laboratory frame you see how those are generalized you have inertial frames then you have local inertial frames in general relativity okay so you have a sequence of of of idealizations of the notion of a frame of reference which is still linked to our perception in a concrete laboratory frame of reference but it becomes further and further by a series of successive approximations from the ordinary Lebensfeld but this is just like what Husserl says about geometry in the crisis so that's how I would try to make a condition there you go I haven't died, I think I will invite you. There you go.